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Abstract 
In 2012 Tullow Oil plc discovered commercial quantities of crude oil onshore Kenya. 
Additional commercial discoveries have subsequently been made and estimates suggest that 
Kenya’s oil reserves are substantial. Steps towards the development and production of these 
reserves are progressing and Kenya is thus preparing to become another of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s oil-exporting states. Nevertheless, experience has shown that the majority of these 
resource-rich states have succumbed to symptoms of the ‘resource curse’: economic and 
human development and growth has been hindered rather than helped and many of these 
states find themselves struggling to escape from the clutches of rent-seeking, bribery and 
corruption.  
In an attempt to determine how best Kenya might avoid the negative impacts of the curse this 
study examines various strands of resource curse theory. It focuses on theories that suggest 
the promotion of good governance through the implementation of effective transparency and 
accountability measures can help a state to beat the curse. Following a discussion about 
Kenya’s political culture and an overview of the structure of its oil and gas sector, this study 
applies these theories to the case of Kenya in order to ascertain how transparent its oil and 
gas sector is currently, what it stands to gain from further transparency and accountability, 
and what barriers might stand in the way.  
This study concludes that whilst the Kenyan government and international oil companies 
operating in Kenya offer rhetorical support for the promotion of effective transparency and 
accountability, this rhetoric is not matched in practice. Kenya’s oil and gas sector is 
characterised by opacity and its reform is currently in limbo. The primary reason for this 
appears to be a lack of government will to implement change: Kenya’s political culture is 
inherently secretive and this in turn lends itself to the continued prevalence of bribery, 
corruption and ethnically-motivated patronage. International oil companies, civil society and 
the international community each have a role to play in promoting transparency initiatives 
and face certain challenges of their own, however without government support there is little 
hope that such initiatives will progress from rhetoric to reality. This study ultimately shows 
that unless and until Kenya’s oil and gas sector embraces transparency, its positive impact on 
the state’s development is likely to be thwarted. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  iii 
Opsomming 
 
Tullow Oil het in 2012 kommersieel benutbare ruoliebronne in Kenia ontdek. Verdere 
ontginbare bronne is sedertdien gevind en volgens beramings bevat Kenia omvatryke 
oliereserwes. Die ontwikkeling en benutting van hierdie bronne kom tans op dreef, en Kenia 
gaan binnekort nog een van die olieproduserende state suid van die Sahara wees. Ervaring 
toon egter dat die meerderheid van hierdie natuurlike-hulpbronryke lande aan ‘n 
‘hulpbronvloek’ ly: die ekonomiese groei en maatskaplike ontwikkeling word in werklikheid 
belemmer in plaas van aangemoedig, en menigte state sukkel om uit die kloue van 
wanbestuur, korrupsie, en omkoping te ontsnap. 
 
Hierdie studie gebruik verskeie aspekte van hulpbronvloekteorie om te probeer bepaal hoe 
Kenia die negatiewe aspekte van sy oliefondse moontlik kan vryspring. Daar word op teorië 
gefokus wat aandui dat die bevordering van goeie regeringbestuur, deur die aanwending van 
deursigtige administrasie en verantwoordbaarheid, ‘n land kan help om die hulpbronvloek te 
bestry. Nadat Kenia se politiese kultuur bespreek en ‘n oorsig van sy olie- en gassektore 
gegee is, word hierdie teorië op die Kenia toegepas om te bepaal hoe deursigtig sy olie- en 
gassektore tans is, die baat wat hy by verbeterde deursigtigheid en verantwoordbaarheid kan 
vind, en die struikelblokke wat dit moontlik kan verhoed. 
 
Daar word tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat alhoewel die Keniaanse regering en 
internasionale oliemaatskappye skynbaar deursigtigheid en verantwoorbaarheid wil bevorder, 
hierdie lippediens nie met die werklikheid strook nie. Kenia se olie- en gassektore word 
gekenmerk deur ondeursigtigheid en die hervormingspogings sloer. Die hoofrede hiervoor 
blyk ‘n gebrek aan wil te wees vanaf regeringskant om verandering aan te bring: Kenia se 
politieke kultuur is in wese geheimhoudend en bied ‘n ryke teelaarde vir voortdurende 
omkopery, korrupsie, en etniese begunstiging. Internasionale oliemaatskappye, die burgerlike 
samelewing en die internasionale gemeenskap  kan elkeen ‘n bydra lewer om 
deursigtigheidsinisiatiewe te bevorder, en word elkeen deur sy eie uitdagings in die gesig 
gestaar, maar sonder ondersteuning vanaf die regering is die kans klein dat sulke insiatiewe 
ooit sal slaag. Hierdie studie dui uiteindelik daarop dat die positiewe impak van Kenia se gas- 
en olie-industrie op die land se ontwikkeling belemmer sal word, tensy die sektore werklik 
deursigtigheid omarm.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Rationale 
 
Despite the emergence of alternative sources of energy and the recent global slump in oil 
prices, demand for fossil fuels continues to rise. One direct result of this demand is that 
private companies are constantly on the lookout for new frontiers. East Africa is one such 
frontier with substantial reserves of gas declared in the Rovuma Basin offshore Mozambique 
and both onshore and offshore Tanzania. It is estimated that South Sudan has the third largest 
reserves of oil in sub-Saharan Africa (Francis, 2016) and in Uganda there have been major 
discoveries with resources estimated to be in the region of 1.7 billion barrels of oil (Tullow, 
2017c). It thus came as no great surprise when Tullow Oil plc (Tullow) announced in March 
2012 that it had discovered a major oil play in the Turkana County region of north-west 
Kenya. Further significant discoveries have been made in Kenya since 2012 and initial 
estimates suggest that there are over 750 million barrels of oil (MMBO) recoverable within 
the South Lokichar Basin alone with the overall upside potential targeting one billion barrels 
(Tullow, 2017c). Although plans for the small-scale exportation of crude from Kenya by 
truck (Otuki, 2017) have been halted amidst the uncertainty caused by the delayed enactment 
of new petroleum legislation and the debacle of the current elections, there is still significant 
exploration and development activity in Kenya’s oil sector by international oil companies 
(IOCs). Such activity reflects an optimism that Kenya could soon join its neighbours in the 
possession of a burgeoning upstream sector1. 
 
One inevitable result of a state’s discovery of commercial volumes of natural resources2 is an 
application by observers of ‘resource curse’ rhetoric. Will the state in question succumb to 
the curse, or will it follow the example of states such as Norway and Botswana and 
successfully avoid the notoriously damaging effects that large natural resource finds are 
supposed to promise? What steps should the state take if it wishes to avoid the curse and 
                                                
1 All references to the upstream or oil sector throughout this study are intended to capture 
natural gas as well as oil. 
2 For the purposes of this study, ‘natural resources’ are defined as non-renewable natural 
resources such as oil, gas and minerals. 
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promote positive economic growth and development? Should the resource in fact be left 
undeveloped?  
 
Literature examining resource curse theories is vast and well established. For example, there 
are writers who focus on whether there is really a curse and there are those who study what 
its causes are. Increasingly, others are examining what might be done to best avoid falling 
into the curse’s trap. Whilst the literature falling into the latter grouping is impossible to 
neatly categorise, one common theme is the recognition that there is no ‘one size fits all’ 
framework; it is generally acknowledged that each state begins from a unique starting point 
and is consequently affected by different factors. Varying population sizes and composition, 
geographical endowments, levels of economic and institutional development, political 
environments and histories are just some examples of the factors which will prevent any one 
state from developing a blueprint for avoiding the curse that can then be applied to any other 
state. Nevertheless, there is a growing belief that good governance within a state’s natural 
resources sector is a fundamental element for any successful avoidance of the curse. Al 
Faruque’s recent conclusion that “the prevailing poverty and underdevelopment in many 
mineral resource-rich developing countries and economies in transition are largely attributed 
to the mismanagement and corruption of revenues derived from the extraction of such 
resources and their diversion by the ruling elite for their own benefit at the expense of the 
vast majority of people (2015:66-67)” is typical of this growing belief and promotion of good 
governance is regarded as an antidote to such harmful mismanagement and corruption. 
Transparency is oft-cited as a key element in the promotion of good governance because it 
“not only removes the cover for possible corruption, but enables good decisions, allows rapid 
intervention to correct problems in the system, and builds trust (Lahn, Marcel, Mitchell, 
Myers & Stevens, 2007b:14).” 
 
A focus on improving transparency in the natural resources sector began to take hold and 
garner global interest following the World Bank Group’s (World Bank) financing of the 
Chad-Cameroon pipeline in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the World Bank’s 
documents were made public but the upstream documents remained confidential (Rosenblum 
& Maples, 2009:17). Hicks (2015:2, 12) argues that Chad was used as something of a 
laboratory for testing theories of successful resource extraction and that the promotion of 
transparency and good governance were at the heart of this after it emerged the World Bank’s 
involvement had been ineffective at preventing Chad from using its oil revenues to buy 
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weapons instead of funding development projects. According to Rosenblum and Maples 
(2009:18) the focus on transparency garnered in Chad resulted in calls for the BTC (Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline documents to be made public and subsequently “contract 
transparency became an urgent issue.” Global initiatives such as Publish What You Pay 
(PWYP) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) emerged and further 
demanded revenue transparency, but transparency has since been developed to incorporate 
much more than just the disclosure of contracts and revenue streams. There is a recognition 
that the net of transparency should be cast wider to incorporate all elements of the life-cycle 
of a natural resource project, a recognition reflected in the fact that the EITI Standard no 
longer just cites revenue transparency as an objective but also that of contracts and licences, 
production data and social and economic contributions (EITI, 2016).  
 
The relevance of studies focused on the meaning of transparency, how best it be achieved and 
what impact it might have upon governance within the natural resources sector cannot be 
understated. Given the continued global demand for oil it is unlikely that arguments to leave 
the oil in the ground will be heeded by governments, like the Kenyan government, who find 
themselves in possession of what could be an incredibly value resource with the potential to 
transform the state’s development path. As Hicks (2015:10) has argued, the question 
therefore becomes how best to manage the resources and it is crucial that we understand what 
role increased transparency might play in such management. 
 
Kenya presents an opportunity to study the relevance of transparency within a fledgling oil 
sector, one which still has the potential to both be shaped and to dramatically alter its state’s 
development path. Kenya is ranked 146th out of 188th states in the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) most recent Human Development Index with a score of 
0.555 (UNDP, 2016:24). Poverty levels are dire: the World Bank (2016:vi) estimates that 
around 40 per cent. of the population live below the national poverty line and it is notable 
that the oil discoveries to date have been made in Turkana County where development has 
historically lagged behind other counties and where 94 per cent. of the population are 
believed to live below the poverty line (World Bank, 2016:97). Turkana is also home to the 
Kakuma refugee camp which had a population of 183,542 registered refugees and asylum 
seekers as at 31 August 2017 (UNHCR, 2017). That there is hope the oil sector can help 
boost and support economic growth and development within Turkana and nationwide is 
therefore understandable, particularly as both the Kenyan government and Tullow have stated 
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(if not yet demonstrated) a willingness to embrace transparency. Kenya’s governance levels 
are also commendable: in the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance it was ranked 12th 
in Africa and 3rd (out of 13) in East Africa (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016b:4-5). It therefore 
appears to be a state where transparency has a chance of being successfully implemented and 
effectively utilised. 
 
Nonetheless, there are significant challenges to overcome. Like so many other states in 
Africa, Kenya’s political culture is one characterised by bribery, corruption and patronage 
with ethnic tensions simmering throughout the state. Ethnic violence reached boiling point in 
the aftermath of the 2007 general election when over 1,100 people were killed and over 
600,000 were forced to flee their homes (Smith, 2013) and there remains an underlying fear 
that, although the 2013 general elections were relatively peaceful, tensions may once again 
induce further violence during the re-run of 2017 general election which is due to be held on 
26 October 20173. Furthermore, Turkana County has previously experienced violent conflict 
over resources such as water and arable land (World Bank, 2016:98). Coupled with the 
ongoing process of devolution initiated by Kenya’s adoption of a new constitution in 2010, 
the risk of disagreement and thus disparate policy between various interest groups is high.  
 
Upon Tullow’s discovery of oil in Turkana in 2012 cartoonist Gado produced the drawing 
depicted in Figure 1.1 below. His suggestion that the threat of the resource curse looms over 
Turkana and its inevitability is undeniably pessimistic, yet it is a pessimism which is rooted 
in precedent. No oil-rich state in Africa has thus far avoided the curse’s symptoms and 
Kenya’s starting point appears rife with challenges. The need for a greater understanding of 
how transparency and good governance might mitigate the onset of the resource curse is 
made ever more urgent. 
                                                
3 This study was submitted for examination on 3 October 2017 and thus prior to the re-run of 
the general election. Its scope therefore does not cover any developments in Kenya following 
this submission date. 
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1.2 Research Problem and Focus of the Study 
 
The very fact that the number of states commonly cited as having avoided the resource curse 
(such as Norway, Botswana, Chile and Canada) is dwarfed by the number of those that have 
succumbed to its symptoms is significant: it proves that there is a pressing need to continue to 
expand on the resource curse theory in order to determine how a state with natural resource 
wealth might avoid the onset of the curse. This need is relevant for states that are already 
extracting and exporting their natural resources, however it is arguably even more relevant 
for those still in the early stages of such exploitation whose policies and development paths 
are less embedded and perhaps more inclined to positive change.  
 
Many commentators on the resource curse acknowledge the importance that good governance 
has for a state that wishes to promote successful development of its natural resources and to 
encourage sustained economic growth in place of stagnation. The broad aim of this study is 
to ascertain what role increased transparency can have in promoting such good governance 
and consequently avoiding the resource curse. Understanding this issue is crucial: if it can be 
shown that there is an important role for transparency to play in avoiding the curse, this will 
allow civil society, the governments of resource-rich states and the private companies 
operating within these states to justify a push for increased transparency and will provide 
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them with the impetus to necessitate the required changes in applicable legal and regulatory 
frameworks. Whilst so many of the factors attributed to causing the curse are outwith a 
government’s control–such as the type of resource found and the timing of the discovery, 
ethnic or religious divisions or the state’s history–good governance is largely within a 
government’s control. Furthermore, this will encourage the international community to 
increase the pressure initiated in the form of initiatives such as PWYP, the EITI, 
Transparency International and the Open Contracting Partnership for all resource-rich states 
to pursue transparency by making a state’s non-adherence to such schemes a repellent to 
foreign investment. Importantly, if more states are in a position whereby there is a greater 
likelihood of them avoiding the resource curse then this will undeniably aid the social and 
economic development of millions of people across the globe.  
 
Thus, this research will be of benefit to the Kenyan government as well as other parastatal 
bodies and policy-makers involved in the oil sector. It will be of relevance to the private 
companies operating within the sector, from the companies who own the licenses to their 
business partners, contractors, advisers and shareholders. It will greatly benefit civil society 
and the communities directly affected by onshore oil developments, but also the Kenyan 
population as a whole. However, this research will have a larger role to play in the ongoing 
academic and political debate over whether transparency can really be achieved in the oil 
sector and, if it can, what effect this can have on achieving better governance and avoiding 
the resource curse. This study therefore aims to contribute to an increased understanding of 
transparency within the oil sector. As one of many states recently finding itself to be rich in 
natural resources, the Kenyan example will further provide a useful test case on which other 
states can turn their scrutiny. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
The primary objective of this research is to investigate what the impact of increased 
transparency in the Kenyan oil sector might be and whether such transparency can help 
Kenya avoid symptoms of the resource curse. Accordingly, the study seeks to answer the 
following main research question: 
 
To what extent might increased transparency in Kenya’s oil sector help it to avoid the 
resource curse by promoting good governance?  
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Another objective is to examine what form transparency in Kenya’s oil sector should take 
and how it is to be achieved. Inextricably linked to this objective is the need to obtain an 
understanding of the political culture in Kenya as this will help to determine roles that each 
of the Kenyan government, civil society, private actors and the international community play 
in promoting or prohibiting increased transparency and to appreciate how they might be 
affected by increased transparency. Therefore, in order to support and complement the main 
research question the following sub-questions have been developed: 
 
(i) What is meant by increased transparency and how might it be achieved in Kenya’s oil 
sector? 
(ii) How transparent is Kenya’s oil sector at present? 
(iii) What are the main barriers Kenya faces to achieving increased transparency in its oil 
sector? 
(iv) Why is increased transparency important to Kenya’s oil sector and what effects might 
it have? 
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
 
1.4.1 The Economic ‘Resource Curse’ 
 
Auty (1993) coined the term ‘resource curse’ to capture the idea that a state endowed with 
natural resources often paradoxically suffers from lower economic growth than those states 
with no, or limited, natural resources. Essentially, it is said to occur when natural resources 
(the focus traditionally being on non-renewable resources such as oil, gas and minerals) are 
newly discovered or if there is a boom, for example if there is a drastic improvement in terms 
of trade for the resource in question. There will be an influx of revenue entering the state and 
a surge in government income with a corresponding increase in government spending. The 
question is whether this increased spending capacity is sustainable due to its reliance on a 
steady flow of foreign exchange and revenues, such revenues being entirely dependent on a 
sector where price volatility is high. The ‘trap’ element is that domestic costs sit on an 
upward curve as governments tend to get tied into costly mega-projects and social spending 
projects to quell the public’s demands to ‘share the resource wealth’. If proven to be 
unsustainable, economic growth will slow, as will social and political development and 
stability. In sum, the state may be worse off than if it had no resources at all. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  8 
An important element to this is the ‘Dutch disease’. This term was used in 1977 by The 
Economist to explain why the Netherlands’ manufacturing sector was stunted following a 
huge gas discovery in the 1950s. It has since been broadened to refer generally to describe the 
impact a prosperous resource sector can have on non-resource sectors. To understand the 
‘disease’ it is helpful to think of a resource state’s economy as divided into three commodity 
sectors: (i) the tradable natural resources sector (that is, the natural resources themselves and 
associated industries); (ii) the tradable non-resource manufacturing sector (such as 
manufactured goods); and (iii) the non-tradable sector (such as public services) (Sachs & 
Warner, 1995:6). The theory is two-fold: firstly, an influx of foreign currency related to the 
resource sector can lead to currency appreciation which makes the tradable non-resource 
products less price competitive on the export market; and secondly, as the supply of tradable 
natural resources increases, so too does the demand for non-tradable goods and services and 
this results in a movement of capital and labour away from the tradable non-resource 
manufacturing sector. Manufacturing tends to suffer and experiences stunted growth. 
 
The resource curse theory therefore suggests that whilst resource booms normally have a 
positive short term impact on an economy, in the long term the impact will, conditionally, be 
detrimental (Collier & Goderis, 2012:1242). This is why the resource curse is often referred 
to as the ‘paradox of plenty’: one would logically expect a state with high resource reserves 
to be able to turn these resources into a means to achieve economic, resource-based 
development. There is a failure to effectively diversify the economy away from reliance on 
resources, thus thwarting economic growth and, in turn, social development (Gelb, 1988). In 
reality, a state often becomes dependent on its resource sector and allocates inadequate 
capital and labour to other sectors. There is consequent underinvestment in certain sectors 
and overinvestment in others, causing a failure to diversify the economy and stimulate 
economic and social development. In essence there is a lack of forward and backward 
linkages between the resource sector and the rest of the economy and long term growth will 
stagnate (Renner, 2002:16). 
 
Exactly how the curse will manifest itself varies in substance and in degree from state to 
state. Nonetheless, the effects can be categorised as either economic or socio-political. 
Economic symptoms include slow economic growth, volatile government revenue (Van der 
Ploeg, 2011), Dutch disease (Corden & Neary, 1982; Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001; Auty, 2001), 
unsustainable government spending and levels of foreign debt (Stevens, Lahn & Kooroshy, 
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2015) and lack of diversification. Socio-political symptoms include weakened democracy and 
institutions (Stevens et al., 2015), rent-seeking and corruption (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001), lack 
of development (Stevens et al., 2015), poverty and social inequality (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001), 
as well as a susceptibility to conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). 
 
Whilst Auty (1993) was the first to refer to these effects as the ‘resource curse’, this was not a 
new theory in 1993. A wealth of debate about the effects of exporting resources on a state’s 
capacity to grow and develop began to emerge in the 1970s and the bulk of literature written 
until the early 2000s was characterised by negativity (see Cordon & Neary, 1982; Auty, 
1993; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Auty, 2001; Van der Ploeg, 2011). However, the tide has been 
turning and the literature has expanded to question whether there is such a thing as the 
resource curse and, if so, then what causes it, what its effects are and how to mitigate or avoid 
it. The prevailing view in recent literature is thus more optimistic (see Maloney, 2002; 
Kaznacheev, 2013; Stevens et al., 2015) and has increasingly focused on the political, rather 
than economic, aspects of the curse. 
 
1.4.2 The Roles of Transparency and Good Governance 
 
A dominant element of the politically-focused resource curse literature is an analysis of the 
role played by corruption, including bribery and rent-seeking: corruption in resource-rich 
states is often recognised as central to any explanation of why the resource curse takes hold 
and prevents positive socio-economic development (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009:521). Much of the 
more optimistic resource curse literature consequently focuses on how the promotion of 
transparency can help to lower corruption and the mismanagement of revenues, thereby 
establishing a vital element of good governance. Diamond-rich Botswana is justifiably often 
held up as an example of how transparency and good governance can help a state overcome 
the curse (see for example Iimi, 2006; Meijia & Castel, 2012), with many believing this 
success can be emulated. George Soros, founder of the PWYP campaign, suggests that “the 
resource curse is a major scourge, but it can be cured. It has now been recognised that 
transparency and accountability are the remedies (Soros, quoted in Humphreys, Sachs & 
Stiglitz, 2007a:xiv).” The logic is that transparency provides information, builds trust and 
permits accountability: “the belief is that transparency is the essential first step in a 
multidimensional strategy to counteract the resource curse. In effect, it is the first 
manifestation of what could become a fiscal social contract for the entire energy sector (Karl, 
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2007:274).” This idea that transparency has a role to play in avoiding the resource curse is 
not new and is undoubtedly prevalent, and it is gaining traction in Kenya. For example, the 
Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG) argues that “transparency shines 
light on secrecy and unearths the cost of opaque deals to the state, communities and citizens 
(2014:30).” However, Kolstad and Wiig’s (2009:529) assertion eight years ago that “at the 
present time…the evidence base unfortunately does not match the popularity of the 
transparency concept [and]…more research is needed to inform policies in this area” still 
stands.  
 
One aspect of this is that there is a need to broaden our understanding of exactly how 
transparency can be implemented and what barriers might be encountered. Existing theories 
that suggest revenue and contract transparency be increased must be examined alongside 
those calling for transparency in all areas of the natural resource sector. Amongst others, 
these include transparency of relations between governments and oil companies; contract 
negotiations and bidding processes; important project documents and sub-contracts; policies 
related to the sector (in particular those planning for the tradable non-resource and non-
tradable sectors); fiscal management; and community relations (Humphreys et al., 
2007b:328-330). We also need to understand how compliance with transparency initiatives 
can be ensured, how restrictive confidentiality provisions in private contracts can be avoided 
and how “information overload” is to be prevented (Humphreys et al., 2007b:332-333). 
Furthermore, there is a need to appreciate exactly how the information made available 
through transparency initiatives is to be utilised. Shaxson (2007:218) has suggested that 
achieving transparency in itself might not be sufficient: 
…transparency campaigns rest on the idea that if African citizens know more about 
where their money is going, they can then ‘call their rulers to account.’…However, 
with a few exceptions, the record here is patchy, as African civil societies are often so 
weak and fragmented that in many cases it is hard to stir up outrage, except from 
local groups that are funded by western NGOs that want to drum up interest in the 
issue. 
 
This raises the question of whether transparency initiatives can realistically be expected to be 
effective and we therefore need a greater appreciation of what the combined impact of 
successful increases in transparency across the oil sector might be. As the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute’s (NRGI) Benchmarking Framework states: 
…transparency means making relevant and timely information easily available to all 
actors so that they can observe and analyse decisions made and actions performed by 
authorities and corporate actors. In addition to deterring bad behaviour, transparency 
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also helps lay foundations of trust between citizens, the private sector and the 
government (NRGI, 2016:27). 
 
Theory thus predicts that transparency will permit accountability if there is a concurrent 
ability to interpret, understand and utilise the disclosed information: “transparency allows 
information to be generated, which can then be communicated, used and deployed to place 
pressure on public and private power-holders or retrospectively hold them to account (Desai 
& Jarvis, 2012:110).” Whether this ability is attainable is something that can only be 
understood by applying the theory to a real-life case study. 
 
These theories of transparency will be expanded and explained in Chapter 2 below before 
being applied throughout the remainder of this study to the case of Kenya in order to 
determine what form transparency should take, how it should be implemented and if it has 
the potential to stop, or at least limit, the encroachment of the resource curse in the Kenyan 
oil sector. In essence, this study will seek to test whether the dominant definitions of 
transparency can work effectively in the Kenyan context. Such application to a state in the 
process of establishing its oil sector will not only provide insight into the possibilities open to 
Kenya itself through embracing transparency, but it will contribute to the wider theoretical 
approach to the resource curse.  
 
1.5 Research Design and Research Methodology 
 
To apply the theory that greater and effective transparency can lead to good governance 
within the oil sector generally would be incredibly problematic and indeed near impossible 
given the number of states that have proven oil and gas reserves. It is thus prudent to apply 
this theory to a particular case study in order that a large amount of detailed information can 
be collected and analysed. Whilst this will not permit generalisations about the theory to be 
applied to other states, a more focused study will allow a deeper analysis of the role 
transparency has to play in promoting a successful development of a particular state’s oil 
sector. This case study can subsequently be used to develop theories and hypotheses which 
can in turn be used as a base on which further research can be conducted across different 
states. 
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This study therefore uses a qualitative research method and it is based on a single case study, 
namely the oil sector in Kenya. The majority of information used has been collected from 
secondary sources including academic texts; journal articles; government reports and 
policies; publications from think tanks, multilateral organisations and civil society 
organisations; newspaper articles; and legislative and regulatory texts. This secondary 
information is supported by information acquired from interviews with individuals 
representing civil society bodies and private sector organisations who operate in (or have 
knowledge of) the Kenyan oil sector. These methods have permitted the researcher to obtain 
first-hand information for analysis alongside the secondary information. This triangulation 
allows for crosschecking of findings using a variety of methods and consequently improves 
the accuracy of results of the study. 
 
Regarding the interviews, interviewees were specifically selected by the researcher according 
to their knowledge and experience of the topic being researched as well as their availability 
and willingness to participate in the study. The interviews were conducted by e-mail and 
telephone in an informal setting to encourage the interviewee to be open and responsive. 
They were semi-structured whereby the researcher prepared a number of questions about the 
relevant topic but also encouraged the interviewee to expand on a question as he or she saw 
fit; this not only allowed the researcher to obtain answers to the specific questions she sought 
but also to gain an insight into other areas which the interviewee considered to be relevant 
and which the researcher may not have been aware of. By conducting interviews in place of 
alternative methods of information collection such as questionnaire distribution or focus 
groups the researcher was able to hold a focused and detailed conversation with the 
respondent and was able to direct the conversation as required, including in instances where 
the respondent might have veered onto less relevant topics. The researcher was also in a 
position to ask follow-up questions or for clarifications once the interview had concluded, 
actions which are often not possible if using questionnaires or focus groups.  
 
The specific case of Kenya was chosen for a number of reasons which prove its suitability as 
a case study for examining the role of transparency in the oil sector. Firstly, the oil sector in 
Kenya is still extremely young and underdeveloped. Significant reserves were found only 
five years ago and large-scale export is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future whilst 
discussions are ongoing about the construction of an export pipeline and the draft Petroleum 
(Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2015 (Upstream Bill) remains in limbo. 
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That the industry is so youthful permits an optimism that it can still be shaped and influenced 
by policies that promote transparency and good governance, thus increasing the importance 
of studies such as this which seek to understand why transparency is necessary and how it 
might work in the Kenyan context. Secondly, both the Kenyan government and Tullow have 
publicly stated their support for increased transparency. This willingness to embrace 
transparency from the key public and private sector players involved in Kenya’s oil sector 
suggests that the necessary policies are likely to be embraced if existing research and analysis 
can clearly demonstrate the benefits such policies can bring. A third and related reason is that 
Kenya forms part of the East African region where upstream activity is extensive and that 
Kenya is pushing for rapid development of its oil reserves: “If Uganda has gained a 
reputation for moving cautiously as it prepares for the impact of oil on the economy, its 
neighbour Kenya seems to be trying to achieve the opposite (Hicks, 2015:175).” If Kenya can 
build on its apparent willingness to embrace transparency whilst at the same time pushing for 
the swift progression of its oil industry at a pace faster than its neighbours’, it can use its 
regional influence to lead by example and promote an agenda of transparency and good 
governance across the East African oil sector.  
 
1.6 Limitations and Ethical Considerations 
 
Given Kenya’s political culture and the lack of transparency which exists within the oil 
industry at present, it is recognised that there are limitations on the availability of data and 
sources for analysis. An example is that production sharing contracts (PSCs) signed by the 
Kenyan government and private oil companies have not been made available by the 
government; those which are available are few in number (only seven are freely available as 
at October 2017) and have been published to comply with foreign stock exchange disclosure 
requirements. Official details about which companies hold exploration block licenses are also 
scarce and out of date: the most recent petroleum exploration block map provided by the 
National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK) on its website is dated 2015 (NOCK, 2017b). 
Furthermore, initial requests for meetings with government ministers and representatives to 
discuss transparency efforts received a negative response. Whilst Chapters 3 and 4 of the 
study address these issues by discussing the nature of Kenya’s political culture and the 
operation of the oil sector, their effect is ultimately to limit the availability of research 
material.  
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The study therefore relies largely on publicly-available secondary sources but is bolstered by 
a number of key informant interviews conducted with private sector and civil society 
representatives. Whilst it would have been advantageous to also hold interviews with 
government ministers and to conduct focus groups with members of the Turkana 
communities where much of Tullow’s activities are undertaken, the political climate, budget 
and time constraints of this study did not permit such research to be undertaken. As a result, 
neither the first-hand perspectives of the government nor community members will be 
presented as part of the research and the perspectives given are limited to those of the private 
sector and civil society representatives. It is further acknowledged the interviewees were not 
chosen at random and were instead selected by the researcher following consideration of their 
availability and knowledge of the research topic. 
 
As the research for this study incorporates interviews with individuals, Stellenbosch 
University’s ‘Policy for Responsible Research Conduct at Stellenbosch University’ (2016) 
was adhered to. Each interviewee was: (i) made aware of the purpose of the research and the 
study; (ii) informed of how their responses and the research results will be disseminated; (iii) 
asked to sign a written consent form; (iv) informed of their right to refuse to answer any 
questions or to suspend or conclude the interview at any point; and (v) not monetarily 
remunerated for their participation. Detailed written records of each interview were taken and 
kept by the researcher, and all records (including each interviewee’s personal and 
confidential information, where relevant) are secured appropriately. All necessary steps were 
taken by the researcher to ensure that the interviewees’ rights to confidentiality and privacy 
were respected. Finally, all information provided by interviewees and used in this study has 
been fully referenced and attributed to the relevant participant. 
 
1.7 Outline of the Study 
 
The study is structured under the following chapter headings: 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction.  
 
Chapter 2:  Avoiding the ‘Resource Curse’: The Importance of Transparency. This 
chapter reviews resource curse literature that concentrates on the importance 
of good governance in a resource-rich state’s attempt to avoid the curse. It 
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focuses on theories which suggest that increased transparency has the potential 
to promote good governance through its interplay with accountability, 
specifically in the upstream oil sector. This chapter provides definitions of 
good governance and of transparency which are then used throughout the 
study.  
 
Chapter 3:  Kenya’s Political Culture. The purpose of this chapter is to study the political 
culture in Kenya. It focuses on the continued prevalence of corruption, 
bribery, patronage and ethnic division in the political system and 
contextualises these within the current devolutionary changes being 
implemented following the adoption of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010. 
This analysis is necessary in order to understand the obstacles which stand in 
the way of promoting increased transparency within Kenya’s oil sector.  
 
Chapter 4:  The Kenyan Oil Sector. Chapter 4 provides information on the history and 
current status of the oil sector in Kenya and details the domestic and 
international legislation, rules and regulations which apply to it. The chapter 
also introduces the government, the private sector, civil society and the 
international community as the four key interest groups who have the potential 
to shape, affect and be affected by transparency within the Kenyan oil sector. 
 
Chapter 5: Implementing Effective Transparency in Kenya. This chapter analyses the role 
transparency might play in promoting good governance and accountability by 
applying the theory and definitions ascertained in Chapter 2 to the case study 
of Kenya whilst accounting for the contextual factors identified in Chapters 3 
and 4. It thus considers how far Kenya has progressed in achieving 
transparency to date and what current and future barriers it faces. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
AVOIDING THE ‘RESOURCE CURSE’: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 
 
The ‘resource curse’ is a well-established and well-studied concept. Literature on the subject 
is vast and a detailed examination of such literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead 
focus will be placed on one aspect of the curse, that is how it might be affected by the 
promotion of good governance through greater transparency and accountability. 
 
Most commentators agree that there are two elements to the curse: economic and political 
(Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001; Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001; McPherson & MacSearraigh, 2007; Torvik, 
2009). Economic explanations for its existence tend to concentrate on limited diversification, 
Dutch disease and revenue volatility (Busse & Gröning, 2013:1; Li, 2013:572), whilst 
proffered solutions include adopting suitable macroeconomic policies, establishing natural 
resource funds, pursuing economic diversification, direct distribution of wealth to the 
population and transparency and accountability of revenue streams (Weinthal & Luong, 
2006:35). As detailed in Chapter 1.4 above, initial academic coverage of the curse was 
centred on economics, however in the 1990s the tide began to turn and note was taken of how 
political explanations and solutions might be of equal, if not greater, importance. 
 
In her study of Venezuela, Karl (1997:5) claimed that although economic explanations for the 
curse–such as Dutch disease–were powerful, they ultimately “fail to capture the underlying 
political and institutional processes that set off economic laws and market forces in the first 
place that subsequently form strong barriers to necessary readjustments.” Numerous scholars 
then began to examine political explanations, but it was the work of Robinson, Torvik and 
Verdier (2006) which marked a true change in focus. Some of Robinson’s prior work had 
examined the role institutions and good governance played in Botswana’s success 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001b), but the motivation to focus on political aspects of 
the curse in the 2006 study was based on the recognition that much of the existing literature 
had been economics-focused, save for studies on the impact of rent-seeking (Robinson et al., 
2006:448). They concluded that political incentives are central to an understanding of 
whether natural resources are a curse (Robinson et al., 2006:447, 451) and at the heart of this 
are political institutions “which promote the accountability of politicians, and generally 
develop state institutions away from patrimonial practices towards the use of rational and 
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meritocratic criteria in allocating public sector resources (Robinson et al., 2006:450).” For 
some, there is therefore justification for a shift in focus from Dutch disease-focused 
explanations and a belief that the curse might be less of an economic problem than a political 
one (Collier, 2006:1484; Ölcer, 2009:31). 
 
This shift in academic focus coincided with the emergence of a new global norm pushing for 
better governance in the extractive industries: “from the mid-1990s onward, all of a sudden 
the perverse outcomes of oil extraction in developing countries came into the policymaker’s 
and the broader public’s spotlight” and this caused a “rhetorical rise of the good governance 
agenda (Benner & Soares de Oliveira 2010:289, 294).” Actions of corporates abroad started 
to garner attention, not least in Angola. With its publication of the ‘A Crude Awakening’ 
report, Global Witness revealed that Angolan oil revenues had been used to sustain the state’s 
civil conflict (Gillies, 2010:109) and there was further evidence that conflict diamonds were 
used for similar purposes (Van Alstine, Manyindo, Smith, Dixon & Amaniga Ruhanga, 
2014:49). Global Witness also showed that in Angola US$4.2 billion of oil revenues were 
unaccounted for by the Angolan government between 1997 and 2001 (Ghazvinian, 
2007:135). Furthermore, activists were seemingly at increased risk globally, with the 
execution of Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 causing global outrage and a resultant 
intensification of the focus on the global oil sector (Benner & Soares de Oliveira, 2010:292). 
 
For Gillies (2010:103), the subsequent emergence of transparency as an international norm in 
the oil sector was therefore rooted in reputational risk: risk to western governments, to oil 
companies and to international institutions. She argues that promotion of transparency 
became desirable behaviour from 1999 onwards and that it represented “a surprising 
development in a sector previously characterised by carefully guarded opacity (Gillies, 
2010:103).” As a sector traditionally dominated by secrecy, it was a “seemingly inhospitable 
environment” for transparency to emerge (Gillies, 2010:104), a fact Rosenblum & Maples 
(2009:7) agree with. Haufler (2010:59) goes further than Gillies and suggests that as well as 
being an element in the global fight against corruption, extractive sector transparency as a 
norm was aided by businesses trying to act responsibly in volatile or conflict-affected areas 
following many brutal and prolonged conflicts in the Balkans and parts of Africa.  
 
Regardless of its origins and catalysts, this chapter will examine the theory behind the 
promotion of transparency as a norm in the extractive sectors. Chapter 2.1 firstly explores in 
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more detail the political aspects of the resource curse before Chapter 2.2 looks at the theories 
which suggest good governance and transparency are key to avoiding it. Chapter 2.3 in turn 
sets out some of the tangible methods for implementing transparency in the oil sector. 
Importantly, Chapter 2.4 then explores the widely-held belief that transparency is likely to 
have little impact without effective accountability. Finally, Chapter 2.5 reviews the barriers 
that might prevent transparency being promoted from theory into practice.  
 
2.1 The Political Side of the Resource Curse 
 
Two elements of political resource curse theory garner the most attention, namely corruption 
(including patronage) and rent-seeking. For Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009:608), economic 
performance in a resource-rich state can be negatively affected by either, or both, of these 
elements. Whilst they are similar, these elements are distinct and are best treated separately 
(Kolstad & Søreide, 2009:214). Corruption in particular is perceived as common in sub-
Saharan Africa and “the oil resource curse in Africa has thus become the fashionable poster 
child for Africa’s woes (Clarke, 2008:528).” The effect of corruption, patronage and rent-
seeking on a resource-rich state’s development trajectory has thus understandably received 
significant attention since the late 1990s. 
 
2.1.1 Corruption and Patronage 
 
Many scholars have studied the supposed linkage between natural resource rents and 
corruption (Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Palley, 2003; Herringshaw, 2004; Hodler, 2006; 
Weinthal & Luong, 2006; McPherson & MacSearraigh, 2007; Petermann, Guzmán, & Tilton, 
2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2009; Arezki & Brückner, 2011; 
Frankel, 2012; Busse & Gröning, 2013). Corruption can be defined simply as “the abuse of 
public office for private gain (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009:522)” or more widely as “the use of 
entrusted power for private gain at the expense of the public interest (Aaronson, 2011:50).” 
An intangible concept, Busse and Gröning (2013:6) suggest that it “assesses the level of 
corruption within a political system and includes financial corruption (e.g., demands for 
special payments and bribes in connection with import and export licences, exchange 
controls, or tax assessments), excessive patronage, nepotism, or secret party funding.” It can 
therefore take many forms, including nepotism; patronage; job reservations; exchange 
controls; secret party funding; bribes; police protection; loans; tax assessments; and others 
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(Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2009:612). However, within the oil sector corruption has been 
categorised into four forms: (i) policy corruption, including sector policies, laws and taxes 
such as price controls, special accounting procedures and tax breaks; (ii) administrative 
corruption, for example abuse of office; (iii) commercial corruption, including kickbacks, 
tender-rigging and cost inflation; and (iv) grand corruption, namely theft of money and 
diversion of funds (McPherson & MacSearraigh, 2007:198-199). 
 
With regard to patronage, it is a specific form of corruption. For the purposes of this study 
patronage is defined as “the use of public resources to secure political power (Kolstad & 
Søreide, 2009:216)” and can be captured by each of the four aforementioned categories of oil 
sector corruption. It is generally accepted that ‘big men’ play a key role in the oil sector, and 
particularly in Africa (McPherson & MacSearraigh, 2007:201), and their role in promoting 
and sustaining patronage and corruption in the sector is significant. Collier (2007:44-45) has 
convincingly argued that patronage politics develops with resource abundance: “in the 
context of ethnic loyalties and the absence of press freedom, patronage politics is more cost-
effective than the provision of public services as a strategy for winning elections.” In an 
earlier work he argues that this is because 
in a well-functioning democracy, parties compete to spend public revenues 
effectively on public goods, balancing the benefits against the costs of taxation. 
However, an alternative way of gaining votes is to bribe opinion leaders through 
private patronage. Where voters have strong ethnic loyalties and limited objective 
information, as is common in Africa, patronage politics is likely to be cost effective 
(Collier, 2006:1484). 
 
Whilst Corrigan (2014:17) is one of few who believe corruption has no real impact on a 
resource-rich state’s growth and development, the impact of the different forms of corruption 
is widely regarded as negative. Easterly, who argued that the impact of corruption generally 
on growth had been ignored for too long (2001:252), concluded that “corruption not only has 
a direct effect on growth; it also has an indirect effect because it makes other policies that 
affect growth worse (Easterly, 2001:246).” Numerous scholars subsequently applied this 
theory to resource-rich states and reached similar conclusions. For example, Kolstad and 
Wiig (2009:521) argued that corruption is key when explaining why resource-rich states have 
poor socio-economic development. Auty (2009:43) suggests patronage erodes institutions 
and Aaronson (2011:51) believes it has a direct impact on corporate profits, business risk 
levels, investment and access to public services, governance and democracy, corporate social 
responsibility and attraction of inward investment and support.  
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Regarding the oil sector specifically, scholars have consistently shown a link between 
resource rents and corruption. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) found that corruption, 
rather than Dutch disease, caused poor economic performance in Nigeria. Damania and Bulte 
(2003:24) built on the earlier work of Leite and Weidmann (1999) and found that the greater 
the level of natural resources in a state, the higher its levels of corruption. Petermann et al. 
(2007:99) looked empirically at differences between fuel and non-fuel exports and their 
impacts on corruption and, whilst their study is limited in that it only covers the period from 
1998-2002 and that it accepts the causal links are complex, they concluded that fuel exports 
have an unambiguous and persistent impact on corruption: as dependency on these exports 
increases, so too does corruption. Bhattacharyya and Hodler’s (2009:608-609) extensive 
study was conducted in reaction to the small amount of existing literature on rents and 
corruption and analysed panel data for 124 states between 1980 and 2004–a welcomingly 
broader period than Petermann et al.’s study. They concluded that there is a link between 
resource rents and increased corruption, one which is dependent on the quality of democratic 
institutions in the relevant state. With similar motivation, Arezki and Brückner (2011:955, 
961-962) examined 30 oil-exporting states between 1992 and 2005 to show that oil rents 
significantly increase corruption. More recently, Busse and Gröning (2013:15) concluded that 
natural resources increase the opportunities available for corruption, particularly in 
developing states and specifically in Africa. Interestingly, studies by both Vicente (2010:37) 
and Frynas, Wood and Hinks (2017:236) suggest that even the expectation of a resource 
boom can lead to increased levels of corruption, with the former’s analysis of how expected 
booms in both Sao Tome e Principe and Cape Verde resulting in a recommendation that there 
is a need to monitor the political arena after a resource discovery to ensure national laws are 
put in place and internal and international supervision exists in order to prevent 
misappropriation of natural resource revenues by politicians. 
 
This is not to say that corruption is solely a problem for resource-rich or oil states, however 
they are particularly susceptible. “The oil sector is prone to mismanagement and abuse 
because of the magnitude of the revenues at stake, its enclave-sector nature with few people 
involved, and the complexity of fiscal arrangements (Cossé, 2006:10).” Ferguson (2005:378) 
agrees, arguing that traditionally the oil sector is like an enclave where IOCs operate 
separately to the rest of society: they are often incorporated offshore, they use private security 
and infrastructure and they send their funds offshore. Darby (2009:24) and Healy, 
Kuppuswamy and Serafeim (2011:6) both point to the fact that the scale of the sector and its 
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revenues leans towards domination by monopolies and oligopolies, particularly foreign 
companies, and McPherson and MacSearraigh (2007:196-197) agree, arguing that this means 
there is a concentration of revenue flows which permits limited accountability. Cossé 
(2006:10), McPherson and MacSearraigh (2007:196-197) and Healy et al. (2011:6) all concur 
that the sector’s complexity–both technically and structurally–opens the door for corrupt 
activity, the latter highlighting in particular the complexity of the legal, fiscal and commercial 
agreements (Healy et al., 2011:6). The assumption is that this complexity allows less 
opportunity for accountability in the sector as few are in a position to decipher its workings. 
An additional factor that is said to pave the way for corruption is the involvement of the 
government, such involvement justified because of the strategic significance of the sector to 
the state (McPherson & MacSearraigh, 2007:196-197; Healy et al., 2011:6). Government’s 
dominance and oversight over the sector naturally increases opportunity for corruption and 
patronage and again a lack of oversight where transparency is low. Finally, McPherson and 
MacSearraigh (2007:196-197) suggest that the structure of the oil sector is such that there are 
a large number of transactions throughout the value chain, therefore granting many 
opportunities to corrupt in small fractions which further makes detection difficult. The 
overarching point is that there is seemingly little opportunity for transparency and 
accountability and much opportunity for corruption in the oil sector.  
 
2.1.2 Rent-seeking and the Rentier Effect 
 
Because of the exceptionally high potential rents they can generate, combined with 
the finite life of the resources, extractive industries have turned many resource-
abundant countries into honey-pots, raided by all actors, domestic and foreign, 
regardless of the long-term consequences of this collective rent-seeking. Citizens in 
resource-rich countries have in general lacked information about the true value of the 
resources, the revenues generated by them and the spending of the receipts, since the 
extractive sector has, by tradition, closed its doors to public scrutiny. This opacity in 
the industry has also resulted in a lack of technical knowledge that limits the ability 
of outsiders to engage on complex issues (Ölcer, 2009:8). 
 
Like patronage, rent-seeking is a form of corruption and there is thus overlapping literature 
(Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2009:609), with much of the literature on corruption discussed 
above also applicable to rent-seeking. For example, Leite and Weidmann (1999) were 
amongst the first to highlight the fact that resources increase opportunities for rent-seeking 
and are a therefore factor in corruption levels in that state, and a number of scholars similarly 
concluded that resource booms are very likely to lead to rent-seeking (Lane & Tornell, 1996; 
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Tornell & Lane, 1999; Baland & Francois, 2000:527-529). That said, there is a distinct body 
of literature that discusses rentier state theory (Mahdavy, 1970; Anderson, 1987; Beblawi & 
Luciani, 1987; Ross, 2001; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Moore, 2004; Weinthal & Luong, 
2006) and which therefore requires separate consideration.  
 
‘Rentier states’ can be defined as states “that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of 
external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, 
concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country 
(Mahdavy, 1970:428).” Mahdavy’s (1970:428) definition of a rentier state gave the term its 
currently understood meaning–he was the first to explore the concept–but this was refined by 
Beblawi who added that the rents are paid to the government and only a few actors are 
involved in generating the rents (Ross, 2001:329). Mahdavy’s ground-breaking study focused 
largely on Iran (1970), with Beblawi & Luciani (1987) expanding this focus to the Middle 
East and Arab states more generally. However, it was not until Yates (1996) and Ross (2001) 
that the rentier state concept was expanded beyond the Middle East and seen as a more 
globally-applicable problem. Yates (1996) focused on Gabon between 1975 and 1985 but 
also examined Nigeria, Angola, Congo and Cameroon and set out with the intention of telling 
the story of rentier states in Africa as a whole. Ross (2001) meanwhile took this even further 
and analysed data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997.  
 
The concept is that “states based on external sources of income are substantially different 
from states based on domestic taxation (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987:10).” As defined, this 
clearly captures many oil-exporting states where oil revenues flow into the state from foreign 
entities. As discussed with corruption more generally in Chapter 2.1.1, the oil sector appears 
to be at particular risk of rent-seeking due to the ‘point-source’ nature of the resource (Sala-i-
Martin & Subramanian, 2003; Kolstad & Søreide, 2009:215; Arezki & van der Ploeg, 
2011:519; Williams, 2011:499; Frankel, 2012:10). Point-source resources are those from a 
narrow economic or geographic base, like minerals and fuels (Isham, Pritchett, Woolcock and 
Busby, 20015:141), thus capturing oil and gas. In their study of Nigeria, Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003:13) found that such point-source resources create easily appropriable and 
high rents and therefore have a more robust and systematic effect on growth by way of their 
negative effect on institutional quality. Specifically, Moore (2004:305) argues that this is 
because the physical concentration of the resource naturally leads to the resource being 
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concentrated in the hands of few and they have the potential to create huge surplus rents ripe 
for rent-seeking. 
 
Rent-cycling theory suggests that low rents incentivise efficiency and growth as the 
government must tax to gain revenues, so rent is channelled through markets as opposed to 
patronage networks (Auty, 2009:34). Therefore, where rents are high the opposite occurs and 
instead rentier states are created and they “live largely off unearned income: the state is 
resourced with little organisational or political effort on the part of the state apparatus, and 
especially little such effort in relation to their domestic populations (Moore, 2004:304).” 
Essentially, oil revenues can result in the state’s financial autonomy so domestic taxpayers 
have less importance to the government and, in turn, the state no longer needs to be 
accountable to its population as it is not dependent on them for taxation revenues. As 
Mahdavy (1970:432) found with Iran, oil revenues permit the government to have large 
public expenditure with little need for taxation, balance of payments problems or inflation. 
For Collier (2006:1484), the checks and balances required to prevent rent-seeking and 
patronage are the very restraints eroded when the need to tax is lowered due to rents. 
McGuirk’s (2013:309) recent empirical study further showed that as resource rents increase 
the taxation burden in a state decreases, his explanation being that it is done “as a means of 
rendering them [the populace] more acquiescent to the current regime’s policies.” The result 
is government spending of oil wealth and therefore “getting access to the oil rents becomes 
cardinal. This cultivates a culture of dependence and a rentier mentality in the elite (Yates, 
2009:7).”  
 
It is argued that this ‘rentier effect’ has numerous consequences. For Ross (2001:330), these 
consequences are either economic or political. The former involves less economic growth, 
whereas the latter involve less democracy. Torvik (2002:469) suggests that rentier state 
theory can be used as an alternative explanation for economic effects of the curse in place of 
Dutch disease, arguing that “more natural resources are likely to stimulate rent-seeking that 
results in fewer manufacturing firms and lower average productivity, rather than harming the 
productivity in traded sector agriculture as an application of standard Dutch disease theories 
would suggest, or increasing productivity in domestic manufacturing.” Furthermore, as well 
as the basic economic problems caused by a direct diversion of resources through rent-
seeking and the rentier effect, Frynas et al. (2017:236) believe that  
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given their dependence on extractive revenues, governments in resource-rich 
countries have greater incentives to focus their efforts on political competition to 
capture resource rents and on patronage to pay off political supporters to stay in 
power, rather than on encouraging the creation of wealth by improving the quality of 
societal institutions. 
 
Regarding political consequences, Moore (2004:306-307) has discussed seven ‘political 
pathologies’ which are generated from a state reliance on oil revenues in place of taxation: (i) 
government autonomy from citizens; (ii) increased external, foreign intervention that further 
exacerbates government autonomy; (iii) coupism and countercoupism; (iv) reduced 
incentives for civic politics; (v) a vulnerability to subversion; (vi) non-transparency in public 
expenditure; and (vii) ineffective public bureaucracy. Busse and Gröning (2013:2) reveal the 
political impact by dividing the rentier effect into three further categories. Firstly, the 
‘taxation effect’ discussed above where the need to tax is reduced; this can consequently 
hinder representative political systems and can cause lower demands from the population for 
government accountability and institutional improvement. Secondly the ‘spending effect’, 
where easily obtained revenues are spent, for example, on patronage (which similarly tends to 
decrease pressure for democratisation). Thirdly, the ‘group formation’ effect, which sees 
suppression of special interest or social groups by the government who use revenues to curb 
the activity of these groups, such groups often being key in pushing for the promotion of 
political rights. For Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004:162-163), rent-seeking and the 
rentier effect can also help sustain kleptocrats when rents are used to bribe groups and this 
sees the state “controlled and run for the benefit of an individual, or a small group, who use 
their power to transfer a large fraction of society’s resources to themselves.” In sum, there are 
many negative political consequences for rentier states where rent-seeking is permitted to 
flourish. 
 
2.1.3 A Threat to Democracy? 
 
The political effects of the curse are not simply restricted to corruption and rent-seeking. For 
example, the analysis above lends itself to the theory that resource rents threaten democracy. 
Specifically, there is an argument that taxation is required to permit democracy through 
accountability (Frankel, 2012:9-10) and that resource rents prevent this from occurring due to 
the rentier effect. Auty (2006:20) concludes that low-rent states have a better chance of 
democratisation and economic growth and this conclusion clearly draws on the rentier state 
theory discussed above (Ahmadov, 2013). As with rentier state theories, the initial focus for 
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scholars suggesting resources can negatively impact democratic levels focused on the Middle 
East, but again Ross (2001:356) expanded the analysis and found there was a broader link 
between resource abundance and a lack of democracy, particularly in poorer states. Jensen 
and Wantchekon (2004:816) empirically analysed resource-rich states in Africa between 
1970 and 1995 and found a distinct correlation between high resource abundance and poor 
democratic levels. Isham et al. (2005:146-149) then built on Ross and found that in addition 
to the lack of accountability caused by low taxation levels, governments were able to use 
rents to mollify revenues and to repress dissent, and Ahmadov (2013:1260) found the same in 
a more recent study of oil-rich states in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Indeed, there are those who argue that autocracies tend to perform better than democracies in 
resource-rich states (Collier, 2006; Collier, 2007; Collier & Hoeffler, 2009; Wright, Frantz & 
Geddes, 2013). Referring to his 2005 work with Hoeffler, Collier (2006:1484) suggests that 
“resource rents subvert and indeed reverse the normally beneficial economic effects of 
democracy. In the absence of resource rents democracies grow more rapidly than autocracies, 
but with large resource rents autocracies outperform democracies.” Later he argued this is 
caused by a malfunction of democracy, largely because “oil and other surpluses from natural 
resources are particularly unsuited to the pressures generated by electoral competition 
(Collier, 2007:43).” His belief is that autocracies outperform democracies in terms of 
economic growth when around eight per cent. of the national income is derived from natural 
resources (Collier, 2006: 1484). The general consensus in the literature is that oil wealth 
ultimately deters the forces of democratisation and increases the chances of autocratic regime 
survival (Wright et al., 2013:288), but it is worth noting that there are some who believe 
instead that it permits spending on measures (including on the military) which suppress 
challenges from other autocrats (Isham et al., 2005:146-149; Wright et al., 2013:289). 
Further, there are others who believe that there is little evidence to prove that natural resource 
wealth has an impact on democratic levels (Karl, 1997; Dunning, 2008; Corrigan, 2014:17) 
and Dunning (2008:278) points to resource-rich states such as Botswana, Bolivia, Chile, 
Australia, Norway, the United Kingdom and Ecuador which are largely considered to be full 
democracies despite their significant resource wealth. 
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2.1.4 Conflict 
 
Another important political consequence of resource abundance is susceptibility to conflict. 
In their study of 30 states Arezki and Brückner (2011:961) found no link between resource 
wealth and conflict, and Clarke (2007:68) similarly argues that there is “no simple causal 
nexus [which] ties oil to wars and hence inevitable conflict: many dimensions have marked 
most struggles even within petroliferous states.” For Clarke (2007:187) oil is susceptible to 
terrorism and hostile state action due to its long-life cycle, its slow pace of development and 
the fact hard assets tend to be sitting targets, but he believes there is no causal link to civil 
conflict. Nonetheless, many have argued otherwise (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Hodler, 2006; 
Bjorvatn & Naghavi, 2011; Frynas et al., 2017). Collier and Hoeffler (1998:568-569) 
concluded that initially resource-rich states are more likely to experience civil conflict than 
states with no natural resources, however the chances of conflict decrease as resource wealth 
increases as this corresponds with increased state power and government financial capability 
which in turn permits spending on military defence (1998:271). Bjorvatn and Naghavi 
(2011:741) later reached the same conclusion. Interestingly, Hodler (2006) found that 
ethnically fractionalised, resource-rich societies have a greater risk of conflict, whilst Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998:571-572) found the opposite. Instead, the latter found that societies with 
two key power groups have a 50 per cent. higher risk of conflict than homogenous or highly 
fractionalised societies (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998:571-572). 
 
2.1.5 Summary 
 
What is clear from the analysis above is that the resource curse has political as well as 
economic dimensions. The general view is that the resources–in particular the revenues they 
generate–are used ineffectively and there is wastage. The bulk of the literature demonstrates 
that resource-rich states tend to see higher levels of corruption and rent-seeking which in turn 
hampers economic growth, democratisation and human development. For states rich in oil 
this can be a significant problem and civil conflict might arise: 
over time, reliance on energy to fuel growth can in fact undermine growth and 
effective governance. Without productive investment in the economy as a whole, 
government officials both depend upon and favour oil for growth. Entrenched 
policymakers may funnel petrodollars to their allies and families to stay in power. 
Corruption can become endemic. Eventually, many such countries are at increased 
risk for conflict and even state failure (Aaronson, 2008). 
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Chapter 2.2 will examine the theory that effective governance and transparency can help curb 
the onset of such problems. 
 
2.2 Good Governance and Transparency 
 
“In most countries, the profits from oil exports are more likely to contribute to clientelism, 
corruption, human rights abuses, and conflict than to benefit the broad majority of citizens. 
This is the direct result of bad resource governance (Benner & Soares de Oliveira, 
2010:309).” Many commentators believe that political causes and consequences of the 
resource curse are due to bad governance, holding the view that better governance, 
institutions and policies would help overcome or lessen the impact of the curse by curbing 
corruption and rent-seeking (Damania & Bulte, 2003; Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, 2006; 
Collier & Goderis, 2012; Kolstad & Søreide, 2009:217; Stevens et al., 2015:2-3; Frynas et 
al., 2017:259). The global good governance initiatives that emerged in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s gained a foothold at a time when the academic resource curse literature more 
generally was expanding, with the curse termed as ‘bad resource governance’ (Van Alstine et 
al., 2014:49). In his widely read and well commended book ‘The Bottom Billion’, economist 
Paul Collier included bad governance as one of his four ‘traps’ alongside that of natural 
resources, arguing that although avoiding economic problems are important in escaping such 
traps, governance of natural resources is key (Collier, 2007:42). In essence, a standpoint 
emerged where the curse was no longer seen as inevitable and that good management could 
help overcome it (Herringshaw, 2004:175). Botswana’s apparent avoidance of the curse was 
seen as good evidence of such, with numerous commentators pointing to its effective 
governance and strong institutions (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001:1, 17; Iimi, 2006). 
 
2.2.1 The Concept of Governance 
 
“An oft-repeated mantra is that good governance is vital in avoiding the resource curse. But 
‘governance’ is a difficult concept to pin down (Shepherd, 2013:vi).” In the late 1990s when 
governance became the focus of international attention, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón (1999) introduced six new aggregate measures using over 300 indicators for the 
World Bank to enable it to produce its Worldwide Governance Indicators index. The six 
indicators were regulatory burden; rule of law; graft; government effectiveness; political 
instability and violence; and voice and accountability. They broadly defined governance  
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as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This 
includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, 
(2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann et al., 1999:1). 
 
By 2009 the six indicators remained largely the same, but ‘regulatory burden’ had become 
‘regulatory quality’; ‘political instability and violence’ became ‘political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism’; and ‘graft’ had changed to ‘control of corruption’ (Kaufmann, 
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009). However, the definition of governance from 1999 (as cited above) 
remains the same in the most recent Worldwide Governance Indicators (2017) publications, 
publications which are still produced by Kaufmann and Kraay. In her work on Botswana, 
Iimi (2006:10) used these World Bank indicators as the basis for her analysis, concluding that 
the most important for resource-rich developing states promoting good governance are voice 
and accountability and government effectiveness, complemented by market-friendly and anti-
corruption policies.  
 
However, what good governance means in reality is also important. For McPherson and 
MacSearraigh (2007:194) it “has several dimensions, including clear and stable laws; the rule 
of law; high levels of capacity in government; fiscal, monetary, and budgetary discipline; and 
open dialogue between government and society. The absence of corruption, however, is one 
of good governance’s cornerstones.” Lahn, Marcel, Mitchell, Myers and Stevens (2007a:8) 
agree that it has numerous dimensions, the five key elements being “clarity of goals, roles 
and responsibility; sustainable development for future generations; enablement to carry out 
the role assigned; accountability of decision-making and performance and transparency; and 
accuracy of information.” Regarding petroleum sector governance in particular, Lahn et al. 
(2007b:2) highlight the importance of organisation, processes, policies, objectives and 
regulation:  
petroleum sector governance refers to the system for making and implementing 
decisions concerning the exploitation of a nation’s oil and gas resources. It includes 
the structural and hierarchical organisation of the sector, its decision-making and 
communication processes, the policies and objectives governing its activities and the 
regulation of those activities. 
 
In sum, Van Alstine et al. (2014:49) clarify governance’s meaning for the natural resources 
sector “as the hard and soft rules which shape and constrain the way hydrocarbons contribute 
to sustainable development and poverty alleviation within host countries (Van Alstine et al., 
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2014:49).” In practice, the quality of such governance can be addressed through numerous 
means including incentive structures, regulatory and legal frameworks, institutional and 
political (including policy) frameworks and capacity, as well as through transparency and 
accountability (Desai & Jarvis, 2012:108).  
 
2.2.2 The Impact of Good Governance 
 
The primary justification for advocating good governance is that it can change institutions. 
Institutionalist thinking thus underpins the ‘good governance’ agenda within the international 
development sphere (Hickey & Izama, 2017:163-164) and, as noted above, Botswana is 
commonly cited as a working, successful example (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001a; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001b; Iimi, 2006:9; Meijia & Castel, 2012). In his study of the impact of 
institutions on economic growth, North (1990) found that they are relevant for economic 
performance and explain variations between different states, for some benefit growth and 
some cause stagnation. Easterly (2001:250-252) agrees, arguing that strong institutions can 
prevent corruption and create incentives for better government: they provide checks and 
balances as opposed to pay-off opportunities. More recently, Andreula, Chong and Guillén 
(2009:13) conducted a survey of 82 states to analyse the levels of fiscal transparency and 
found that the higher the level of institutional quality or governance, the higher the levels of 
fiscal transparency. Regarding the impact of good governance on the effects of the resource 
curse specifically, although Ahmadov (2013:1260) has questioned whether improved 
governance and institutions can help economic effects, he does believe they can help curb the 
political effects. Mehlum et al. (2006:1) studied panel data for 42 states where more than 10 
per cent. of gross domestic product (GDP) was made up from resource export revenue, 
concluding that the quality of institutions is key when explaining difference in success for 
resource-rich states, depending on whether they are “grabber friendly” or “producer 
friendly.” Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) both find that rent-seeking 
and resource-grabbing happens when there are dysfunctional institutions, with Mehlum et al. 
(2006:3) citing Venezuela, Nigeria and Mexico as examples. It is worth noting that Mehlum 
et al.’s (2006) findings stand in contrast to those of Sachs and Warner (1995) who found that 
resources do not deteriorate institutions and that Dutch disease is a more applicable 
explanation for the curse. However, Mehlum et al. (2006:3,12) argue that this analysis has no 
relevance for explaining how institutions can affect growth in a resource-rich state. 
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2.2.3 Governance in the Oil Sector 
 
“Producing oil seems to be a bit like cocaine: if you are already healthy it might invigorate 
you, but if you are weak or sick, as many African countries are, it can do you serious harm 
(Shaxson, 2007:5).” As touched on above, there is a belief that natural resources can foster 
corruption and rent-seeking in states that have poor democratic institutions (Bhattacharyya & 
Hodler, 2009:619). Further, whilst strong institutions are considered by some as necessary to 
ensure checks and balances on a state’s oil sector are in place, there is also a warning that 
resource rents tend to erode these very institutions (Collier, 2007:46; Collier & Hoeffler, 
2009:305; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003:6). As with solutions proposed to economic 
aspects of the curse, such as the creation of stabilisation and savings funds or the 
encouragement of diversification, solutions to poor governance and weak institutions are 
focused on policy improvements (Alba, 2009:24). Islam (2003:36) is one of many who 
suggests that governments must share information to benefit from better policy-making, 
which in turn will lead to better governance and economic growth. Transparency and scrutiny 
are thus forwarded as positive steps to improving governance.  
Scrutiny of government is a public good, the supply of which is commonly provoked 
by the tax burden. The lack of scrutiny in countries with large resource rents makes it 
easier for public revenues to be diverted into patronage: not only are public revenues 
larger, but they are also less well defended. Hence, on this thesis, resource rents 
subvert democracy by making patronage politics financially feasible. In such 
environments, trust must be placed not in the good faith of political parties, but in the 
efficacy of appropriate checks and balances that enforce accountability of politicians 
to citizens (Collier, 2006:1484). 
  
Corrigan (2014:19) latterly agreed with Collier, arguing that scrutiny is of paramount 
importance in resource-rich states where levels of scrutiny, transparency and therefore 
accountability tend to be lower because there is no (or limited) citizens’ tax burden.  
 
In sum, the current consensus is that it is not oil itself which is the issue but that it is a case of 
bad governance which can be fixed. Shaxson (2007:7) famously called oil “the corrupting, 
poisonous substance” and wrote that “ExxonMobil likes to say that there is no resource curse, 
just a governance curse. This is like saying of a heroin addict with criminal tendencies that 
there is no drug problem, just a criminal problem (2007:235).” For Shaxson (2007:235), it is 
oil that is the problem, not corruption or bad behaviour. Ghazvinian (2007) is of a similar 
opinion and Watts (2004:199) had earlier concluded the same during his study of Nigeria 
where he argued that although petro-states are hugely varied, one thing they have in common 
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is that oil is central to how communities are made and broken. Nevertheless, the analysis 
above has shown that there are convincing arguments to suggest instead that “the ‘resource 
curse’ phenomenon should be attributed more to the corruption and mismanagement of 
resource revenues than to the resources themselves (Al Faruque, 2015:68),” particularly in 
Africa. Clarke (2007; 2008) believes bad governance is to blame, attacking Shaxson and 
Ghazvinian for blaming oil (2008:532-536) and instead stating that “most often African 
countries are found to be cursed by their politicians (2008:531).” Heilbrunn (2014:34) has an 
even more optimistic view, believing that “African petrostates are better off with oil than they 
would have been had oil companies never discovered the oil and gas.” Domestic policy and 
the response to an influx of resource rents are considered key and the focus on promoting 
transparency is borne from this belief. 
 
2.2.4 Calls for Transparency 
 
A desire to improve governance in resource-rich states led to a focus on promoting 
transparency (Islam, 2003). Transparency was–and often still is–seen as the “Swiss Army 
knife of policy tools (Haufler, 2010:56)” and therefore “emerged as the most broadly 
recommended policy response to the poor governance records in resource-rich states and 
their damaging developmental effects (Gillies & Heuty, 2011:26).” Many global initiatives 
were created on the basis that “sunlight is the best disinfectant (David-Barrett & Okamura, 
2013:3),” with the primary target of these initiatives being corruption and rent-seeking: Yates 
(2012:223) sees corruption as “a plant that grows best in darkness, and tends to wither when 
exposed to the light.” As Ölcer (2009:17) argues, transparency within the oil sector is deemed 
necessary if there is to be any informed debate or scrutiny. 
 
As a concept, transparency can be defined as “the public disclosure of information in 
accessible formats (Gillies & Heuty, 2011:28).” How this manifests specifically in the oil 
sector will be discussed in Chapter 2.3 below, but it is important to note that whilst initial 
focus was placed on transparency of government revenues and payments to the government 
from the private sector, this has subsequently expanded to incorporate the entire value chain. 
Many scholars now accept that whilst transparency of government revenues is important, 
corruption is often worse in government expenditure than it is in revenues (Shaxson, 
2007:218) and there thus needs to be a clear and transparent expenditure process (Gary & 
Karl, 2003:78; Kolstad & Søreide, 2009:217; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009:521; Gillies, 2010; 
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Shepherd, 2013). For Shepherd (2013:vii-viii), “the biggest threat that oil poses to this 
harmony [between government and society] would come from allowing rumour and 
speculation to dominate, notably over how revenues are allocated. It is for this reason that 
transparency is vital.” However, it is not just monetary flows that are considered important. 
Healy et al. (2011:13) divide the information that should be made transparent into two 
categories: payment and performance. Whilst the former captures revenues, profits, profit 
taxes and royalties, the latter also captures information such as production volumes and 
reserves. Gillies (2010:105-106) agrees, arguing that oil sector transparency as a norm should 
mean that the public “enjoy greater access to information about the revenue flows and 
operations of the petroleum industry” and she suggests this includes revenue flows (that is 
payments by oil companies to governments, including in-kind gifts, as well as flows of 
revenue between government agencies), revenue management (including investment 
strategies and funds), revenue expenditure and also information on industry operations.  
 
2.2.5 The Intended Impact of Transparency 
 
As mentioned, many believe that transparency can help lower corruption and rent-seeking 
and therefore can improve governance in resource-rich states. It is widely accepted that 
payment and information disclosure can help citizens hold their governments accountable, 
thus reducing corruption and rent-seeking, improving management of the sector, reducing 
conflict and promoting sustainable development (Haufler, 2010:53). Somewhat dauntingly, 
the supposed impacts of transparency are vast. In 2010 the Institute of Development Studies 
undertook a literature review to determine what scholars believed transparency could 
achieve. The findings were summarised as follows by Gillies and Heuty (2011:28):  
improved public services, re-direction of resources to poor neighbourhoods, creation 
of new civic associations, reducing clientelism, enhanced democratic representation, 
less leakage in public expenditure, public participation, trust, improved decision 
making, better public understanding of decision making, fulfilment of socioeconomic 
rights, like access to water, less corruption, improved public financial management, 
improved business environment, empower the public, empower reformers, empower 
local voices, better budget utilisation and better delivery of services, increased state 
or institutional responsiveness, new democratic spaces for citizen engagement. 
 
Nevertheless, the impacts that receive most academic attention can be grouped into the 
following: reduced corruption (including rent-seeking), greater trust between government and 
society and improved economic growth. 
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Regarding corruption and rent-seeking, Kolstad and Wiig (2009:522) argue that transparency 
has a direct impact on the detection of corruption and therefore the probability that those 
involved will be caught. If an oil company’s cost structure is transparent then there is a lower 
chance of officials being able to distort figures (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009:522). Rent-seeking 
should thus decrease as the government would no longer hold all of the information, 
particularly as “secrecy is an important way in which government officials attempt to 
influence public opinion or create rents for themselves (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009:523-524).” 
Corrigan (2014:19) agrees and argues transparency should make it harder for the government 
to divert its resource revenues to channels of patronage, rent-seeking or other forms of 
corruption.  
 
As well as removing the cover for corruption, Lahn et al. (2007a:14) and Marcel (2016:26-
28) believe that transparency correspondingly builds trust. Eigen, the founder of TI and then 
chairman of the EITI, said in a speech to oil industry members in Houston that a key aim of 
the EITI is to increase trust (2006:38), and Al Faruque (2015:68-70) takes this further by 
suggesting that such trust between communities, governments and oil companies is necessary 
in order to add stability and reduce the likelihood of conflict which can correspondingly be 
increased by secrecy. Another helpful way of looking at how transparency can help reduce 
corrupt activity is to do as Kolstad and Wiig (2009:522) did and determine what a lack of 
transparency can do. For them, various bureaucratic assumptions exist which show that a lack 
of transparency has the following impacts: (i) “makes corruption less risky and more 
attractive”; (ii) “makes it harder to use incentives to make public officials act cleanly”; (iii) 
“makes it hard to select the most honest and efficient people for public sector positions or as 
contract partners”; (iv) “informational advantages give access to rents, making reform 
difficult”; (v) “makes co-operation more difficult to sustain, and opportunistic rent-seeking 
more likely”; and (vi) “may undermine social norms and reduce trust.” 
 
Linked to a reduction in corrupt activity garnered by greater transparency is the impact a 
more open sector would have on promoting economic growth. By encouraging more effective 
policymaking and a sensible distribution of revenues, in his study Cossé (2006:10) found 
evidence that transparency aids economic growth. Gary and Karl (2003:78), Corrigan 
(2014:19) and Al Faruque (2015:68) agree, with the latter citing better management of 
revenues as crucial to ensuring the entire population benefits. Al Faruque (2015:68-70) 
further argues that transparency helps encourage a stable business and investment climate, 
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something that Eigen (2006) also believes. For Eigen (2006:338-339), transparency should 
increase investment as direct foreign investment is harmed by perceptions of corruption and 
transparency reduces this risk. He further suggests that corporates operating in transparent 
climates will gain better reputations, thus attracting better employees and investors than 
corporates considered as opaque (Eigen, 2006:339).  
 
 
Proponents of transparency argue that it makes markets work more efficiently; 
enhances trust and co-operation; strengthens institutions; reduces corruption and 
mismanagement; enables people to hold others accountable for their actions; and 
increases the legitimacy of decisions and institutions (Haufler, 2010:55). 
 
In sum, the concept of increased transparency is rooted in an assumption that more 
information is better than less. Information disconnects or asymmetries are a problem and 
transparency helps to level the playing field. Gillies and Heuty (2011:31) argue that 
“information asymmetries facilitate rent-seeking behaviour and permit those in charge to 
utilise the country’s resource wealth to advance their personal and political aims.” If 
transparency can help to remove these information enclaves and in turn lead to policy 
improvements, there should be less wastage of resource wealth. “Decisions made in a 
vacuum fail to benefit from multiple views and available expertise, and they are subject to 
little scrutiny (Gillies & Heuty, 2011:31).” Williams (2009:124) agrees with Gillies and 
Heuty, arguing that information “can help to reduce the problems associated with 
informational asymmetries between parties, a fact that has been well-known in the theoretical 
economic literature for many years.” Figure 2.1, produced by Gillies and Heuty, helpfully 
shows in diagrammatical format these impacts on the political economy of a resource-rich 
state, including how they help obtain good governance. The ‘Level I’ effects are the direct 
effects and have an impact on the incentives of individuals to act ‘well’, whereas the ‘Level 
II’ effects are indirect and are dependent on the costs of corruption outweighing the potential 
gains if the incentives created by Level I are to be successful. 
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2.2.6 Inherent Difficulties in Measuring Effectiveness 
 
Whilst the literature is on the whole agreed that there is a link between oil rents, corruption 
and rent-seeking, it is important to note that there is also acknowledgement that it is inherently 
difficult to test causality and also to test the effectiveness of transparency initiatives (Kolstad 
& Wiig, 2009:521; Mejia Acosta, 2010:7-9; Arezki & Brückner, 2011:961; Gillies & Heuty, 
2011:26-30). That is not to say scholars and commentators have not tried and the wealth of 
studies on the impact and effectiveness of the EITI is testament to this (see for example 
Aaronson, 2008; 2011; Darby, 2009; Hilson & Maconachie, 2009; Ölcer, 2009; Shaxson, 
2009; Keblusek, 2010; Scanteam, 2011; David-Barrett & Okamura, 2013; Corrigan, 2014; 
Sovacool & Andrews, 2015; Rustad, Le Billon & Lujala, 2017). However, there are some 
inherent methodological issues: “one methodological problem in evaluating the governance 
impact of resource extraction is the hidden nature of corrupt dealings that may be an integral 
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part of transactions with government but may not be known or prosecuted (Frynas et al., 
2017:250-251).” Further, Clarke (2007; 2008) is wary of corruption statistics in general as 
they tend to be subjective and based on individual perceptions of corrupt practices without 
being empirically tested (2008:526). Gillies and Heuty (2011:26-30) highlight the confusion 
between effectiveness and impact, and they believe sampling issues are common. For them it 
is impossible to directly compare states and to account for time inconsistencies–for example 
between implementation and effect–and attribution, where transparency initiatives are likely to 
be happening at the same time as other reforms making it hard to tell which reform is having 
an effect. Mejia Acosta (2010:7-9) agrees, noting the difficulty in measuring effectiveness 
both qualitatively and quantitatively when key hurdles relate to attribution–that is identifying 
the relevant factors for change, and timing–that is measuring the lapse of time between 
implementation of initiatives and change. 
 
2.3 The Reality of Transparency in the Oil Sector 
 
Although there is an increasing body of literature discussing the merits of transparency, there 
is still a limited analysis of exactly what form this transparency should take in the oil sector. 
Indeed, a large part of the existing analysis is produced by civil society organisations and by 
the international transparency and governance initiatives themselves (for example, Lahn et 
al., 2007a; Lahn et al., 2007b; Alba, 2009; NRGI, 2014; EITI, 2016; NRGI, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the analysis to date is relatively consistent on how transparency should be 
applied to the sector. As discussed in Chapter 2.2.4 above, there has been a notable shift of 
focus from simply promoting revenue transparency to capturing the entire value chain. This 
is reflected by the broadened scope of the EITI Standard in recent years which now captures 
transparency of contracts and licences, production, revenue collection and revenue allocation 
as well as social and economic contribution (EITI, 2016). The consensus is thus that the 
entire value chain of an oil project should be more transparent. Van Alstine et al. (2014:50) 
cite the World Bank’s value chain for extractive sector transparency as a good starting point 
for, although limited in some respects, it covers more than just revenue and similarly to the 
new EITI Standard includes: “(i) award of contracts and licenses; (ii) regulation and 
monitoring of operations; (iii) collection of taxes and royalties; (iv) revenue management and 
allocation; and (v) implementation of sustainable development policies and projects.” 
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In their report for Chatham House, Lahn et al. (2007a:56) produced a series of benchmarks 
that should be applied in order to promote transparency and good governance in the 
petroleum sector generally. These include ensuring that “a simple, comprehensive guide to 
the petroleum sector governance structure is available publicly” and that “the government 
and other shareholders receive timely and accurate financial and operational information 
from operators (Lahn et al., 2007a:56).” Where information about the sector is not publicly-
available, Lahn et al. (2007a:56) suggest that “the rationale for that confidentiality is 
explained and justified,” and they also suggest that the criteria for awarding licences and 
material government procurement contracts (including by the NOC) are published and 
explained. Although the scope of this current study does not permit a detailed discussion of 
the academic debates surrounding the practical implementation of transparency throughout 
the oil sector’s value chain, the following sections will provide an overview of the 
commentary on the key areas of the sector where it is argued transparency might most 
usefully be implemented. 
 
2.3.1 Award of Contracts and Licences 
 
This is one area of the value chain that attracts regular demands for greater transparency (see 
Collier, 2007:140; Lahn et al., 2007a; Alba, 2009:3; Ölcer, 2009:20; Caspary, 2012:174). It is 
important because it comes as one of the first steps in the chain and, as Ölcer (2009:20) 
states, is a step often associated with corruption. The argument is that by making the 
licensing and bidding process for oil exploration and production rights more transparent, 
public trust is increased and so is competition between the bidders, thus attracting higher 
quality and better qualified IOCs (Lahn et al., 2007a:57). Alba (2009:6) agrees, suggesting 
that transparent and competitive bidding procedures will help promote competition which in 
turn is of benefit to the host state. Caspary (2012:174) argues that there should therefore be 
“transparent, competitive, and nondiscretional procedures for the award of exploration, 
development, and production rights” and that these procedures be “embedded in a clear legal, 
regulatory, and contractual framework, which is upheld by a set of institutions with clearly 
defined responsibilities,” something Alba (2009:23) is in agreement with. Whilst Lahn et al. 
(2007a:57) do not go as far as to suggest the bidding rounds necessarily be open, they do 
believe that “whichever system a country chooses, the selection criteria (e.g. the investment 
commitment, operations record, transfer of technology, best practices, standards of business 
conduct, etc.) and reasons for the choice of winning company should be explained publicly.” 
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2.3.2 Corporate Ownership  
 
Linked to encouraging a transparent licensing and contract award process is transparency of 
ownership. Section 2.5 of the EITI Standard (EITI, 2016) currently recommends that 
governments keep a public record of who the ultimate or beneficial owners of an upstream 
licence are, yet this is not mandatory. It is also something that the NRGI’s Natural Resource 
Charter (NRC) (2014:10) recommends be put in place. In his study of petroleum ownership 
rights in Kenya, Hubert (2016) cited concern that a lack of transparency in ownership does 
little to curb IOCs from using complicated structures for tax avoidance. With oil revenues 
taking numerous forms–from corporate taxes and royalties to direct profits–any leakage of 
these revenues from the host state is likely to have a significant impact on the overall 
revenues governments receive. Hubert (2016:4) believes that the problem of companies 
operating in host states through subsidiaries registered in a tax haven “is particularly acute in 
the extractive sector, where large multinational companies establish complex corporate 
structures in order to minimise tax payments and maximize profits.” Thus, a transparent 
system whereby ownership of petroleum rights is publicly-available could help the public 
understand exactly who holds those rights. 
 
2.3.3 Revenues, Payments, Taxation and Expenditure 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.2.4, the initial focus of transparency initiatives was on flows of 
money between IOCs and governments. This includes all bonuses (including signature and 
production bonuses), royalties and taxes, all of which should be traceable and transparent 
and, ideally, made to the central bank (Alba, 2009:3,12; NRGI, 2014:10). Al Faruque 
(2015:51) places high importance on transparency of taxes and royalties because he argues 
that any windfall revenues (for example, when oil prices increase) are particularly vulnerable 
if the institutional quality is not sufficient to ensure they are allocated correctly. However, 
there is an increasing demand for transparency of revenue allocation and management by 
governments (Collier, 2007:141; Alba, 2009:14; Caspary, 2012:175). Alba (2009:24) argues 
that allocation of revenues to sub-national bodies must be transparent and Caspary 
(2012:175) suggests that opacity in expenditure of resource revenues could mean that they 
“easily end up funding corrupt practices, promoting social and economic inequalities, and 
generating intrastate or even interstate conflicts.” Whether this also demands the creation and 
monitoring of stabilisation or national savings funds, what is clear is that revenue 
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management and allocation should follow clear and transparent policies. Ultimately for 
Collier (2007:141) this is critical: “whereas transparency in public spending is always 
desirable, in the resource-rich countries it is vital.”  
 
2.3.4 Contracts 
 
The NRGI’s NRC (2014:10) and Section 2.4 of the EITI Standard (EITI, 2016) call for 
contracts and other documentation relevant to upstream projects to be publicly-available. In 
particular, focus tends to be on the key upstream project documents which might include 
licences or PSCs, joint operating agreements, shareholders’ agreements and service contracts. 
Eigen (2006:342) and Rosenblum and Maples (2009:15-17) believe that citizens have the 
right to see what is in the contracts that govern the extraction and sale of the resources they 
own, with the latter saying it is undemocratic to keep these contracts private. However, calls 
for contract transparency go further. For example, Rosenblum and Maples (2009:11-12; 46), 
who conducted an extensive study on the viability of confidentiality claims, argue that it puts 
governments in a better position for negotiating terms of future deals if they have the same 
access to information that the IOCs do. This is important in light of the fact that many 
governments of emerging oil states have far less experience in negotiating and concluding 
upstream deals than the IOCs they are negotiating with, so transparency of upstream 
contracts–even if those from other states–would help to reduce the information asymmetry 
between parties. Further, Rosenblum and Maples (2009:11-12) believe that transparency of 
contracts would aid the stability and durability of contracts, thus preventing uncertainty for 
IOCs, investors and shareholders that the terms might be renegotiated: essentially, trust 
increases and there is less suspicion between the parties. In sum, 
those who considered contract transparency of vital importance for ensuring that 
contracts maximise the public interest thought so because such contracts–when 
combined with prevailing laws and regulations–would clearly set out the beneficiaries 
of such investments, the fiscal terms (which may be either contract-specific or 
governed by legislation), the geographical extent of the investment and compensation 
measures for those affected by the development. Pushing for across-the-board 
contract transparency would, it is hoped, lead to greater harmonisation of contract 
terms both within countries as well as internationally (Darby, 2010:25). 
 
Typical arguments against disclosure of project documents tend to focus on the fact that there 
is a risk of disclosure of sensitive commercial information which will in turn induce a ‘race to 
the bottom’ where IOCs will try to compete in an unsavoury manner to get the best 
concessions (Rosenblum & Maples, 2009:17; Sovacool & Andrews, 2015:184-186). As 
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Gillies (2010:107) states, this sees the IOCs “set about wooing producer governments…[and] 
companies soften their governance, environmental and other standards so as to sharpen their 
competitive edge (2010:107).” Furthermore, many IOCs and governments will point to the 
fact that they are prevented from disclosing documents because the documents contain 
restrictive confidentiality provisions. However, as Rosenblum and Maples (2009:23, 33) 
argue, the need to keep confidential or commercially sensitive information hidden from 
public scrutiny has to be pitted against the public interest and these arguments are in 
themselves circular: it is these parties who negotiate the contracts and who could therefore 
choose to exclude restrictive confidentiality provisions, or at the very least waive them with 
consent. Darby (2009:22) also notes that such waivers to confidentiality provisions are 
common in the sector. In addition, commercially sensitive information is in itself hard to 
define and can be broad, but more importantly it is often the case that it is not even included 
in primary contracts: in their study of 150 oil and mining contracts between governments and 
companies, Rosenblum and Maples (2009:23, 33-35) found that these contracts rarely held 
information on shareholders, revenue and cash flow, merger and acquisition activity, 
employee data or reserve details, all of which might objectively be considered sensitive. 
Darby (2009:23) further points out that proprietary information is likely to either be 
geological data or that relating to costs of extraction and profitability, none of which will be 
held in primary contracts. 
 
Ultimately, the critical question is “what is the difference between the information that 
governments and companies want to keep confidential versus the information that needs to be 
confidential (Rosenblum & Maples, 2009:7)?” Legal justification for secrecy disregards 
government obligations and society’s democratic right to information (Rosenblum & Maples, 
2009:12). Moreover, Darby (2009:24) argues that many documents are already available and 
Rosenblum & Maples (2009:13) make the valid point that it is standard industry practice to 
share contracts and agreements: 
within the industry, confidential contracts are bought and sold, analysed, and even 
ranked. Some contracts, or essential details of their terms, are disclosed to investors 
pursuant to securities regulations. Others are shared among colleagues on electronic 
mailing lists. For larger projects, competitors are often co-parties to the contract, 
giving them de facto access.”  
 
Rosenblum and Maples (2009:14) concluded their study thus: “though unquestioned for 
decades, contract secrecy provides no discernible benefits for any of the parties involved. The 
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arguments for contract transparency are substantial, and the counterarguments look weak 
under scrutiny.” 
 
2.3.5 Operational Information 
 
Although the focus of transparency initiatives tends to be on the areas of the upstream value 
chain discussed above, there is an increasing recognition that more transparency relating to 
operations is required (Alba, 2009:3). For example, the NRGI’s NRC advises that national oil 
company (NOC) details and operations should be publicly-available (NRGI, 2014:10) and 
their actions should be monitored and regulated. Further, the NRC suggests that data and 
reports on all licence activity should be publicly-available, including geological surveys, 
reserve estimates and any social, economic or environmental impact assessments (NRGI, 
2014:10). Nonetheless, as suggested in Chapter 2.3.4 this leads to questions of commercially 
sensitive information disclosure and there is acknowledgment that there can be legitimate 
demands by IOCs for certain information to be kept confidential, such demands often 
capturing operational information (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009:525). This conclusion is supported 
by the findings of Healy et al. (2011:2-4) who studied the supposed costs to companies of 
revealing proprietary information and determined that expropriation risk is increased when 
operational data is released by oil companies. There is therefore ongoing debate over the 
value of releasing operational data. 
 
2.4 Accountability 
 
Advocates of transparency argue that it will help to increase accountability and therefore 
reduce incentives to bribery, rent-seeking and other corrupt behaviour. There is broad 
consensus that incentives are key (Auty, 2009:43; Kolstad & Søreide, 2009:224; Gillies & 
Heuty, 2011; Caspary, 2012:179; Busse & Gröning, 2013:16; Corrigan, 2014:19-20) and that 
incentives to good behaviour must outweigh the benefits of bad behaviour. At the heart of 
this is ensuring accountability (Caspary, 2012:179). 
 
2.4.1 Transparency Needs Accountability 
 
Whilst transparency is important, it is only the first step towards achieving accountability 
(Stevens et al., 2015:21-22) and alone is considered insufficient to promote good governance 
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(Gary & Karl, 2003:6; Kolstad & Søreide, 2009:224; Ölcer, 2009:22; Li, 2013:57; Shepherd, 
2013:23-24; Stevens et al., 2015:21-22). As Shepherd (2013:23-24) argues, access to 
information or even public consultation is not the same as transparency: “simple access to 
information is not enough to drive meaningful popular engagement.” Accountability is 
required to incentivise good behaviour, particularly in resource-rich states. Kolstad and 
Søreide (2009:224) have clearly summarised why: 
For access to information to have an impact on the conduct of government officials, 
the officials must face some sort of sanction where misconduct is detected. In many 
resource-rich developing countries, opposition parties or other groups or institutions 
that would be able to punish a government for corruption, are missing or weak, or 
have been co-opted by the government (cf. the rentier state argument). In other 
words, accountability is the important issue, and transparency is only one aspect of 
this. 
 
 
Accountability therefore acts as an incentive. Rosenblum and Maples (2009:11) argue that 
this is particularly important where natural resources are concerned as governments are not 
corporates and government accountability over non-renewable resources is crucial for the 
governments “have duties, obligations and interests that go beyond pure profit maximisation. 
As such, the same secrecy afforded to contracting parties in commercial law is out of place in 
such contracts [with governments].” For Newell and Wheeler (2006:13) accountability is 
both an outcome and an ongoing process of engagement between citizens and governments. 
Indeed, Desai and Jarvis (2012:102) believe accountability receives less attention than it 
deserves when resource industry governance is discussed, arguing the need for 
“accountability for the key decisions made in the development of non-renewable resources 
from the award of licences through to how revenues are distributed, spent and resulting 
investment is managed and monitored.” 
 
Numerous studies have used the EITI as an example to show that transparency must go hand-
in-hand with accountability. Like Shepherd (2013), Ölcer (2009:22) makes clear the need to 
distinguish clearly between transparency and accountability, with the latter involving “the 
provision of information regarding actions or decisions, their justification, and recourse to 
punishment in the case of misconduct.” For him, the EITI is lacking in the first aspect and 
third aspect, so “risks being an instrument of toothless transparency without full 
accountability (2009:22).” Hilson and Maconachie’s (2009:52) conclusion backs this up as 
they found that transparency could be useful but only with effective institutional change in 
the host state and that alone transparency cannot tackle corruption. The Scanteam (2011:3) 
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survey later demonstrated similar results, finding that in the states they studied transparency 
had often improved but that there was little evidence to show that governance or 
accountability had done simultaneously, and Caspary (2012:179) reached a similar 
conclusion. David-Barrett and Okamura (2013:22) believe that “it is only when there is an 
absence of accountability that public officials exercise their power for private ends 
unchecked by scrutiny, complaint, or the threat of punishment,” and that whilst EITI 
membership might help reduce corruption by granting transparency, accountability is key. 
Finally, although Aaronson (2008) reviewed the effectiveness of EITI membership (and thus 
transparency) after four years of implementation and found many states had shown better 
governance levels, including voice and accountability, Sovacool and Andrew’s (2015:184) 
more recent study of Liberia and Azerbaijan showed that their governance indicator results 
instead plummeted. Aaronson (2008) herself admitted that the period covered by her study 
(four years) is too short for a full impact analysis to be conducted, however it is clear from 
both her study and that of others that there must be accountability for transparency to be 
effective. 
 
2.4.2 Effective Accountability 
 
The equitable participation of citizens or groups using transparent information is required to 
hold private and public-decision makers to account and to increase accountability (Desai & 
Jarvis, 2012:109). Accountability should therefore either come from the grassroots level, that 
is bottom-up, demand-side accountability, or from the supply-side where policy-makers and 
those responsible for ensuring accountability promote it (Desai & Jarvis, 2012:109). 
However, transparency and accountability cannot stand alone in a society and consequently, 
as Al Faruque (2015:71) suggests, “governance structure, institutional setting and political 
culture largely determine the bedrock of accountability of a government's expenditures and 
public actions in a country.” Thus, the accountability mechanisms must be effective. 
 
As Darby (2010:9) suggests, “simply making information available is not sufficient to 
achieve transparency. Large amounts of raw information in the public domain may breed 
opacity rather than transparency.” Information released through transparent initiatives must 
be timely, accurate, relevant and accessible in order that citizen participation, a key element 
of transparency and accountability, is permitted (Darby, 2010:9). Citizens must be 
empowered in order to participate (Scanteam, 2011:3) and this is often challenging in 
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resource-rich states where the poor and marginalised do not consider themselves citizens 
(Desai & Jarvis, 2012:112). Gillies and Heuty (2011:37) agree, believing that any 
transparency and accountability initiatives must be rooted in broader reforms which empower 
citizens. But as Shaxson (2007:218) noted, “African civil societies are often so weak and 
fragmented that in many cases it is hard to stir up outrage, except from local groups that are 
funded by western NGOs that want to drum up interest in the issue.” 
 
Further, the information released through transparency initiatives must be decipherable by 
civil society and citizens in order to permit accountability (Darby, 2010; Haufler, 2010). As 
noted above, the oil sector is considered to be notoriously complex, so interpretation of 
released information must be supported: “much government information is complex, but that 
is not a sufficient reason to keep it from the public (Rosenblum & Maples, 2009:41).” Gillies 
and Heuty (2011:36) argue that effective dissemination of information is required, and 
Herringshaw (2004:177) points to the fact that information must be provided in an accessible 
format to ensure governments can be held accountable. In their study of Uganda, Van Alstine 
et al. (2014:55-57) found that weak local government capacity caused by increased 
decentralisation was also a barrier to growth. After studying the impact of the EITI in 
Nigeria, Keblusek (2010:14) concluded that it is not safe to assume civil society has the 
required capability to evaluate information and Benner and Soares de Oliveira (2010:30) 
found little evidence to show the EITI has had any impact on citizen empowerment in 
Nigeria. Aaronson’s (2011:53) study of the EITI resulted in her reaching a similar 
conclusion, namely that the EITI is constrained by many factors including a lack of 
government willingness to engage with civil society, the latter’s ability to dissect the 
information and finally the public’s ability to interpret it. She suggests that the public’s 
interpretation is regularly thwarted by illiteracy, lack of education, cultural and political 
factors, lack of interest and livelihood demands (2011:53). For Gary and Karl (2003:58-59) 
the concern is civil society capacity as they believe understanding is key to staying abreast of 
change and to adjusting to such changes in the sector, otherwise there will be no meaningful 
interaction with the government and IOCs.  
 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009:524) believe education can help with civil society and public 
interpretation, and Collier (2007:141) forwards the idea of using a “broker” who acts as an 
accountant but not a police officer with regard to sector revenues and payments, therefore 
“converting a confusing morass of information into knowledge that citizens could use.” 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  45 
Nonetheless, achieving accountability in oil-rich states with oppressive regimes is likely to be 
challenging (Hilson & Maconachie, 2009:57). Keblusek (2010:15) therefore argues that there 
is a need for citizens to feel comfortable to organise, comment on and challenge public 
policy. Furthermore, Ölcer (2009:26-27) finds that “this includes [needing] an environment in 
which civil society is very strong, knowledgeable and independent…and where there exists 
no conflict of interest between the government and extractive industries on the one hand, and 
citizens on the other” yet that “these characteristics are far from being the reality in most 
resource-rich countries.”  
 
Although difficult, what is clear is that society cannot rely solely on external actors to push 
for transparency and accountability as there is a definite need for civil society and the public 
to have certain rights and capabilities: (i) institutional freedom (including free speech, a free 
press and freedom of assembly); (ii) the means to hold the government accountable; and (iii) 
a mutual interest in transparency, accountability and the eradication of corruption (Weinthal 
& Luong, 2006:41).  
 
2.5 Barriers to Success 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2.4.2 above, achieving effective accountability by ensuring that the 
information released through transparency is accurate, reliable, timely and can subsequently 
be meaningfully interpreted by a capable civil society and the public is a key step towards 
success. Similarly, ensuring that civil society and the public have the freedom to hold 
governments and IOCs to account is also a challenge. There are, however, further barriers 
that stand in the way of effective transparency and accountability initiatives. 
 
2.5.1 Will and Co-operation 
 
In her study of the EITI, Aaronson (2011:50) found that often the partners in the initiative 
(that is governments, civil society and business) did not share the same vision, and indeed 
there was a limited partnership as some implementing governments had not fully embraced 
civil society involvement and were restricting information access. This problem is likely to 
be encountered with all transparency initiatives, for it is necessary to have the co-operation of 
all partners. Clarke (2007:271) believes motivations for joining initiatives are schizophrenic 
and that there should be a clear political will, as is agreed by Stevens et al. (2015:19). Hilson 
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and Maconachie (2009:68) found that the World Bank’s experience in Chad and elsewhere 
has shown that host regimes must be committed to transparency, yet Haufler (2010:58) notes 
that often host governments are reluctant to do so when there is a chance that the wealth of 
elites can be reduced and patronage networks hampered. IOCs must also embrace change, but 
this can be difficult. Whilst some oil companies act out of self-interest and may promote 
transparency, it can at times simply be “to protect their positions with regulators, stock 
exchanges and the equity markets (Clarke, 2007:272).” Concern that disclosure might affect 
their competitive advantage or incur the wrath of host governments prevents transparency by 
IOCs (Haufler, 2010:58), as infamously happened to British Petroleum plc (BP) in Angola in 
2001 after the company disclosed details of its signature bonus for a new concession without 
consent and resulted in the government writing an open letter to BP threatening its expulsion 
(Ghazvinian, 2007:140-141; Gillies & Heuty, 2011:37; Stevens et al., 2015:22). Furthermore, 
“disclosure is not a policy that corporations necessarily welcome. Any single company has a 
disincentive to adopt information disclosure on its own, since it may undercut its competitive 
position and reduce its ability to obtain contracts with secretive governments (Haufler, 
2010:58).” In sum, there must be a concentrated and combined effort by all parties. 
 
This leads to a related barrier, which is that some key players in the industry might be less 
affected by or concerned about promoting ‘good governance’. Whilst some states choose to 
implement initiatives like the EITI “because they seek to improve their reputation with the 
international community (David-Barrett & Okamura, 2013:6),” others are seemingly not so 
concerned with their reputation. Chinese, Russian and Indian companies–key players in the 
global oil market–are a case in point: “despite soliloquies from its advocates, the norm of oil 
sector transparency has held little sway over ‘non-Western’ actors in [the] oil sector such as 
Chinese and Russian national oil companies (Gillies, 2010:122).” Benner and Soares de 
Oliveira (2010:295) concur, suggesting that Chinese and Indian understanding of energy is 
firmly “realpolitik” and has little regard for the reformist agenda. Gillies (2010:123) goes on 
to argue that reputational concern is crucial for whether companies view it as necessary to 
embrace transparency, suggesting that smaller companies and non-Western companies have 
less chance of doing so than bigger, public-facing companies. She cites Talisman’s 
continuation of activity in the former Sudan years after most other companies left as an 
example, explaining it was due to the fact Talisman had little consumer interaction as it did 
not sell products directly to consumers (Gillies, 2010:123). Haufler (2010:69) agrees that 
smaller firms face less pressure to embrace transparency and includes NOCs in this analysis, 
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with MacSearraigh (2007:200) suggesting that smaller companies are often more corrupt than 
larger ones. Healy et al. (2011:5) interestingly argue the opposite, believing bigger 
companies tend to reveal less information, and there is a related argument that companies are 
not in fact put off investing in states which are known to be opaque or corrupt (Hilson & 
Maconachie, 2009:57). Continued investment by IOCs in states like Chad, Nigeria, Iraq and 
South Africa stand to bolster this point. 
 
There is also a debate over whether the burden of disclosure should be placed on IOCs or on 
governments (Gillies, 2010:118). Darby (2009:118) believes that most companies are neutral 
on the point so the focus of activity should be placed on governments, and Gary and Karl 
(2003:2) agree. However, it is no secret that many oil executives prefer the EITI model to the 
PWYP model as the former puts the impetus with the government rather than the company, 
unlike the latter (Ghazvinian, 2007:139-140). Furthermore, Gary and Karl (2003:2-3,78) 
argue that there are key roles for international finance institutions and export credit agencies 
which should promote transparency and accountability by using their leverage in a timely and 
logical fashion, for example by export credit agencies only financing private sector 
organisations or offering loans, risk insurance or guarantees to companies who are 
transparent. Palley (2003) emphasises the role of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, similarly suggesting that they should only provide country assistance or 
financing to recipients who promote transparency. That said, most scholars and 
commentators agree that the important thing is for all parties to be involved and that pressure 
must come from each one of them (Collier, 2007:143-144; Ölcer, 2009:22). 
 
2.5.2 Voluntary Nature of Initiatives 
 
Transparency can be required by law, for example by government legislation (either in the 
host state or in the home states of IOCs), by stock exchange and regulatory rules or 
contractually, however existing global initiatives such as PWYP, Transparency International 
and the EITI are voluntary. Many see this as a problem (Gary & Karl, 2003:53; Herringshaw, 
2004:176; Hilson & Maconachie, 2009:91-92; Kolstad & Søreide; 2009:224; Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2009:528; Ölcer, 2009:21-22; Benner & Soares de Oliveira, 2010:312; Aaronson, 
2011,57; Gillies & Heuty, 2011:38-39; Al Faruque, 2015:73). Aaronson (2011:57) argues 
that the voluntary nature of initiatives means IOCs and governments can ignore or selectively 
implement them and Al Faruque (2015:73) believes that success therefore necessitates an 
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existing level of integrity and transparency. With a voluntary initiative it is hard to encourage 
accountability, particularly as some governments might not wish to go further than 
encouraging transparency by pairing it with the necessary accountability (Hilson & 
Maconachie, 2009:91-92). There are calls for these initiatives to be mandatory (Gary & Karl, 
2003:53; Herringshaw, 2004:176; Benner & Soares de Oliveira, 2010:312; Gillies & Heuty, 
2011:38-39), with Herringshaw (2004:176) and Gary and Karl (2003:53) arguing that this 
would even the playing field for companies rather than punishing those who show leadership 
on transparency and it would prevent the worst behaving companies from being able to 
undercut the best behaved. The lack of sanctions available to punish those who do not 
comply with requirements also attracts criticism, with Benner and Soares de Oliveira 
(2010:302-303) for this reason calling the EITI toothless and Hilson and Maconachie 
(2009:57) going further: “overall, it appears that the EITI, which is a voluntary pact that 
imposes no penalties on regimes that violate its principles, is far from being a recipe capable 
of offsetting the resource curse in sub-Saharan Africa.” 
 
2.5.3 The Form of Information Disclosure 
 
A further area of debate surrounds what form information should be provided in to comply 
with the EITI: either aggregated (no company breakdowns) or disaggregated (company-by-
company). Darby (2009) discusses this in detail and is of the belief that disaggregated 
information is required (2009:3). He believes that this allows for a distinction between ‘good 
and bad’ IOCs, that suspicion for IOCs not complying increases when they use aggregated 
reporting on the assumption that they have something to hide and that disaggregation is 
essential where states employ revenue-sharing formulae for redistribution of industry 
revenues to regional or other sub-national bodies, as in Peru (Darby, 2009:31-32). He further 
notes that most of the information is already available in a disaggregated format and that it 
allows the dissemination of accurate information which, in turn, pre-empts calls for resource 
nationalism as companies can defend themselves against unfounded accusations. 
In countries where no information is published on the fiscal contribution of 
companies to government, and where little or no public goods and services are 
provided, the public will often assume that a government’s failure to provide public 
goods and services is not because the money has been wasted (as is often the case), 
but rather because the company is not paying enough (Darby, 2009:31-32).  
 
As part of his research Darby interviewed many involved in the oil sector and he provides a 
summary of many of the common arguments against disaggregation, despite the fact he then 
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systematically discredits them. Arguments against disaggregation include: (i) company 
payments are the wrong focus as government revenues are key, so there is no need for 
disaggregation; (ii) disaggregated information does not provide the information required for 
accountability; (iii) individual company payments will not necessarily help identify 
corruption; (iv) there is a political risk for the IOCs if the public is ignorant, with a chance 
that the IOC will attract unwarranted criticism and be subject to demands for nationalisation 
or renegotiation of terms; (v) there is a commercial risk to the IOCs if their investors are 
ignorant; (vi) competitive risk exists where less scrupulous IOCs undercut the compliant 
IOC; and (vii) it could breach confidentiality restrictions and cause commercial disadvantage 
(Darby, 2009:16-29). However, as Darby (2009:24) notes, ultimately all IOCs operating in a 
state will be equally vulnerable if they all have to disclose the same form of information. The 
assertion is therefore that uniformity of disclosed information is key. 
 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 
To date, and despite significant support for transparency initiatives, “the picture is sobering: 
the good governance and transparency agenda has not affected the core rules of the game of 
global energy governance. Instead the agenda has remained only a niche concern, mostly at a 
superficial rhetorical level (Benner & Soares de Oliveira, 2010:310).” Benner and Soares de 
Oliveira (2010:311) see little evidence that good governance is affecting global markets:  
The shady world of international oil trading remains immune to reputational 
concerns. Likewise, private rating agencies do not factor transparency and good 
governance records into their rating decisions. Western secrecy laws continue to 
shield oil and gas profiteers. Confidentiality clauses in investment contracts 
perpetuate obfuscation and corruption. What is more, consumers at the pump do not 
have any ability or inclination to base their decisions on which gas to buy based on 
the development stance of the oil company. 
 
Clarke (2007:273) agrees, noting the continued existence of “backroom deals, illicit 
payments, the search for insider edge in contracts and the like. The link from corporate oil to 
the realm of Caesar is an umbilical cord that is unlikely ever to be entirely broken.” 10 years 
later and the situation remains relatively unchanged. 
 
However, context is key and the way a state seeks to manage its resource sector needs to be 
tailored depending on circumstance; there is no one-size-fits-all solution (Lahn et al., 2007a, 
2007b; Scanteam, 2011:3; Frankel, 2012:20; Stevens et al., 2015:16). Best practice industry 
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standards are not always suitable for emerging producers who often face development 
challenges and have weak institutional capacity and limited experience and knowledge, so 
heeding national context is key (Yates, 2012; Marcel, 2016:6). “Context matters. The 
paradox of plenty that we find in Africa seems to be contextually ground in African realities 
(Yates, 2012:2).” There is therefore hope for Kenya, a state on the brink of petroleum 
production, but it is crucial that the right policies are put in place as soon as possible. This is 
particularly important given the findings of Frynas et al. (2017:237) who looked at the cases 
of Madagascar and Sao Tome e Principe and found that the effects of the resource curse can 
show before genuine resource windfalls occur as anticipation is enough to trigger a change. 
Further, Kenya seems to be at significant risk of the curse: 
There is little experience, expertise, knowledge, dialogue and public information on 
the extractive sector in Kenya. This comes against a background of high poverty 
incidence, where 48 per cent. of citizens live below the poverty line. Poverty is more 
severe in some of the regions where oil, gas and minerals have been discovered. In 
areas like Turkana, conflict incidences are high and women and children are often the 
main casualties (Oiro Omolo & Mwabu, 2014:3). 
 
As a result of its infancy there is very little literature on Kenya’s oil sector, and indeed this is 
a gap that this study seeks to fill. The theories discussed in this chapter can therefore be 
applied to the case of Kenya in order to speculate as to how transparency might be able to 
positively impact Kenya’s strategy for avoiding negative effects of oil wealth. However, 
given the importance of understanding context, before turning to an analysis of how 
transparency and accountability might be implemented in and affect Kenya, Kenya’s political 
culture and the current status of its oil sector will be examined. 
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Chapter 3 
KENYA’S POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
‘Political culture’ is a concept introduced by Sidney and Verba in the 1960s and it has since 
received much academic attention and revision. However, for the purposes of this research it 
can be defined simply as “the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and 
meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that 
govern behaviour in the political system (International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 
2008).” This chapter will focus on how certain attitudes, beliefs and sentiments manifest 
themselves in and have an impact on Kenya’s political system and it will therefore examine 
the quality of Kenya’s democracy and the existence of political violence, ethnic division, 
patronage systems, bribery and corruption in the state.  
 
3.1 Background 
 
To fully understand the political culture in Kenya it would be necessary to examine Kenyan 
history from the pre-colonial period until the present day. Neither the scope nor the focus of 
this research permits such a detailed examination, but it is fundamental that the nature of 
today’s political culture is recognised. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, various actors play a 
formal role in Kenya’s oil sector. However, the informal influences exerted upon these 
formal actors, such as systems of patronage, bribery, corruption and ethnic divisions, are 
strong and are embedded in Kenyan society. This chapter will therefore provide an overview 
of the political culture in Kenya to demonstrate the potential impact that such informal 
influences might have upon transparency in the oil sector. 
 
Barkan (2013) describes three eras in Kenya’s political history: the period up until 
independence in 1963, including the late-colonial period and the transition to independence; 
the post-independence period from 1963 until 1990; and the period from 1990 onwards when 
Kenya became–at least in name–a democratic, multi-party state. Throughout these periods 
Kenya has stood apart from many of its African counterparts in that it has suffered no 
military dictatorships, no civil war nor any periods of failed socialism; however, “it is, and 
always has been, a deeply divided society and polity (Lonsdale, 2014:88).” Classified as a 
lower-middle income state by the World Bank (2017a:6), it has a population of 46,050,302 
and a gross national income per capita of only US$1,340. Far from reaching its potential to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  52 
develop a strong economy and promote sustainable human development since independence, 
instead it is generally accepted that Kenya suffers from and is stunted by inherent problems 
of land distribution, inequality, corruption, poverty, insecurity and employment (wa Gĩthĩnji 
& Holmquist, 2008:356). It is also home to one of the world’s largest populations of refugees 
and currently faces a significant security threat from the al-Qaeda linked terrorist group al-
Shabaab: following Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011 when it invaded Somalia, 
various terrorist attacks have targeted Kenyan citizens (including the attacks on Nairobi’s 
Westgate Mall and Garissa University College) and there has been a surge in related political 
discontent (Anderson & McKnight, 2015:1-4). In sum, Kenya may have avoided a number of 
the pitfalls experienced by its neighbours, however its path has been far from steady. 
 
3.2 A Functioning Democracy? 
 
After decades of one-party rule in Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta (president from 1963 to 1978) 
and Daniel arap Moi (president from 1978 to 2002), in 1992 Kenya held its first multi-party 
elections. This was a development described by Haugerud (1995:55) as a “political 
explosion.” However, it would take another decade for opposition parties to create a unified 
coalition capable of defeating Moi (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2015:9), with Mwai Kibaki 
subsequently becoming president and remaining so until 2013 when current president and son 
of Jomo Kenyatta, Uhuru Kenyatta, was elected as Kibaki’s successor. As well as the 
emergence of multi-party politics in the 1990s, the 2002 elections were a further landmark in 
Kenya’s struggle toward democracy as Kibaki’s platform heralded expectations of real and 
improved democracy where the handover of political power was smooth and where 
corruption and bribery would have no place (Nasong’o & Murunga, 2007:9). Indeed, Kenya 
does exhibit many typically democratic characteristics: it holds regular elections, its citizens 
participate in the political process, there is an active opposition, there have been handovers of 
power between governments and there have been coalition governments. Many also herald 
the adoption of the new constitution in 2010 as a positive step, particularly regarding its 
commitment to devolution: 
A more decentralised government makes eminent sense, given Kenya’s diversity and 
experience with political use of central power. Decentralisation has been increasingly 
seen and adopted worldwide as a guarantee against discretionary use of power by 
central elites as well as a way to enhance the efficiency of social service provision, by 
allowing for a closer match between public policies and the desires and needs of local 
constituencies (World Bank, 2012:1). 
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Kenya’s commitment to devolution is considered relatively unique, not simply because it is 
enshrined in the constitution (as opposed to being required by more easily revocable 
legislation), but because of its scope (D’arcy & Cornell, 2016:255). The elections in 2013 
saw 47 new county governors elected and the establishment of county assemblies which have 
some legislative power, with county governments given responsibility for certain key service 
delivery such as healthcare. Further, fiscal resources of not less than 15 per cent. of national 
revenues have been allocated to the county governments. 
 
However, although Kenya might outwardly appear democratic, numerous factors suggest 
otherwise and reveal that its democracy is unproven. Regarding devolution, there is concern 
that it “could potentially undermine national unity by encouraging fragmentation of the state 
along partisan lines or by ‘decentralising corruption’, leaving citizens worse off if local elites 
are able to capture resources (World Bank, 2012:1).” The International Crisis Group 
(2013:14) has warned that this decentralisation could balkanise counties and create “ethnic 
fiefdoms” which will perpetuate current inequalities. Instead of reducing patronage and rent-
seeking, D’Arcy and Cornell (2016:246) argue that these practices are continuing under 
decentralisation but simply on a more localised scale due to popular expectations that suggest 
it is ‘everyone’s turn to eat’. For them, “decentralisation has not changed the way in which 
politics is practised in Kenya, but rather the levels on which it operates, bringing it closer to 
ordinary people (D’Arcy & Cornell, 2016:273).” Whilst others accept that devolution has 
generated a system with more robust checks and balances, there is a belief that the cost of this 
is a potential exacerbation of corruption and ethnic tensions locally (Cheeseman, Lynch & 
Willis, 2016:2). For Long, Kanyinga, Ferree and Gibson (2013:141) there is ultimately a risk 
that the new governorships are simply “another political arena ripe for violent contestation.”  
 
On top of the risks that devolution poses to Kenya’s democracy, the effectiveness of Kenya’s 
democracy can be called into question. There were clear irregularities in the 2013 elections 
(Long et al., 2013:140) and the Supreme Court was required to validate the result when Raila 
Odinga challenged Kenyatta’s victory after the latter’s Jubilee coalition received 50.07 per 
cent. of the vote (International Crisis Group, 2013:1). It is also hard to ignore the fact that 
Kenyatta is the first president to be elected whilst facing trial under the International Criminal 
Court at The Hague and only the second elected president to do so after Omar al-Bashir 
(International Crisis Group, 2013:9); hardly esteemed company. There have been numerous 
confirmed reports of procedural faults during the 2013 elections, such as the widespread 
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failure of the new biometric registration system, the breakdown in the results transmission 
and tallying mechanism and the unnecessary delay in publishing results (Cheeseman, Lynch 
& Willis, 2014:3). As Long et al. (2013:152) ask, “how can an electoral process be 
considered free and fair if more than three-quarters of citizens believe that their electoral 
officials had problems counting and reporting the contest’s results, and nearly a third think 
that these problems led to the wrong outcome?”  
 
The outcome of Kenya’s most recent election does little to suggest things are improving4. 
Fears of voter intimidation, electoral misconduct and violence in the run-up to the election 
seemed justified when in the primaries 62 people were charged with electoral offences 
including incitement to violence and bribing of voters (Kenya Election: 62 Charged for 
Electoral Offences, 2017). Chris Msando, a key and senior election official who was head of 
information technology at the primary body responsible for overseeing the polls (the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission) and who was heavily involved in 
developing Kenya’s new electronic voter registration and ballot systems, was found brutally 
murdered in the outskirts of Nairobi just days before the polls (Burke, 2017). Voters 
subsequently went to the polls on 8 August 2017 to choose their new president–Kenyatta and 
Odinga were once again the two key candidates)–as well as members of parliament and 
county governments. The incumbent Kenyatta was declared winner of the presidential race 
with approximately 54 per cent. of the vote compared with Odinga’s 44 per cent., but within 
10 days and echoing the post-election period in 2013, Odinga sought to challenge these 
results in court amidst claims that Kenyatta’s victory came amidst huge voting irregularities 
and fraud (Kenya Election: Raila Odinga to Challenge Result in Court, 2017). In what has 
been termed an “historic ruling and a first in Africa (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017),” Kenya’s 
Supreme Court subsequently took the bold and unprecedented decision to nullify the result of 
the presidential election and ordered a re-run. Addressing the courtroom, Justice Maraga 
stated that the six-judge panel had found that the electoral commission had “committed 
irregularities and illegalities in the transmission of results” and raised concerns about other, 
unspecified issues (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017). Whilst many rightly hail the actions of the 
Supreme Court as a victory for the rule of law and thus democracy in Kenya, the fact remains 
that these irregularities could occur in the first place and, importantly, the election was 
                                                
4 As noted in Chapter 1, this research was submitted before the date of the election re-run on 
26 October 2017. Its scope therefore does not capture any developments subsequent to the 
date of submission. 
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widely and quickly praised as legitimate by the international observers whose specific role is 
to expose any such irregularities. As Epstein (2017) notes, it is shocking that in the 
immediate aftermath of the election 
observer teams from the African Union, the European Union, and the highly 
respected US-based Carter Centre, led by former Secretary of State John Kerry, 
commended the electoral process and said they’d seen no evidence of significant 
fraud. Congratulations poured in from around the world and Donald Trump praised 
the elections as fair and transparent. 
 
Furthermore, the response to the annulment has been lacklustre: Kenyatta has threatened to 
“fix” the Supreme Court and called its judges “crooks” on a live TV broadcast (Kenya 
Election: Kenyatta Vows to ‘Fix’ Court as Win Quashed, 2017), and Odinga’s opposition 
boycotted the opening of the new parliament on 12 September 2017 (Kenyan Opposition 
MPs Boycott Uhuru Kenyatta’s Speech, 2017). In light of such developments, it is clear that 
Kenya has a way to go before its electoral process might be classified free and fair.  
 
3.3 Political Violence  
 
It is, however, electoral violence which provides the strongest evidence that effective 
democracy has not yet been attained in Kenya. Political and electoral violence has existed for 
decades in Kenya and Mueller (2008:192-194) has highlighted the role played by “privatised 
violence” under president Uhuru Kenyatta and then under president Moi. She argues that this 
saw the advent of gangs like the Mingiki and the Baghdad Boys across the state, all of whom 
operated outwith state control and therefore began to delegitimise this state control. Coupled 
with a “phenomenon of deliberately weak autonomous institutions outside the presidency 
(Mueller, 2008:194),” this privatised violence and lack of legitimate government force were 
contributing factors to the excessive and costly violence experienced in the aftermath of the 
2007 elections.  
 
Widely viewed as fraudulent (Harbeson, 2012:17; Long et al., 2013:141), the 2007 elections 
saw Odinga securing a majority in the National Assembly but Kibaki being declared 
president. The violence that then erupted–lasting until the effective interception of the Kofi 
Annan-led mediation party and appointment of Odinga as prime minister under the National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act–cost the lives of about 1,500 people and the displacement of 
nearly 600,000. This fighting “was the worst since independence and shattered Kenya’s 
reputation as one of Africa’s most stable new democracies (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  56 
2015:9).” It had clear ethnic undertones and was focused largely in the Rift Valley region 
where a vast tract of land had been allocated to Kikuyu settlement under the Million Acre 
Settlement Scheme in the 1960s and which the Masaai generally considered to be theirs 
(Harbeson, 2012:26). With Kalenjin and Luo initially the main perpetrators, Kikuyu victims 
quickly regrouped and retaliated with dire and prolonged consequences (Bratton & Gyimah-
Boadi, 2015:9). Although it resulted in fewer deaths than electoral violence in the early 1990s 
(Cheeseman et al., 2014:5), this violence garnered worldwide attention. One reason for such 
attention was because although some of the violence appeared to be spontaneous, “a 
significant proportion was allegedly planned, organised, and financed by political leaders 
(Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2015:9).” Branch and Cheeseman (2009:19) astutely argue that 
“the extent to which the violence was planned, and how much of it occurred under the 
direction of political leaders, will never be known. Nonetheless, the speed and coordinated 
nature of the early attacks strongly suggests that it was not spontaneous.” Indeed, the roles 
allegedly played by Ruto (the current deputy president) in inciting violence against Kikuyu in 
the Rift Valley and then by Kenyatta against Luo and Kalenjin in Nakuru and Naivasha are 
why they were indicted by the International Criminal Court (Cheeseman et al., 2014:7).  
 
It is not accurate to attribute this violence solely to ethnic divisions (Branch & Cheeseman, 
2010:2). Deep social divisions also exist in Kenya and put pressure on the state’s fragile and 
young democratic institutions to perform, which they failed to do (wa Gĩthĩnji & Holmquist, 
2008:345). Nevertheless, whilst the 2013 elections were relatively peaceful, many believe 
that the conflict drivers from the 2007 elections such as high unemployment, land grievances, 
impunity, corruption, failed resettlement of internally-displaced persons, ethnic tensions, 
weak institutions and socio-economic inequality still abound and are yet to be adequately 
addressed (International Crisis Group, 2013:15). This is the reason for warnings that violence 
could well return during the saga of this year’s elections: in 2013 peace was desired at all 
costs, but Cheeseman et al. (2014:16) have warned that such a desire may not hold strong in 
2017 as the conflict drivers continue to exist.  
 
3.4 Patronage in an Ethnically Divided State 
 
Although it is too simplistic to reduce electoral violence in Kenya to tribal warfare, it is fair 
to say that “ethnic identities become salient because they have come to embody other societal 
divisions, such as regional inequalities, control over land, and access to political opportunities 
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(Branch & Cheeseman, 2009:3).” Kenya has over 40 ethnic groups with no one group 
forming a majority, leaving it with somewhat of a “salient ethnic cleavage (Hassan, 
2017:383-386).” Whilst Barkan (2013) believes colonialism left a legacy of inequality of 
regions, classes and land, Lonsdale (2014) takes this further and suggests that these divisions 
are largely ethnic. For him, although pre-colonial Kenya had ethnic groups in the place of 
political tribes, colonialism brought with it hierarchies of race, ethnicity and power and ethnic 
tribes were then politicised after independence by Kenyatta through land distribution 
(Lonsdale, 2014:90, 93, 100). Inequality in Kenya today thus has a clear ethnic and a regional 
dimension, particularly when it comes to ownership of land (wa Gĩthĩnji & Holmquist, 
2008:346). This inequality is rooted in pre- and post-independence land resettlements, and 
indeed land rights and disputes are embedded in Kenya’s history. By way of example, as an 
East African Protectorate Kikuyu and Masaai lands were regularly passed to the state and this 
was a factor in the Mau Mau Rebellion when up to 20 per cent. of Kenya’s land mass, 
including its best agricultural land, was given to white settlers (Klopp, 2000:15-16).  
 
Klopp (2000:15-16) concludes that land has been a key element of Kenya’s patronage system 
since independence and led to the “land-grabbing mania” of the 1990s, as well as 
undoubtedly being a factor in the 2007 electoral violence. Patronage in Kenya is largely 
structured along ethnic lines (D’Arcy & Cornell, 2016:256) and this seeps into the political 
parties: for Elischer (2010:219) and Mueller (2011:2014), political parties have central, 
ethnically-based structures. “Kenyan political parties are barely distinguishable in terms of 
ideology, programs, platforms, or organisation. Many are no more than changing sets of 
ethnic coalitions (Mueller, 2011:104).” Mueller believes that ethnicity is the key determining 
factor in the distribution of Kenya’s national resources:  
Politics [in Kenya] is viewed primarily as a winner-takes-all zero-sum ethnic game. 
The national economic cake is the prize. Various ethnic groups argue that it is their 
turn to eat. The means to this end is controlling the state and having a fellow co-
ethnic become president (Mueller, 2011:105). 
 
This view is shared by Cheeseman et al. (2016:29) who suggest that this pattern of patronage 
exists in the local political arena as well the national. For them, there is fierce local 
competition amongst “local notables” for the resources that government positions can offer: 
“salaries, allowances, bursary funds, control over licences and property, the issuing of 
contracts, and the hiring of staff, all come with elected office, and county governments have 
become a field for vigorous contests over these benefits (Cheeseman et al., 2016:29).” Thus, 
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although ethnic divisions were not the sole cause of past violence, it is important to recognise 
that ethnicity and ethnically-motivated patronage certainly form an extremely prominent part 
of Kenya’s political culture. 
 
3.5 The Prevalence of Bribery and Corruption 
 
Ethnically-motivated patronage is clearly a key element of Kenya’s political culture, one 
which is overshadowed perhaps only by the prevalence of bribery and corruption. According 
to Burbidge (2015:3), corruption “is bleeding away the people of Kenya, day in, day 
out…Kenyan society suffers from pervasive corruption, dominating the provision of public 
services, the formation of contracts and, of course, political life.” Burbidge draws on 
Groenedijk to define political corruption as “the misuse of public authority for private gain” 
and he argues that citizen acceptance of widespread corruption is hugely problematic in 
Kenya for it means that citizens are somewhat complicit, gradually becoming unable to 
distinguish between what is and is not corrupt (2015:4-5). For him two big political scandals 
of recent years, namely the Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing scandals, turned the tide away 
from the aforementioned hope for a crackdown on corruption promised under Kibaki 
(Burbidge, 2015:13). Wrong’s (2010) widely-published book detailing the experience of John 
Githongo–Kenya’s appointed anti-corruption czar–in his discovery and exposure of the 
Anglo-Leasing fraud in the 2000s reignited the belief that corruption is firmly embedded in 
Kenya at the highest levels. Once discovering the fraud, Githongo’s complaints fell on deaf 
ears, including with the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DfID). Similarly, the Goldenberg scandal of the early 1990s had seen 
government bonus and export credit schemes abused by the Goldenberg company which 
claimed to export gold and diamonds (Kenya has no significant reserves of either resource). 
Billions of shillings were transferred from the central bank between 1990 and 1993 and the 
involvement of government and opposition members, including Odinga, was proven. 
However, those involved were never punished and instead flaunted their wealth (Branch, 
2012:219-222). Both scandals served to reinforce the idea in Kenya that corruption, even on 
the largest scale, is likely to go unpunished and be swept under the carpet. 
 
It is not just in the infamous scandals where bribery and corruption can be found; there are 
countless stories of public officials abusing their power and position. For example, the 
Energy and Petroleum Cabinet Secretary Davis Chirchir was suspended in 2015 after he was 
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allegedly involved in corruption, as were three other Cabinet Secretaries: Kazungu Kambi 
(Labour), Felix Koskei (Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries) and Michael Kamau 
(Transport) (Nalubega, 2015). Having survived three impeachment attempts at the National 
Assembly, the Devolution Cabinet Secretary Anne Waiguru resigned due to poor health in 
2015 but was widely linked to the loss of Sh791 million by the National Youth Service 
(Alushula, 2015). Latterly, numerous officials from the Ministry of Health have been accused 
of theft of more than five times the amount Waiguru is accused of pocketing and distributing 
(Revealed: Taxpayers Lose Sh5bn in NYS-style Afya House Theft, 2016), and deputy 
president Ruto has a seemingly unshakeable association with bribery, fraud and corruption 
(ODM Says DP Ruto is a CORRUPTION ADDICT Whose Other Name is ‘Bill SCANDAL 
Man’, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, bribery and corruption are not just prevalent at government level. Instead, 
“paying bribes to the police and bureaucrats remains routine for ordinary Kenyans, as do 
other economic crimes (Hope Sr., 2017:62-63).” Neither is it new, particularly with regard to 
land. According to Harbeson (2012:25) land tenure corruption is “like a virulent cancer 
[which] suffused the Kenyan body politic” and in 2002 the Ndungu Commission found 
“conservatively” that between the Moi and (Uhuru) Kenyatta administrations about 200,000 
illegal land titles were issued, 98 per cent. of which were issued during 1986 and 2002. For 
Hope Sr. (2017:62) “corruption represents a governance ill…It persists in Kenya primarily 
because there are people in power who benefit from it and the existing governance 
institutions lack both the will and capacity to stop them from doing so.” In his earlier work 
Hope Sr. blames the grasp of Kenyan corruption on deliberately undermined or weakened 
institutions which in turn are unable to uphold the rule of law, coupled with a lack of public 
accountability, the centralisation and personal nature of presidential power and the 
acceptance of corruption as a necessary aspect of ensuring personal survival and economic 
gain (2014:494-495). It would therefore not be a stretch to conclude that many view 
corruption as endemic at all levels in Kenya (Wrong, 2010; Hope Sr., 2014; Hope Sr., 2017). 
 
This is not to say that the problem of corruption is ignored. President Kenyatta recently made 
a public speech where he derided the courts for their failure to do enough, citing the fact that 
between 2009 and 2016 only 198 corruption cases were resolved when there are more than 
600 cases still pending (Judiciary, Independent Departments on the Spot Over War on 
Corruption, 2016). Yet Kenya consistently scores poorly on global governance and 
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corruption indicators. In the latest Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation, 2016a) which uses 90 indicators of good governance across 14 sub-categories 
and four categories, Kenya has improved its general ranking over the last 10 years and is now 
ranked 12th out of 54 African states. However, its worst scores come from the ‘Safety and 
Rule of Law’ category which includes analysis of ‘Rule of Law’, ‘Accountability’, ‘Personal 
Safety’ and ‘National Security’ sub-categories and where Kenya is ranked 25th out of the 54 
African states. In particular, the four indicators in which it has recorded worsening scores 
over the last 10 years relate to ‘Accountability’: ‘Access to Information’, ‘Accountability of 
Public Officials’, ‘Corruption Investigation’ and ‘Corruption and Bureaucracy’. This decline 
in anti-corruption success is supported by Figure 3.1 below which shows Kenya’s percentile 
ranking on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, where 0 is low and 100 is 
high. The percentile rank shows how many other states rate lower than Kenya, with the bars 
showing the estimated rank and the black lines showing the likely range. It can be seen that 
although ‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Rule of Law’ scores have improved, the ‘Control 
of Corruption’ and ‘Voice and Accountability’ scores are extremely poor and are in fact 
worsening.  
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Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index shows a similar pattern: 
improvement on the whole, but only by a small margin. This lack of significant change is 
clearly shown by Figure 3.2 below which has been compiled using Kenya’s scores from 2006 
until 2016. The index goes from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), with Kenya scoring 
around 21 or 22, peaking at 27 in 2012 and 2013 and then dropping again to its current level 
of 265. For perspective, Denmark and New Zealand were the highest scorers in 2016 with a 
score of 90.  
                                                
5 Note that prior to 2011 the index used a decimal point system from 0 to 10 instead of 0 to 
100. A score of 2.2 in 2009 would equate to a score of 22 from 2011 onwards. The figures for 
the pre-2011 period have thus been converted to the current format for the purposes of Figure 
3.2. 
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Table 3.1 further shows the progression of Kenya’s global ranking on the index and again 
indicates that it has made little notable improvement since 2006. 
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Corruption is undoubtedly a concern for Kenya: for its government, its citizens and those 
doing business there. It is acknowledged that high levels of corruption can have a 
stranglehold on prospects of growth and profitability of private firms in Kenya, not least in 
their ability to penetrate export markets (Kimuyu, 2007:215). Kenya’s position on the World 
Bank’s ease of doing business survey (2017a:6-7) has risen from 113th out of 190 states in 
2016 to 92nd in 2017, ranking it behind Mauritius (49th), Rwanda (56th) and Botswana (71st) 
but ahead of states such as Namibia (108th) and Tanzania (132nd). Nonetheless, corruption, 
bribery and fraud is endemic and scandals appear daily in the state’s newspapers. Combined 
with the tradition of ethnically-based patronage systems, electoral violence and discrepancies 
that call into question the extent of democratic governance and the failure of its institutions to 
effectively promote and sustain democratic processes and the rule of law, Kenya’s political 
culture is one which is far from stable: 
On balance, it is a history characterised not only the absence of democracy, but also 
by the weakness and decay of the state itself and its descent into what in important 
respects has been a kind of Hobbesian jungle, despite Kenya’s superficial appearance 
as one of sub-Saharan Africa’s more stable and secure post-independence states 
(Harbeson, 2012:18). 
 
But what does this mean for transparency in Kenya’s burgeoning oil sector? This will be 
explored further in Chapter 5, but it is important that formal actors in the sector are aware 
that the political culture will seep into all oil activities. Not only are the government and its 
representatives key players in the sector (including with regard to drafting and enforcing 
relevant legislation, the award of exploration and development licenses and other contracts 
and the control of revenue streams), but all activities in the sector are conducted with the 
overarching consent of the Kenyan government. It is therefore crucial to understand how 
informal influences such as those outlined above affect operations in the sector, and 
specifically how they might act as barriers to achieving greater transparency. There is an 
inextricable link between the oil sector and political culture, and ultimately there is a risk that 
oil becomes a resource subject to the influences of patronage, division, conflict and 
corruption. 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that modern Kenyan politics is characterised by certain 
features. Its democracy exists but comes under threat from various angles, not least through 
electoral violence, irregularities and the near-constant accusations of fraudulent political 
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activity. Long-standing ethnic divisions in Kenya surface in political forms and, despite 
recent improvements, it appears that bribery, corruption and patronage are mainstay features 
of the Kenyan political climate. Alongside the formalised arms of political life it is clear that 
many, more informal influences are at play: one can justifiably argue that at least a form of 
neopatrimonialism exists in Kenya. 
 
Neopatrimonialism is a concept used to help understand much of African politics. Médard 
defined patrimonialism as “an ideal subtype of traditional domination corresponding to a lack 
of differentiation between what is private and what is public” and neopatrimonialism as “a 
mixed type combining in various degrees differentiation and lack of differentiation of the 
public and private domains (Médard, quoted in Yates, 1996:10).” Bratton and Van de Walle 
(1994:459) stated that “neopatrimonial practice can be found in all polities” but argued that 
“it is the core feature of politics in Africa” and, further, that “the interaction between the ‘big 
man’ and his extended retinue defines African politics, from the highest reaches of the 
presidential palace to the humblest village assembly.” Both Médard and Yates (1996:5) 
agree, finding that neopatrimonialist realities are prevalent in Africa and with Médard 
concluding that “public authority has been made an object of appropriation by the formal 
officeholders, functionaries, politicians and military personnel who based their strategies of 
individual ascendancy or family ascendancy on a private usage of the republic (Médard, 
quoted in Yates, 1996:5).” In essence, informal structures exist alongside the formal, rational-
legal state bureaucracy and also affect a state’s governance. As can be seen from the analysis 
above and particularly with regard to ethnic divisions, bribery, patronage and corruption, 
Kenya has not avoided the clutches of neopatrimonialism and it is embedded in Kenya’s 
political culture.  
 
How such a political culture might impact any attempt to implement effective transparency in 
Kenya’s oil sector and whether it poses an insurmountable barrier will be examined in 
Chapter 5, but it is first necessary to understand and contextualise the sector itself. The 
following chapter will thus provide a history and overview of Kenya’s oil sector before 
identifying the key, formal actors who have such an influence over it. 
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Chapter 4 
THE KENYAN OIL SECTOR 
 
Before turning to looking at the history and status of Kenya’s oil sector and identifying the 
key players and structures within it, it is important to note the significant difference between 
the formalised aspects of the sector and those that have an impact and influence but which are 
more informal. In respect of the latter aspects, as suggested in Chapter 3 and as will be 
explored in Chapter 5, the reality in Kenya is that neopatrimonialism exists and the result is 
that numerous informal structures, processes and actors have an important role to play in 
informing outcomes in the oil sector. In essence, there is a substantial disconnect between the 
formal nature of the sector and the way it operates in reality. This chapter will examine the 
formal aspects of the sector, namely those formalised structures, processes and actors which 
shape it and which derive from the rational-bureaucratic state and its institutions.  
 
4.1 History and Overview 
 
Kenya has four basins in which oil and gas exploration takes place: the Anza, Mandera, 
Tertiary Rift and Lamu Basins (NOCK, 2017b). Latest information from the NOCK suggests 
that these basins have been divided into 46 exploration blocks, as is shown by Figure 4.1 
below. However, this information is unhelpfully outdated. Not only was the number of blocks 
increased by 17 to 63 in mid-2016 (Kamau, 2016), but the available information on which 
entities holds rights to each block dates from December 2014 and is therefore inaccurate as a 
number of blocks have since been relinquished or have changed ownership. Indeed, on the 
NOCK’s website the latest map is from 2015 and the version below has been taken from a 
secondary source. The inference is that there is a lack of transparency at the most basic level 
in Kenya’s oil sector.  
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What makes this lack of transparency most surprising is that upstream activity in Kenya is 
not new. In a study for the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Patey (2014:8) describes three 
separate waves of exploration activity in Kenya. The initial wave from the 1950s to 1950s 
saw a total of 15 exploration wells being drilled (Patey, 2014:8). The first well was drilled in 
1960 and Kenya attracted interest from oil giants like BP and Shell who were involved in 
exploration in the Lamu Basin from 1954 and drilled 10 wells (NOCK, 2017a). According to 
the NOCK (2017a), numerous gravity, geology, aeromagnetic and seismic surveys were also 
conducted in the Mandera Basin, but there was no drilling activity. In the 1970s gas and oil 
shows were then found in the Cretaceous rocks in the Lamu Basin which encouraged further 
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drilling by multinational oil companies including Chevron and Esso, however there were no 
commercial finds.  
 
Patey (2014:8) describes the second wave of exploration activity as taking place after the 
introduction of the first petroleum legislation. The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) 
Act was first enacted in 1984 and then revised in 1986 where changes included the transition 
from royalty-based contracts to PSCs. Further exploration blocks were created and another 15 
wells were drilled before the turn of the century (Patey, 2014:8). Total and Amoco drilled 10 
wells between them in the Anza and Mandera Basins between 1985 and 1990, but all proved 
dry (NOCK, 2017a). Nonetheless, exploration activity continued with the government itself 
commissioning further studies, including the Lamu Basin study in 1991, to increase the 
amount of data available. Again, although there were no commercial finds during this period 
there were indications that significant oil plays were present. For example, in Block 10BB in 
Turkana county the Loperot-1 well discovered oil but political tensions prevented the 
operator, Shell, from gaining an extension on its exploration period and the well was left 
undeveloped (Patey, 2014:8). 
 
It was not until the third and current wave from 2000 onwards that activity significantly 
increased. 30 wells had been drilled in the 50 years between 1950 and 2000, but in the shorter 
period between 2000 and 2012 33 wells were drilled (Patey, 2014:8). Numerous basin studies 
were conducted, including the NOCK’s Tertiary Rift Basin study in 2000-2001 and 
Woodside’s acquisition of 7884km of 2D seismic offshore Lamu in 2003 (NOCK, 2017a), 
which helped to retain international interest in Kenya’s blocks. However, a key turning point 
was when significant discoveries of oil and gas were made onshore Uganda and offshore 
Tanzania and Mozambique (KCSPOG, 2014:8). Drilling activity across East Africa surged 
and in March 2012 Tullow, with its joint venture partner Africa Oil Corporation (Africa Oil), 
found oil accumulations with its Ngamia-1 exploration well in Block 10BB in the South 
Lokichar Basin which forms part of the Tertiary Rift Basin (Tullow, 2017c). Tullow followed 
this up with further success in the South Lokichar Basin, as is shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 
4.2 below. 
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The result of Tullow’s success has been a significant increase in drilling activity, with KPMG 
(2016:5) estimating that over 40 wells were drilled between 2012 and 2016 “…owing to the 
favourable price per barrel but also due to renewed enthusiasm over the prospectiveness of 
the [East African] region.” This trend can be seen in Figure 4.3 below where drilling activity 
in Kenya (shown in yellow) was minimal between 2000 and 2012 with only two wells 
drilled, yet there was a noticeable jump from 2012 onwards following Tullow’s discovery in 
Block 10BB. 
 
 
Exploration activity is still continuing in Kenya. For example, following the success of the 
Erut-1 well which proved that the oil limits of the South Lokichar Basin extend to its 
northern point (see Figure 4.2 above for the Erut-1 well location), Tullow and its partners 
have drilled the Amosing-6 and Ngamia-10 wells in 2017 and plan to drill a further three 
wells in the current exploration and appraisal period of Block 10BB (Tullow, 2017a). Focus 
is also being placed on further appraisal and development of existing discoveries. With 
estimated recoverable resources of 750 MMBO and an overall upside potential targeting 1 
billion barrels (Tullow, 2017c), development of existing discoveries is underway. A field 
development plan for Tullow’s South Lokichar Basin discoveries was submitted to Kenyan 
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authorities in December 2015 and the partners are targeting developmental approval from the 
government and a Final Investment Decision in 2017 (Africa Oil, 2016).  
 
Midstream activity is also progressing to capitalise on the recent discoveries. Initial plans 
envisaged a pipeline originating in Uganda then crossing into Kenya or Tanzania before 
reaching a port, allowing export of oil by sea from Uganda and from Kenya though 
connection points. However, in April 2016 Uganda opted for the southern route which will 
see its pipeline routed from Hoima in western Uganda into northern Tanzania and to the port 
at Tanga (Senelwa, 2016). Kenya has thus announced that its own US$2.1 billion pipeline 
will run from the South Lokichar Basin area in Turkana to Lamu port in the east (Senelwa, 
2016) and it will be approximately 865km long (Ndege, 2017). The proposed pipeline route 
is shown in Figure 4.4 below. 
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According to the official request for consultants to apply for the pipeline’s front end 
engineering design (FEED), the discovered crude is considered ‘sweet’–that is, it is low in 
sulphur–and relatively waxy, meaning that the pipeline will need to be heated (The 
Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2016). Tullow (2017c) declared that its upstream 
FEED for the project has already begun and that the Joint Development Agreement, 
concluded in October 2016, is due to be executed. Large scale production and transportation 
of crude (estimated at up to 100,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd)) is thus expected to begin 
once the pipeline has been constructed, with optimistic indications suggesting this could be as 
early as 2020 (Otuki, 2017). 
 
Kenya’s desire to see oil exports begin as soon as possible saw President Kenyatta (2016) 
announce that small-scale exports of oil from Turkana would begin in June 2017: “We have 
started and we are not moving back. We want to be at the top of the pile. So, we have set a 
path and Kenya is going to be a major oil producer and exporter.” On 14 March 2017 Tullow 
signed a production agreement with the government providing for the transportation of crude 
by truck from Turkana to Mombasa port for export (Otuki, 2017). Termed the Early Oil Pilot 
Scheme (EOPS), Tullow states that “the EOPS will use existing upstream wells and oil 
storage tanks to initially produce approximately 2,000 bopd gross in mid-2017. This early 
pilot scheme will provide important information to assist in full field development planning 
(Tullow, 2017c).” Initial delays awarding EOPS upstream contracts did not stop progress, 
with Tullow first intending to evacuate its stored crude–produced during extended well 
testing from 2015–before moving to well production in the latter stages of 2017 (Tullow, 
2017a). Kenyatta’s attempts to accelerate the timeline for crude exports appeared to be 
gaining ground, for in May 2017 it was announced that China and India would be the first 
buyers of Kenya’s exported oil (Ndege, 2017). However, on 29 June 2017 and one day before 
the government’s deadline of 30 June 2017 for the EOPS to begin, Charles Keter, the Cabinet 
Secretary for Energy, announced that the EOPS plans were to be suspended (Githae, 2017). 
Official explanations for the suspension blamed the delay in adoption of the new Upstream 
Bill (Githae, 2017), yet media reports also suggest that tensions on the ground in Turkana had 
prevented Tullow from accessing its sites and that bandit attacks on the company responsible 
for constructing the necessary Kitale-Turkana road saw a suspension of activity (Achuka, 
2017; Githae, 2017). Whatever the reason, Kenya’s Ministry of Energy and Petroleum 
(MoEP) (2017b) is correct to assert that “it is clear that the National Government and 
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Turkana County Government have more to discuss before the first oil can be transported to 
Mombasa.” For the time being, progress with regard to exports is thus in limbo. 
 
4.2 The Key Players 
 
A huge range of formal actors are involved in Kenya’s oil sector, from IOCs and their 
employees, shareholders, advisors and consultants, to government representatives and 
agencies and to members of the local communities where oil exploration and development 
takes place. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study it is necessary to limit and define this 
almost exhaustive list in order to analyse who plays an important role in shaping transparency 
in the sector and who is most likely affected by its existence. Accordingly, the following 
groups have been identified: 
 
(i) the government of Kenya, including its representatives and associated agencies, 
institutions and other bodies; 
(ii) IOCs, as well as their associated entities and representatives; 
(iii) civil society in Kenya, incorporating local communities within oil-rich regions as well 
as the entire Kenyan population. This group also includes civil society organisations, 
the media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within Kenya; and 
(iv) the international community, including NGOs and other global initiatives. 
 
These first three groups comprise what are commonly referred to as the three “sectors” of 
society: respectively, the government sector, the business sector and the civil society sector 
(United Nations, 2017). The addition of the international community is necessary for this 
study due to the prominence that international organisations and movements have within the 
global natural resources sector, and thus in that of each resource-rich state, particularly with 
regard to promoting transparency and good governance. Taking each of these four groups in 
turn, this Chapter 4.2 will briefly summarise the roles that they play in Kenya’s upstream 
sector. 
 
4.2.1 The Kenyan Government 
 
Numerous government entities have a role to play in the sector and the landscape is set to 
change if the 2015 Draft National Energy Petroleum Policy (Petroleum Policy) is 
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implemented in full. The following paragraphs therefore describe the status quo and the 
proposed changes, with Figure 4.5 showing key existing institutions (in orange boxes) and 
those which are to be established (in blue boxes).  
 
 
4.2.1.1    Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the Cabinet Secretary for Energy and 
Petroleum 
 
Kenya’s MoEP “is responsible for formulation and articulation of energy and petroleum 
policies...Its tasks include national energy and petroleum planning, training of manpower and 
mobilisation of financial resources (Republic of Kenya, 2015a:21).” The Cabinet Secretary6 
for Energy and Petroleum is the head of the MoEP and has wide-ranging powers granted to 
him under the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 1986 (Republic of Kenya, 1986). 
For example, under Section 5(1) of this Act (Republic of Kenya, 1986) he “…may, on behalf 
of the government, negotiate, enter into and sign petroleum agreements with a contractor” 
                                                
6 Previously the person holding this position was known as the ‘Minister’, however following 
the adoption of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010 all government Ministers are now referred 
to as ‘Cabinet Secretaries’. 
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and, in accordance with Section 5(2), he “…may grant non-exclusive exploration permits, in 
respect of areas specified therein, under which a person may enter upon an area and prospect 
and carry out geological and geophysical surveys.” He thus has the power to negotiate and 
grant petroleum agreements as well as directing policy and overseeing regulation of the 
sector. 
 
4.2.1.2    Energy Regulatory Commission and the Energy Tribunal 
 
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) is currently responsible for regulating Kenya’s 
energy sector. It is supported by the operations of the Energy Tribunal which is described by 
the government in its Petroleum Policy as a “quasi-judicial body” whose role is “to primarily 
hear appeals against the decisions of ERC. It also has jurisdiction to hear and determine all 
matters referred to it relating to the energy sector (Republic of Kenya, 2015a:21).” However, 
it can be argued that the ERC’s powers are limited and its independence questionable given 
that its regulatory function overlaps with that of the Cabinet Secretary for Energy and 
Petroleum (KCSPOG, 2014:19). Whilst not yet enacted, the Upstream Bill proposes that a 
separate authority be created for regulating the upstream petroleum sector, namely the 
Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (UPRA) (Republic of Kenya, 2015b: Section 15). 
It will be a body corporate and an independent entity with a monitoring function. According 
to the Petroleum Policy (Republic of Kenya, 2015a:21), the ERC will retain “responsibility 
for economic and technical regulation of electric power, renewable energy, and downstream 
petroleum sub-sectors. Its functions [will] also include tariff setting, review, licensing, 
enforcement, dispute settlement and approval of power purchase and network service 
contracts.” Meanwhile, Section 16 of the Upstream Bill requires the new UPRA to 
(a) regulate upstream petroleum operations in Kenya; (b) provide such information 
and statistics to the Cabinet Secretary as may be required from time to time; (c) 
collect, maintain and manage upstream petroleum data; (d) conduct due diligence and 
investigate the affairs of any person prior to granting non-exclusive exploration 
permit; (e) perform any other function that is incidental or consequential to its 
functions under this Act or any other written law (Republic of Kenya, 2015b). 
 
 
4.2.1.3    The National Fossil Fuels Advisory Committee 
 
The National Fossil Fuels Advisory Committee (NAFFAC) is the licensing body of the 
government and its role is to assist the Cabinet Secretary for Energy and Petroleum, 
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particularly during negotiations. Its members include the Attorney General, the 
Commissioner of Petroleum, the Principal Secretary of the National Treasury, the MoEP’s 
Chief Geologist, the Commissioner of the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) and the Director 
General of the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) (KCSPOG, 2014:19). 
However, the Petroleum Policy proposes replacing NAFFAC with two separate committees: 
the National Upstream Petroleum Advisory Committee (NUPAC) which will be responsible 
for petroleum exploration and development, and the National Coal Advisory Committee 
(Republic of Kenya, 2015a:12). 
 
4.2.1.4    The NOCK 
 
The NOCK is one of the key players in Kenya’s oil sector. It is officially described in the 
Petroleum Policy as “a wholly owned state corporation mandated to stabilise the petroleum 
supply market by participating in all aspects of the petroleum industry namely upstream, mid-
stream and downstream activities (Republic of Kenya, 2015a:23).” According to the 
KCSPOG (2014:18) it previously “performed both regulatory and commercial roles but in 
recent times, it does not exercise any regulatory powers. Its principal role is now that of a 
mainstream oil company taking part in oil and gas exploration.” Nevertheless, although it 
does participate directly in upstream activities (see Chapter 4.2.2 below), its role expands 
further and in reality it advises the Cabinet Secretary for Energy and Petroleum, granting the 
NOCK policy influence (KCSPOG, 2014:18). According to the international law firm 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2013:2), the NOCK effectively “acts as an instrument of 
government policy in matters related to oil and gas and gives advice to Kenyan energy 
policymakers…It also acts as the agent of the government in relation to the compilation of 
national energy data, running petroleum laboratories and the development of alternative fuels 
(2013:2).” That said, the Petroleum Policy seeks to restructure the NOCK in order that the 
midstream and downstream business is separated from the upstream (Republic of Kenya, 
2015a:29). 
 
4.2.1.5    Other Actors 
 
Other significant government actors include parliament whose role is to oversee the executive 
and, according to Kenya’s new constitution, to ratify all petroleum agreements (KCSPOG, 
2014:19). Although the expertise and capacity of parliament to consider technical upstream 
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matters is debatable, it certainly can have a major impact on the sector. The current delay of 
the Upstream Bill is a case in point. The KRA will also have an increasingly important role to 
play once petroleum production revenues commence as it is responsible for managing and 
collecting taxes, and NEMA is responsible for the enforcement of environmental laws and 
regulations. Finally, there is likely to be a prominent place for the proposed Upstream 
Petroleum Data Centre which, according to the Petroleum Policy (Republic of Kenya, 
2015a:29), will be responsible “for the safe, secure custody and management of upstream 
petroleum data.” 
 
4.2.2 IOCs 
 
As noted in Chapter 4.1, there is little up to date or accurate publicly-available information 
detailing which IOCs hold upstream licenses in Kenya. Table 4.2 below was taken from the 
draft Petroleum Policy (Republic of Kenya, 2015a:26) and shows that in January 2015 there 
were 22 IOCs holding licences in Kenya. However, not only is this information is over two 
years old, but it does not provide details of the IOCs who are non-operators on the blocks. By 
way of example, under Blocks 10BB and 13T it lists simply ‘Tullow Oil’: Tullow does 
operate these blocks, but it is in a joint venture partnership with Africa Oil and Maersk Oil & 
Gas A/S (Maersk Oil). Indeed, if relying solely on the government-provided information in 
Table 4.2 one would not be aware that Maersk Oil even has any interest in Kenya. 
Furthermore, this information does not account for the 17 new blocks created mid-2016, nor 
does it give any indication as to the full chain of block ownership. For example, BG Group is 
said to hold two blocks but it was subject to a takeover by Shell, meaning that Shell is now 
the ultimate owner of Blocks L-10A and L-10B (Connors & Kent, 2016). BlockL-09 is said 
to be held by ‘Ophir/Dominion’, but it would be more accurate to say that Dominion is the 
actual operator and that Dominion is a subsidiary of Ophir Energy plc, again due to a 
takeover (Ophir Energy plc, 2017). ‘Zarara’ is the operator of Blocks L-4 and L-13, however 
this does not indicate that Midway Resources International in fact owns Zarara (Midway 
Resources International, 2017). Even when it suggests ‘Tullow Oil’ holds the block this 
information is inaccurate for it is a subsidiary of Tullow which holds the asset. Ultimately, 
this information is of limited use as it is both out of date and lacking in requisite detail, 
particularly regarding which corporate entity specifically holds the assets and who the 
beneficial owner of such entity is. 
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In his study on beneficial ownership and the use of tax havens by entities operating in the 
Kenyan oil sector, Hubert (2016:15) undertook “an exhaustive review of public domain 
information including corporate filings to all relevant stock exchanges as well as company 
annual reports and press releases” to accurately ascertain which entities are directly involved 
in the sector. Table 4.3 below details his findings as at January 2016 and shows each of 
Kenya’s onshore and offshore blocks as well as the IOCs that hold working interests in such 
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blocks, their percentage holding and which entity is the operator. However, there have been 
inevitable changes since then. These include (but are not limited to) the following7: 
 
(i) Blocks 01, L-17 and L-18 are subject to a sale from Afren (the parent company of 
East Africa Exploration (Kenya) Ltd.) to Octant Energy Corp. (Koigi, 2017; Ngugi, 
2017); 
(ii) Marathon Kenya Limited BV sold its interest in Block 9 to Delonex Energy Ltd. 
(Delonex Energy Ltd., 2017); 
(iii) Africa Oil purchased Centric Energy Kenya Ltd.’s 25 per cent. working interest in 
Block 10BA (Maersk Oil, 2017); 
(iv) Delonex Energy Ltd. now holds a 40 per cent. working interest in Block 12A 
(Delonex Energy Ltd., 2017) and neither Africa Oil nor Marathon Kenya Limited BV 
hold a stake in it any longer (Tullow, 2017b); 
(v) Block 12B is now held solely by Tullow (Tullow, 2017b); 
(vi) Block 14T is held by the NOCK (see Table 4.2 above); 
(vii) working interests in Blocks L-04 and L-13 are now held 75 per cent. by Zarara Oil & 
Gas Limited, 15 per cent. by Sohi Gas Dodori Ltd. and 10 per cent. by the NOCK 
(Midway Resources International, 2017); 
(viii) Total S.A.’s website makes no mention of holding any interest in Blocks L-05 or L-07 
(Total S.A., 2016) and neither does Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (Anadarko 
Petroleum Corporation, 2017), suggesting these blocks might have been relinquished; 
(ix) there is uncertainty as to whether Eni Kenya BV actually holds any interest in 
offshore Blocks L-11A, L-11B and L-12. There have been changes in ownership 
since January 2016–Anadarko Petroleum Corporation claims ownership of a 45 per 
cent. –not a 50 per cent. –working interest in the blocks, as is suggested by Table 4.3 
(Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 2017). Furthermore, there is no mention on Eni 
S.p.A.’s website of its ownership of these blocks and Cove Energy plc (the parent 
entity of Cove Energy Kenya Limited) was subject to a takeover in 2012 by the Thai 
entity PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Ltd. (Bream, 2012);  
(x) Total E&P Kenya BV holds a 70 per cent. working interest in Block L-22, not a 100 
per cent. interest as shown in Table 4.3 (Total S.A., 2016); and 
                                                
7 This information has been compiled by the author from publicly-available sources and is, to 
the best of her knowledge, correct as at the date of submission of this study. 
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(xi) in August 2017 it was announced that Total S.A. had agreed to acquire a 100 per cent. 
equity interest in Maersk Oil meaning Total S.A. will, through its subsidiaries, take 
ownership of Maersk Oil’s interests in Blocks 10BA, 10BB and 13T (Total S.A., 
2017). 
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Whilst it is often possible to work out the ultimate beneficial owner–that is, the holding or 
parent company of the entity which holds the direct interest in the block–from the name of 
the company in Table 4.3, this is not possible in all cases. It is therefore worth noting the 
following: 
 
(i) Lamu Oil & Gas Limited, owner of Block L-14, is a joint venture between Edgo 
Energy and QFB (Edgo Energy, 2017); 
(ii) Molori Energy Inc. (previously known as Taipan Resources Inc.) is the parent 
company of Lion Petroleum Corp. which holds interests in Blocks 01 and 02B 
(Dumaresq, 2017);  
(iii) Erin Energy Corporation is the parent company of CAMAC Energy Kenya Ltd., 
owner of Blocks L-01B, L-16, L-27 and L-28 (Erin Energy Corporation, 2012); 
(iv) Blocks 03A and 03B are held by Avana Petroleum Kenya Ltd. but its parent company 
is actually Vanoil Energy Ltd. (Vanoil Energy Ltd., 2014); and 
(v) CH-SwissOil Holdings International Ltd. is the ultimate parent company of Sohi Gas 
Dodori Ltd.. 
 
In sum, many IOCs currently operate in Kenya. However, the corporate ownership chain of 
these entities is far from transparent and nor is it information which is made readily available 
to the public. In addition to this there is no accessible source from which members of the 
public can access up-to-date information telling them which entities own upstream interests; 
there is simply no official record and such information must be deduced from other publicly-
available sources. It is nonetheless worth noting that whilst many IOCS are active in Kenya, 
only three of these entities are close to development. Tullow, Africa Oil and Maersk Oil8 are 
in the development and production phase and this is taking place in Blocks 10BB and 13T. 
As operator and owner of interests in a further three blocks (Block 10BA with Africa Oil and 
Maersk Oil, Block 12A with Delonex Energy Ltd., and Block 12B on its own) Tullow is 
widely and justifiably considered to be the key IOC operating in Kenya at present (Tullow, 
2017b).  
 
Finally, it is important to mention the Petroleum Institute of East Africa as an important actor 
in the Kenyan oil sector. It is an organisation offering voluntary membership to, amongst 
                                                
8	However, as noted above Maersk Oil is subject to a takeover by Total S.A.. 
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others, IOCs involved in the oil sector in Kenya. It seeks to act as a bridge between its 
members and the government and is recognised by the government as playing “a key role in 
capacity building and awareness creation in the petroleum sub-sector (Republic of Kenya, 
2015a:23). 
 
4.2.3 Civil Society and the Public 
 
Civil society in Kenya refers to individual Kenyan citizens, as well as organisations, groups 
and bodies that represent the interests of such citizens but which are separate from 
government or business entities. Furthermore, when referring to civil society this study not 
only refers to those community members in the Turkana region where oil exploration is 
currently concentrated, but it is also referring to the entire population of Kenya. Whilst it is 
impossible to detail all relevant civil society players active in Kenya’s oil sector, the 
following will highlight some of the most important. It can be argued that what unites these 
different and diverse players is that they face common challenges. According to the 
KCSPOG (2014:iii), these challenges are threefold: “firstly, building its capacity in the new 
sector, secondly, participating in the ongoing development and reform of policy and 
legislation in the sector, and thirdly, ensuring that communities…have access to information 
about the sector.” 
 
Perhaps the most prominent civil society player in Kenya is the KCSPOG itself. The 
KCSPOG acts on behalf of civil society organisations and leaders and thus sits as somewhat 
of a central figure in the sector. Oxfam Kenya (2016) also works extensively “…with 
partners to ensure sustainable, inclusive development aligned with the priorities and 
expectations of local communities” and states it “is working closely with the communities 
and the county government to ensure the community is engaged in the oil exploration and are 
aware of their rights and responsibilities.” Another important civil society organisation is the 
Extractives Baraza. A largely online platform supported by the British government’s Kenya 
Extractives Programme, it claims to be “an advocacy-neutral online platform that promotes 
knowledge, transparency and evidence-based stakeholder dialogue on the extractives sector 
in Kenya” and it aims “to enhance citizen participation and engagement in the governance of 
Kenya’s extractives sector (Extractives Baraza, 2017).” 
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Other examples comprise smaller organisations, such as the Turkana Development 
Organisations Forum which is “a non-political, non-partisan and non-profit making 
membership organisation. It…is dedicated to improving enjoyment of human rights and 
root[s] for democratic governance among the people of Turkana County (Turkana 
Development Organisations Forum, 2017).” The Kenya Oil and Gas Working Group is 
another group whose ‘tagline’ is “Building Communities and Promoting Accountability” and 
which “provides a platform for constructive stakeholder engagement and community 
engagement, and knowledge management contributing to good governance and sustainable 
development in the oil and gas sector (Kenya Oil and Gas Working Group, 2017).” The 
localised Turkana Empowerment Advocacy Group has a presence on Facebook and posts 
items and views it claims are representative of some members of the Turkana community, 
whilst the Kenyan Barrel blog is a regularly updated site containing oil industry news and 
information aimed to “create knowledge and awareness amongst the greater public (Kenyan 
Barrel, 2017).” Oil News Kenya also offers oil sector news for the East African region in a 
particularly accessible format, either through its websites or through Twitter (Oil News 
Kenya, 2017; Twitter, 2017). Importantly, it is clear that civil society representation in Kenya 
is diverse and takes many forms.  
 
4.2.4 The International Community 
 
Non-Kenyan actors–particularly international institutes and organisations–play an important 
role in Kenya’s oil sector. With specific regard to transparency, these actors include the EITI, 
PWYP, the NRGI (including its NRC and Benchmarking Framework), Transparency 
International and the Open Government Partnership. However it is worth noting that it is not 
just organisations which have an impact on Kenya’s oil industry. Foreign regulatory 
frameworks and legislation are equally important in that they often capture (and therefore 
govern) the activities of IOCs operating in Kenya. For example, stock exchange rules may 
require listed entities (and their related entities) to disclose certain information about their 
operations which will subsequently become publicly-available. The same applies to domestic 
legislation which governs the activities of IOCs. An IOC incorporated in France but 
operating in Kenya will be required to comply with French and European Union (EU) 
legislation and regulations. Thus, if such legislation or regulations require disclosure of 
certain information by the IOC, that information will be made public even if the same 
disclosure requirement is not imposed on the IOC by Kenyan regulations or legislation. 
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Examples of how such requirements have influenced the Kenyan oil sector to date will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.4 below. 
 
4.3 The Domestic Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
The legislation and regulations governing all activities in Kenya’s oil sector is vast. Table 4.4 
below therefore sets out the legislation, regulations and government policies most relevant to 
upstream operations. 
 
 
In addition, new legislation has been proposed in the form of the Upstream Bill and the 
Energy Bill 2015. Once enacted the former will govern upstream activities whereas the latter 
will govern, amongst other energy matters, midstream and downstream petroleum activities. 
The government’s Vision 2030 (along with the associated Medium Term Plans) and its draft 
Petroleum Policy are also highly relevant as they place a focus on the oil sector which did not 
exist prior to Tullow’s discovery in Turkana in 2012.  
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A desire to promote greater transparency and accountability is indicated by the numerous 
references to these concepts in some of the legislation and government policies listed above. 
The constitution (Republic of Kenya, 2010) makes numerous references to it: Article 10 
places “good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability” as national values and 
principles of governance, Article 35 states that all citizens have the right to access 
information held by the state or information required for the exercise or protection of their 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and Article 71 requires that transactions involving the grant 
of rights or concessions for the exploitation of natural resources must be ratified by 
parliament. The model PSC upon which all PSCs signed by IOCs in Kenya are to be based 
also deals with transparency. Clause 49 (ERC, 2015) contains industry-standard 
confidentiality provisions but also specifically caters for disclosure of the PSC and related 
information in certain circumstances, such as when required by law, in order to comply with 
Article 71 of the constitution “or in accordance with internationally accepted standards and 
norms concerning transparency in the extractive industries.” Whilst IOCs are permitted to 
negotiate this clause and it therefore may take a different form in the signed PSCs, what 
seems to be apparent is that government is intending to pave the way for greater 
transparency. 
 
The proposed Upstream Bill (Republic of Kenya, 2015b) reflects the constitutional 
provisions in Clause 121 where the Cabinet Secretary for Energy and Petroleum is to: 
develop a framework for reporting, transparency and accountability in the upstream 
petroleum sector, which includes the publication of all petroleum agreements, 
records, annual accounts and reports of revenues (fees, taxes, royalties and other 
charges), as well as, any other relevant data and information that support payments 
made by the contractor and payments received by the Government, County 
Governments, and local communities.  
 
Such reporting is to be disaggregated into different agreements and on a project basis, so the 
intention is that information will be easily interpreted. Furthermore, the Upstream Bill 
(Republic of Kenya, 2015b) requires the new UPRA (see Chapter 4.2.1.2 above) to act in an 
open and transparent manner (Clause 44.1(b)), and Clause 44.2(d) requires it to “advocate 
and ensure transparency in the interaction of the upstream petroleum sector” and itself.  
 
The draft Petroleum Policy (Republic of Kenya, 2015a:29) further envisages the government 
ensuring “transparency and accountability in petroleum upstream operations taking into 
account best industry practices” and states that “efforts shall be made to align them with [the] 
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existing legal framework.” This is cited as a short-term strategy to be achieved prior to 2019. 
The Petroleum Policy also highlights the specific need for greater revenue transparency: “The 
government shall put in place transparent mechanism[s] for the allocation of energy and 
petroleum revenues raised by the national and the county governments for the benefits of 
people of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2015a:119).”  
 
Kenya Vision 2030 is Kenya’s long-term development plan and it also focuses on increasing 
political accountability, suggesting transparency is necessary to achieve this: “An 
accountable system is one that is open and transparent and one that permits free flow of 
information. It should be a system in which the leaders are accountable to citizens (Republic 
of Kenya, 2007:22).” Kenya’s current Medium Term Plan covers the period 2013-2017 and 
mentions improving transparency across its strategy for the political, economic and social 
pillars of the plan. Specifically regarding development of oil, it states that: 
the government will develop the policy, legal, and institutional framework for the 
exploitation and management of Kenya’s natural resources…for the maximum 
economic benefit of the country and local communities, done in a transparent and 
accountable manner (Republic of Kenya, 2013:xii). 
 
It also focuses on revenue transparency, declaring that the government will ensure that 
“legislation for transparency and fair sharing [of] the revenue generated is enacted, and 
safeguards erected…to avoid risks usually associated with huge inflows of resource-based 
external earnings (Republic of Kenya, 2013:xii).” However, perhaps most notable is the 
plan’s direct commitment to joining the EITI (Republic of Kenya, 2013:70). 
 
Nonetheless, the Upstream Bill has not yet been enacted nor the Petroleum Policy adopted. In 
September 2016 President Kenyatta failed to grant his assent to the Upstream Bill and set out 
his misgivings in a memorandum to the National Assembly. According to media reports he 
“said the revenue due to the local communities should be reduced from the 10 per cent. of 
what the national government gets as set by parliament, to five per cent. (Senelwa, 2017).” 
This in turn caused local leaders in Turkana County–including governor Josephat Nanok–to 
start “agitating for increased allocation of the proceeds to the host community and the county 
government (Senelwa, 2017).” It thus remains to be seen what form the final bill will take. 
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4.4 The International Framework  
 
There are no compulsory international laws or regulations governing Kenya’s oil sector as a 
whole. Instead, compliance with international organisations’ policies and rules are voluntary. 
Three of the most important of such regimes are the EITI, PWYP and the NGRI.  
 
The EITI is an international, multi-stakeholder group consisting of government, industry and 
civil society which encourages key information about governance in the extractive industries 
to be reported annually and provides recommendations for improving such governance whilst 
simultaneously disseminating reported information to the public (EITI, 2016:5). It is 
organised around the 12 EITI Principles (set out in Figure 4.6 below) that were first agreed in 
2003 at the London Lancaster House Conference and which lay out the EITI’s general aims 
and commitments (EITI, 2016:9). These Principles are complemented by the EITI 
Requirements which must be adhered to by all states implementing the EITI and by the 
process of ‘Validation’ which allows stakeholders to determine if implementation standards 
are sufficient when measured against the EITI Standard (EITI, 2016:9). The EITI Standard, 
currently in its fifth edition, is the framework document which sets out these elements. 
Ultimately the EITI promotes transparency by requiring disclosure of contracts and licences, 
production data, revenue collection and revenue allocation information, beneficial ownership 
details as well as social and economic contributions. 
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Membership of the EITI is not automatic and requires a strict compliance with the EITI 
process. States must apply to become an EITI candidate, following which they are considered 
an ‘EITI candidate’ until they become ‘EITI compliant’ by adhering to the EITI 
Requirements and EITI Standard; compliance is regularly checked through the ‘Validation’ 
process (2016:11-12). Whilst Kenya is not currently an EITI implementing state (of which 
there are currently 52), it has made public commitments to become one. For example, as 
noted in Chapter 4.3 above, Kenya’s current Medium Term Plan states an intention to join the 
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EITI. More notable was the commitment made following President Obama’s visit to Kenya 
in 2015 when the two governments issued a ‘Joint Commitment Between the Governments of 
the Republic of Kenya and the United States of America to Promote Good Governance and 
Anti-Corruption Efforts in Kenya’. This document (2015:Section II, para 14) specifically 
declares that “the Government of Kenya commits to implementing the [EITI] domestically 
and to identifying and enabling an EITI implementation focal point within the government 
within six months.” Nonetheless, Kenya remains neither a compliant state nor even a 
candidate, so it remains to be seen whether such statement will hold true. 
 
PWYP is a global coalition of civil society organisations which, like the EITI, promotes 
transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. Initially focused on payment 
transparency, it has expanded this focus to capture contract disclosure and transparent 
licensing procedures and it seeks to achieve greater EITI compliance and wider EITI 
reporting across the world. “PWYP has had members in Kenya since 2012, their primary 
focus has been calling for Kenya to join the [EITI] and advocating on the country’s mining 
bill (PWYP, 2017).” PWYP thus engages with civil society in Kenya to encourage EITI 
compliance and provides civil society organisations with an important support framework 
and guidance as to how best achieve their goals. 
 
The NRGI is an international institute which has produced the NRC to provide practical 
advice and policy options for governments, the international community and society in order 
to manage natural resource wealth (2014:4). The NRC is structured around 12 precepts, the 
second of which is that “resource governance requires decision makers to be accountable to 
an informed public” and which can be aided by providing “transparency of information along 
the entire chain of decisions (2014:10).” As well as promoting the avoidance of 
confidentiality clauses in contracts, the NRC (2014:10) requires various levels of information 
to be disclosed, including:  
 
(i) “names of companies and beneficial owners, whether invested or bidding; 
(ii) NOC [national oil company] operations and details; 
(iii) data and reports for licence activity including geological surveys, reserve estimates, 
impact assessments (social, economic and environmental); 
(iv) contracts; 
(v) fiscal details as well as savings funds; and 
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(vi) all revenues.” 
 
The NRC Benchmarking Framework (2016:3) “draws on the policy options and practical 
advice of the NRC, and consists of a series of questions that government officials, concerned 
citizens or actors in the international community can use to structure research, discussions 
and strategic planning.” In respect of precept 2 of the NRC regarding transparency and 
accountability specifically, the questions it asks are as set out in Figure 4.7 below. Again, 
whilst application is voluntary, the NRC and the Benchmarking Framework are nevertheless 
tools which can be and are applied to the Kenyan oil sector. By utilising the questions in 
Figure 4.7, interested parties have a framework around which they can measure how 
transparent and accountable the Kenyan government is and thereafter take appropriate steps 
to address any issues. 
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In addition to these voluntary initiatives, there are compulsory legal provisions in non-
Kenyan legislation which have an impact on Kenya’s oil sector. Examples are laws and 
regulations which affect an IOC operating in Kenya, applicable either because of the IOC’s 
state of incorporation or which stock exchange it is listed. For example, Section 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) in the 
United States requires extractive “companies registered with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) [to] produce annual reports detailing payments made to foreign 
governments (national and sub-national), agencies and state-owned enterprises (KCSPOG, 
2014:36).” These provisions capture foreign-incorporated companies and subsidiaries of the 
SEC registered company and they require project-level reporting of any payment–either 
single or part of a related series–which exceeds US$100,000 (SEC, 2016). Payments include 
royalties, taxes, licence and acreage fees, bonuses and production entitlements (KCSPOG, 
2014:36). The impact of these provisions is, however, in doubt under the new Trump 
administration in the United States after Congress and the Senate voted to repeal the SEC 
transparency requirements and the legislation was signed by President Trump in February 
2017. “The SEC is still obligated under the Dodd-Frank law to write some form of a 
transparency rule for extractive industries,” but “the agency can never publish any rule that is 
‘substantially the same’ as the one that has now been overturned (Cama, 2017).” Currently 
the SEC rules govern the disclosure of many IOCs operating around the world, including in 
Kenya, so any removal or weakening of the present requirements will have a significant 
effect on the global oil sector. 
 
The EU has implemented similar requirements to Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act by 
means of Chapter 10 of the EU Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU) and the EU Transparency 
Directive (2013/50/EU), plus the associated regulations. These Directives require EU 
member states to implement similar legislation domestically and their scope is therefore vast. 
The Directives require compliance from companies which are engaged in extractive 
industries and either (a) publicly listed in the European Economic Area; or (b) private 
companies defined as sufficiently large9. There are no exemptions and it is irrelevant if the 
company is registered in the Europe. Payments must be disclosed on a per government and 
per project basis, and the scope covers all payments of €100,000 or more for single or related 
                                                
9 Companies considered as sufficiently large are those that meet at least two out of the three 
following criterions: (i) turnover of at least €40 million; (ii) total assets of at least €20 
million; and (iii) at least 250 employees (European Commission, 2013). 
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transactions (European Commission, 2013). Furthermore, payments in kind or other 
payments such as production entitlements, taxes, royalties, dividends and bonuses must be 
disclosed (European Commission, 2013). The effect of this legislation, as well as similar 
legislation from jurisdictions across the world, is that many IOCs must now comply with 
increased disclosure rules.  
 
Other compulsory disclosure requirements emanating from stock exchange rules also affect 
IOC transparency. Examples can be found demonstrating how this has directly impacted 
IOCs operating in Kenya: the only Kenyan PSCs publicly-available are those which listed 
IOCs have been forced to disclose due to stock exchange requirements. Five of the seven 
Kenyan PSCs in the public domain relate to CAMAC Energy Kenya Limited’s Blocks L-1B, 
L-16, L-27 and L-28 and ERHC Energy Kenya Limited’s Block 11A, both companies having 
to disclose the PSCs due to their parent companies’ SEC filing requirements. The other two 
publicly-available PSCs are those for Lion Petroleum Corp.’s Blocks 1 and 2B, the disclosure 
of which was required due to Lion Petroleum Corp.’s listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
Other stock exchanges are following suit, an important example being the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange where new extractive company applicants must provide country-by-country 
reporting on tax, royalty and other government payments (Global Witness, 2013:10). What is 
clear is that foreign rules and legislation are tools that can be used to promote transparency 
globally: if a company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange is legally required to disclose its 
PSC, there is little the Kenyan government can do to prevent it. The effectiveness of such 
tools and of the voluntary initiatives described above in achieving greater transparency and 
promoting good governance in Kenya’s oil sector will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the history of Kenya’s oil sector and has 
summarised its current status. It has shown that, despite the relatively long history of oil 
exploration in Kenya, the sector remains relatively undeveloped and this is most apparent in 
its lack of exports and the delays hindering adoption of the new Upstream Bill. Current plans 
for developing the sector following Tullow’s discovery of commercial quantities of oil in 
2012 are on hold and it remains to be seen how quickly and efficiently these plans will be 
given effect, particularly given that the uncertainty garnered by the status of legislative limbo 
is hardly conducive to prompt development of the sector. Furthermore, this chapter has 
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highlighted the fact that there is no accurate, publicly-available source of information which 
provides an interested party with clear and concise details about which IOCs operate in the 
state. Specifically, Chapter 4.2.2 demonstrates that it is nearly impossible to conclude which 
IOCs hold upstream interests in Kenya without extensive research. That said, the proposed 
legislation and various government policies do suggest a rhetoric supportive of improving 
and implementing transparency in the sector. 
 
 This chapter also identified four key actors that play a role in shaping and influencing the 
sector: the government (and its related bodies and entities), IOCs and their affiliates, civil 
society organisations and the international community. It has shown that each such actor has 
a direct impact on the operations of the sector. For example, the government is directly 
involved through its allocation of licenses and interests to IOCs and by virtue of the activities 
of the NOCK, but it is also responsible for adopting, implementing and enforcing the 
legislation and regulations that govern the sector (and which have been summarised in 
Chapter 4.3). IOCs are fundamental to the sector for, without them, no activity would take 
place; they thus hold significant sway over how activities progress and in what manner. Civil 
society organisations like the KCSPOG are perhaps the strongest link between the citizens of 
Kenya and the oil sector and they are thus crucial to ensuring that public opinion is heard and 
that rights are protected. Finally, the role of the international community cannot be ignored: 
not only do influential organisations such as the EITI and PWYP hold sway in the Kenyan oil 
sector, but as Chapter 4.4 has demonstrated, rules, regulations and laws derived from foreign 
jurisdictions can have a huge impact on how the sector develops. 
 
Given their dominant and significant roles, it is thus necessary to determine how each of 
these actors might help to promote or hinder the implementation of effective transparency in 
the Kenyan oil sector. Chapter 5 will therefore firstly examine how transparent the sector is at 
present before analysing the potential impact of each of the government, IOCs, civil society 
and the international community on the push for increased transparency in Kenya. 
 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  94 
Chapter 5 
IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE TRANSPARENCY IN KENYA 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 have explored the contextual factors relevant to gaining an understanding of 
how transparency might effectively be implemented in the Kenyan oil sector. It is thus 
necessary to develop the analysis further by applying the theories discussed in Chapter 2 to 
Kenya whilst accounting for this context. It is important to note that there is undoubtedly a 
difference between introducing transparency and it subsequently being effective in helping to 
avoid negative political effects of the resource curse: not only is it crucial that the correct 
information is released in a timely manner by all relevant parties, but it must be information 
which can be disseminated efficiently and interpreted easily. Only then is there hope for the 
information to be used to promote accountability and deter poor behaviour such as 
corruption, patronage and rent-seeking. The process is therefore threefold: firstly, 
transparency and dissemination of the correct information must be achieved; secondly, 
meaningful interpretation must be possible and permitted; and thirdly, effective 
accountability must exist. This chapter will examine each of these elements and will in 
particular focus on the barriers to achieving them. It will begin by using the theories 
identified in Chapter 2.3 and building on the discussion in Chapter 4 in order to assess 
existing levels of transparency in Kenya’s oil sector before looking briefly at what future 
transparency initiatives might be implemented. The remainder of the chapter will focus on 
how transparency and accountability is might be thwarted by the four key players in the 
sector identified in Chapter 3: government, civil society, IOCs and the international 
community. 
 
5.1 The Current Position 
 
5.1.1 Block Allocation, Ownership and Documentation 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there is very little accurate information available about the 
allocation of upstream blocks and licences in Kenya. Whilst the NOCK website contains a 
map showing the location of the blocks and an image detailing the structural framework of 
the basins (NOCK, 2017b), the map is dated from 2015 and it is also hard to decipher who 
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the IOCs owning the blocks are. Moreover, it does not show working interests in each block 
and instead only notes the operator’s company name (at times this is also inaccurate). There 
is a clear lack of transparency and there are no official publicly-available sources revealing 
information on beneficial ownership of the interests. Indeed, the most comprehensive 
information is available from the 2016 study of Hubert (2016) who meticulously scoured 
public sources and news channels to determine his (now also outdated) understanding of 
which IOCs own and operate each of Kenya’s upstream blocks. As Hubert (2016:5,19) notes, 
the difficulty in accessing accurate ownership is problematic, particularly as he found that 
only five companies operating in Kenya at the time of his research do not use tax havens as 
part of their corporate structure. These five companies are Adamantine Energy LLC, Far 
Limited, First Oil Plc, Qatar First Bank LLC and Simba Energy Inc.. He concludes that there 
is a widespread use of low tax jurisdictions or tax havens by IOCs operating in Kenya and 
that the structures are complex: “in total, thirty-five separate companies hold a percentage 
stake in at least one of the 41 active petroleum license[s] in Kenya. These subsidiaries are 
ultimately owned by twenty-seven separate parent companies” and “seventeen of these parent 
companies own petroleum rights in Kenya directly through a subsidiary registered in a tax 
haven (Hubert, 2016:5).” In sum, Hubert (2016:22) argues that 
uncovering these corporate structures is much more difficult than should be the case. 
Best practice in extractive sector good governance calls for the government to publish 
details of all companies holding oil, gas and mineral rights. Kenya already provides 
some of this information through the online mining cadastre portal. Comprehensive 
information on petroleum rights should also be published including the legal names 
of operators and their joint venture partners as well as their respective percentage 
stakes and the dates on which the relevant transaction were concluded. Furthermore, 
as Kenya has made a public commitment to joining the EITI, companies should be 
required to disclose full details of their corporate structures and their beneficial 
owners. 
 
As this author found in her research, the only practical means available to a member of the 
public wishing to determine ownership details is to painstakingly search online and to fit the 
pieces of the jigsaw together oneself. The discussion in Chapter 4.2.2 above is further 
testament to how difficult the lack of transparency in ownership makes it for anyone wanting 
to establish who owns Kenyan petroleum rights. This difficulty is compounded by the fact 
that many of the IOCs involved in Kenya are subsidiaries and often neither they, nor their 
parent companies, have websites which provide information on their assets or operations. 
Furthermore, given that most upstream transactions tend to be covered by industry-specific 
media outlets as opposed to the mainstream outlets, any interested member of the public will 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  96 
struggle to accurately decipher which IOCs currently own which blocks in Kenya following 
inevitable acquisitions and disposals of interests. The situation in Kenya is thus far from that 
advocated by those who believe corporate ownership should be fully transparent, as discussed 
in Chapter 2.3.2 above. 
 
One particular area of concern regarding block ownership is the lack of clear information 
available on government interests in the blocks. The model PSC (ERC, 2015) and existing 
PSCs (see Table 5.1 below) provide for the government to either have an existing stake in the 
blocks or to elect to participate in the blocks at a future date. Table 5.1 shows what such 
options consist of for the seven PSCs that are publicly-available in Kenya and, whilst the 
government may not have elected to take any interests, there is no officially-provided 
information available to suggest this is the case. Of specific interest is what participation 
rights the government has in Blocks 10BB and 13T (either directly, through the NOCK or 
through another actor) where Tullow has discovered commercial quantities of oil. On the 
basis of the model PSC and the provisions of the available PSCs listed in Table 5.1, it can be 
assumed that the government will have been granted similar participation rights to Blocks 
10BB and 13T. If truly transparent then the public would have access to this information in 
order to determine what expenditure the government is committed to on these blocks–it is 
unlikely to have a carried interest for the development and production phases–and what costs 
it has incurred to date. 
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As noted in Chapter 2.3.1, the process by which blocks are awarded to IOCs is an area of the 
sector which receives significant attention from proponents of transparency. Unfortunately, 
the process is far from transparent in Kenya. Past awards were granted by means of bilateral 
negotiations and there was no public bidding round. Although there has been recent 
acknowledgement that the 17 newly created blocks would be subject to a bidding round 
(Odhiambo, 2015) and similar calls have been made in the past (Obulutsa, 2012), this has not 
yet materialised. Possibly delayed due to the stalled Upstream Bill, the NOCK’s website 
suggests that for the time being awards will continue to be made bilaterally: interested parties 
are invited to submit an application to ‘the Minister of Energy’ (NOCK, 2017c). Indeed, this 
appears to be out of date for, as noted in Chapter 4.2.1.1, the Minister of Energy position has 
been superseded by that of the Cabinet Secretary for Energy and Petroleum. Thus, the 
bidding procedure for Kenya’s oil interests remains opaque. 
 
In Chapter 2.3.4 it was mentioned that numerous scholars and international transparency 
initiatives also propose transparency of upstream contracts. However, Kenya has not yet 
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embraced such a proposition. Only seven Kenyan PSCs are available and these have only 
entered the public domain through foreign stock exchange and legal requirements, not from 
domestic initiatives (see Chapter 4.4). The NOCK makes the model PSC available and gives 
a brief summary of its terms (NOCK, 2017c), but this is a far cry from releasing the full, 
tailored documents which are normally heavily negotiated between the government and the 
IOC. As will be discussed below, neither of the two key IOCs operating in Kenya (Tullow 
and Africa Oil) have released their PSCs despite suggesting they would like to. The Kenyan 
situation is therefore far from transparent with regard to the release of upstream documents. 
 
5.1.2 Operational Information 
 
If the lack of transparency regarding block allocation and ownership is stark, the opacity of 
operational information is even more so. Given Kenya’s oil sector is relatively youthful and 
is embraced by a strong optimism, it might be expected that more operational information 
would be made publicly-available by the government. However, this is not the case and all 
that is available is information released by certain IOCs. The MoEP website does provide 
some very basic information, including a basinal map and a map of wells drilled as well as a 
graph depicting the years such wells were drilled (MoEP, 2017a). The NOCK also provides a 
summary of wells drilled, including the relevant year and a brief indication of what was 
encountered (such as “oil discovery” or “net oil play / gas”) (NOCK, 2017d). Additionally, it 
has a promising webpage entitled ‘Geophysical Data’; however, the promise is hindered 
when all that the page delivers is a simple one-page Excel sheet (NOCK, 2017e). To access 
data one must instead pay the NOCK: for example, it costs US$5,000 for the latest (2006) 
data on the Mandera Basin’s potential or US$500 for any well geological report, geochemical 
reports, well velocity analyses, post-well reviews and proposal reviews dated after 2002, or it 
will cost US$1,000 for a well completion report post-2002 (NOCK, 2017f). Suffice to say 
that it is unlikely most members of the Kenyan public or civil society organisations would be 
willing to pay such sums for this information.  
 
Therefore, whilst the NOCK (2017a) boasts that through its National Data Centre project it 
holds “an inventory of all petroleum exploration data i.e. seismic data, well logs, well reports, 
other oil exploration related reports, aeromagnetic and gravity data, obtained in the country 
by different operators in both digital and analogue formats” and has “set up cores and drill-
cuttings storage facility which holds samples retrieved during drilling from 1960 to date,” 
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most of this information remains outwith the realistic reach of all who are not directly 
involved in the oil sector. In sum, the government makes very little operational information 
available to the public and instead the best information is obtained from IOC press releases 
and websites, yet such information is entirely dependent on the will and practice of each 
individual IOC. Available information on the operations of the NOCK is similarly sparse, 
with its website proudly detailing the airborne geophysical survey it conducted over its own 
block, Block 14T (NOCK, 2017g), but little else. Indeed, one would struggle to find 
information on the NOCK’s own website about which interests it owns or what options it has 
for future participation. Again, the lack of transparency is undeniable. 
 
5.1.3 Revenue Flows and Expenditure 
 
In Chapter 2.3.3 the theories about transparency of revenue flows between IOCs and 
government (including all revenues, taxes, payments and bonuses) as well as government 
expenditure and allocation of revenues were discussed and it was noted that such theories 
formed the basis of early calls for transparency in the oil sector. Whilst Kenya has not yet 
reached production–when substantial revenues and payments are likely to be made from 
IOCs and received by the government–that is not to say that significant and material 
payments are not already being made and received.  
 
An example can be taken of Tullow’s activities which are particularly notable given it is 
close to moving from development to full production. According to latest information 
published on its website, Tullow (2017d) claims to have spent KES6.1 billion in 2013 which 
includes “total payments to all Kenyan stakeholder groups, including taxes to the national 
Government, expenditure with local suppliers and discretionary investment in community 
projects.” Using an historic exchange rate from mid-2013 this equates to approximately 
US$70 million which is a huge amount of money, and Tullow (2017d) states that KES1.9 
billion of this (just under US$24 million) comprised of taxes: VAT, withholding tax on 
imported services and PAYE to its employees. What is most concerning is that Tullow’s 
activities and financial reports are to date unaudited: no audit of Tullow’s statements and 
operations has been conducted since it began operating in Kenya. This is worrying, 
particularly as the situation seems unlikely to change in the near future: in 2016 it was 
reported that Tullow claims to have US$1.5 billion of recoverable costs yet no qualified 
auditor had been found to conduct the audit, and that four shortlisted firms were rejected due 
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to excessive professional fees (Herbling, 2016). Indeed, until the new UPRA is established 
(see Chapter 4.2.1.2) it seems unlikely that there will be any progress in appointing a suitable 
auditor and that opacity will remain. 
 
Furthermore, the lack of publicly-available PSCs (see Chapter 5.1.1) means there is 
significant opacity with regard to the other financial commitments IOCs have in Kenya. For 
example, the model PSC (ERC, 2015) and each of the publicly-available PSCs make 
provision for the IOCs to pay signature bonuses to the government, to pay annual surface 
fees, to contribute annually to training funds and, in some cases, to local community 
development projects. Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 respectively set out these signature bonus, 
surface fee and training fund commitments under the PSCs we have access to. 
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Regarding the annual training fund commitments and the annual surface fees, these range in 
value depending on what phase of the PSC the contractors are in–either exploration, 
development or production. To demonstrate how significant these payments can be it is worth 
looking at Block L-1B as an example. This PSC was signed on 10 May 2012 by the Kenyan 
government and CAMAC Energy Kenya Limited (the ‘Contractor’) and a signature bonus of 
US$310,000 was payable on or before the date of execution to the MoEP (Block L-1B PSC, 
2012). For the initial exploration period of two years, surface fees of US$5 per km2 were 
payable which, on a contract area of 12,128.75km2, would have totalled US$60,643.75 per 
year and US$121,287.50 for the initial period. If this period was extended (as is likely to have 
been the case), then for the next two years the fees rose to US$10 per km2 and then again to 
US$15 per km2 if extended for a second time. Thus, during the first six years of the PSC’s 
term–taking us to 2018–and assuming none of the contract area was surrendered and that the 
exploration period was extended, the total surface fees payable would be US$727,725. 
During this period US$1,050,000 would have been spent on the training fund and at least 
US$300,000 on local community development projects. Thus, for the initial six years of 
exploration the contractor would have paid a sum equating to approximately US$2,077,725, 
and this excludes all forms of taxes and other payments. Given that there are over 40 such 
PSCs in Kenya at present and that some of these have moved into the development periods, 
the amount of revenue being received by the government from signature bonuses, surface 
fees, training fund and development project commitments is substantial. Yet again, however, 
there is a real lack of transparency over these commitments. 
 
Table 5.5 demonstrates a further area of IOC expenditure of which the public has little 
knowledge, again save for that information revealed in the publicly-available PSCs or from 
IOC disclosures to shareholders or regulators: exploration period work commitments. These 
commitments relate to what expenditure the government requires the IOCs to make during 
the exploration period and they depend on what stage of exploration the PSC is in and 
whether the exploration phase is extended. Normally capturing amounts spent acquiring 2D 
or 3D seismic or drilling exploratory wells, the expenditure will not be received by the 
government directly but will instead be incurred by the IOC. This also explains why the sums 
are so high: acquiring seismic and drilling wells is hugely expensive. And although the 
payments are not being made to government (though some indirect revenues may be made 
through taxation), it is still helpful for the public to be aware of how much money the IOCs 
are investing in operations in Kenya. Even the most basic analysis of the available figures 
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shown in Table 5.5 reveals how significant these flows of money are to the Kenyan economy: 
for the seven PSCs included in Table 5.5 the average minimum commitment for the 
exploration period is US$63.64 million. Given that there are currently 41 allocated blocks 
(see Table 4.3 above), a rough estimate of minimum commitments using this average figure 
of US$63.64 million per block would result in a total commitment of just over US$2.6 billion 
before development and production even begin. Once again, however, the lack of available 
information in a readily accessible format points to further opacity in Kenya’s oil sector. 
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What is clear from the figures shown in Tables 5.2 to 5.5 is that the commitments are not 
neglible, yet the public has no clear summary of how much these payments are for each of 
the blocks (particularly as since signature some of the PSCs will have moved from 
exploration to development phases, and some periods may well have been extended). The 
only means of determining the approximate amounts is to study the PSCs themselves, 
something that requires an understanding of how PSCs are structured and what each payment 
is. Furthermore, there is no information at all for the blocks where PSCs are not available–the 
majority of Kenyan blocks. In sum, Kenya’s oil sector is more opaque than it is transparent 
and the significance of this will only increase as blocks begin to move from exploration into 
development and production. 
 
5.1.4 Legislative and Contractual Provisions 
 
Chapter 4.4 set out the existing and proposed legislation and regulations governing upstream 
activity in Kenya and it also highlighted the relevant provisions which promote transparency 
and accountability in the sector. For example, Articles 10 and 71 of the constitution 
(Republic of Kenya, 2010) are conducive to implementing further transparency measures, as 
are Clauses 44 and 121 of the proposed Upstream Bill (Republic of Kenya, 2015b) and the 
draft Petroleum Policy (Republic of Kenya, 2015a). Government policy documents including 
Vision 2030 and its current Medium Term Plan do similarly (Republic of Kenya, 2007; 2013) 
and it is thus clear that there is at least a rhetoric of promoting greater transparency in the 
sector. 
 
However, the reality does not currently match this rhetoric. Firstly, it is relatively difficult to 
determine what legislation is applicable to the sector. The NOCK website has a section called 
‘Overview of Legal Framework’ (NOCK, 2017h), but this gives little information about 
existing provisions and instead includes links to the new, draft documentation such as the 
draft Petroleum Policy, the Energy Bill 2015, the Upstream Bill and the new draft model 
PSC, none of which have yet been formally adopted. Even once relevant legislation or 
provisions have been identified, interpretation of these is difficult for anyone without legal or 
oil sector experience. For example, the new draft model PSC is 125 pages long (ERC, 2017). 
But more importantly there are calls for legislative provisions–and specifically the draft 
Upstream Bill–to go further in their promotion of transparency. Of the Upstream Bill, civil 
society organisation the KCSPOG (2014:15) believes it “does not contain a comprehensive 
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transparency regime” and that “the types of disclosure that would enhance the bill [include] 
reporting on winning bids after a public tender, disclosure of beneficial ownership 
information, and disclosure about expenditure from oil revenues.” Further, the KCSPOG 
(2014:15-16) argues that the absence of a clear mechanism for financing the NOCK by 
means of government revenues from the sector is a glaring omission from current legislation 
and that  
in spite of the high risks of corruption in the oil and gas industry, the bill does not 
incorporate anti-corruption clauses consistent with major international benchmarks 
such as the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions; the United States of America Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977; and the United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010. 
 
Kenyan legislation in its current and proposed form therefore appears to lack the teeth 
necessary to enable the promotion of effective transparency and accountability. 
 
Further barriers to transparency currently lie in the form of PSC confidentiality provisions. 
As discussed in Chapter 2.3.4, opponents to increased transparency and IOCs often cite 
restrictive confidentiality provisions as justification for why they do not release information 
and the provisions in the existing model PSC, the new draft model PSC and the seven 
publicly-available PSCs in Kenya are indeed restrictive. Although both the model PSC (ERC, 
2015) and the draft model PSC (ERC, 2017) permit disclosure of the PSC and related 
information in certain circumstances such as when required by law, in order to comply with 
Article 71 of the constitution “or in accordance with internationally accepted standards and 
norms concerning transparency in the extractive industries,” such provisions do not appear to 
exist in the publicly-available PSCs. Instead, Clause 37 of five of these PSCs prevents 
disclosure of the PSCs (and their content) by any party to that PSC without the prior written 
consent of the other parties, save for the usual caveat where disclosure to affiliates, bona fide 
third party purchasers, independent contractors and consultants or as required by law is 
permitted (Block 11A PSC, 2012; Block L-1B PSC, 2012; Block L-16 PSC, 2012; Block L-
27 PSC, 2012; Block L-28 PSC, 2012). The other two PSCs do not expressly permit such 
disclosure (Block 1 PSC, 2007; Block 2B PSC, 2008). It is interesting that all five of the 
more ‘lenient’ PSCs were signed in 2012 following adoption of the new constitution which 
promotes increased transparency, whereas the other two PSCs (Block 1 PSC, 2007; Block 2B 
PSC, 2008) which do not contain similarly lenient provisions were signed in 2007 and 2008; 
this perhaps explains why the earlier PSCs permit less transparency. Nonetheless, the earlier 
PSCs (Block 1 PSC, 2007; Block 2B PSC, 2008) are wider in scope than the later PSCs 
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(Block 11A PSC, 2012; Block L-1B PSC, 2012; Block L-16 PSC, 2012; Block L-27 PSC, 
2012; Block L-28 PSC, 2012) with regard to what the government may do with information it 
receives from the IOCs: whilst Clause 37(2) of the earlier two PSCs permits the government 
to “use any information supplied, for the purpose of preparing and publishing reports and 
returns required by law, and for the purpose of preparing and publishing reports and surveys 
of a general nature,” the latter PSCs restrict this usage to “internal use.” Positively, Clause 
49(3) of the new draft model PSC (ERC, 2017) does once again remove this reference to 
‘internal use’. 
 
In general it is important to acknowledge that these existing confidentiality provisions are not 
as restrictive as others commonly found in PSCs. In particular they generally allow disclosure 
of the contract or of information provided pursuant to it if the prior written consent of the 
other party is obtained and such consent cannot be unreasonably withheld. The new draft of 
the model PSC (ERC, 2017) contains similar provisions in Clause 49(2). This therefore opens 
the door for IOCs (or the government) if they wish to release information; it would be hard 
for the other party to hide behind their PSC confidentiality clause. Furthermore, the new draft 
model PSC (ERC, 2017) expressly notes that the PSC is a public document at Clause 49(5):  
This contract is a public document and the Government shall have the right to publish 
and keep it publicly available. The Government may publish such information 
concerning this contract as may be required by the laws of Kenya, including for 
purposes of obtaining ratification of the contract by Parliament in accordance with 
Article 71 of the constitution, or in accordance with internationally accepted 
standards and norms concerning transparency in the extractive industries. 
 
Although this clause gives only the government the express right to publish the document, it 
is likely that during negotiations the IOCs will argue for this to be reciprocal and, regardless, 
there would be a convincing argument that the reference to the PSC being publicly-available 
would grant this right to the IOCs anyway. Yet this clause is not wide enough to capture the 
public release of information provided by one party to the other pursuant to the contract, such 
as operational information, and such information would therefore require the prior written 
consent of the other party for disclosure. 
 
That said, if new PSCs signed by the government and IOCs include the provisions of the new 
draft model PSC it is certainly a step in the right direction for transparency. Although 
existing PSC provisions (which are likely to be relatively restrictive given the analysis of 
those seven publicly-available PSCs and the existing model PSC) will remain unchanged, it 
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would be hard and unlikely for the government to justify releasing only the new PSCs if 
demanded by civil society organisations or the IOCs themselves. Nevertheless, there is no 
certainty as to when the new PSCs will be signed nor what their provisions will be and there 
is no guarantee that the new model PSC will be adopted as currently drafted. The conclusion 
is thus that the current Kenyan legislative, regulatory and contractual provisions do little to 
promote effective transparency in the sector but that there are indications this could change in 
the future. 
 
5.1.5 Next Steps 
 
Given the analysis above it is clear that there is minimal transparency in Kenya’s oil sector at 
present and further steps need to be taken. What transparency does exist, such as the release 
of PSCs or of operational information, tends not to come from the government but instead 
from either foreign requirements–whether that be stock exchange rules, regulatory rules or 
simply reports to shareholders and investors–or from the IOCs themselves. Barriers to 
effective transparency are thus already in place simply from the structure of Kenya’s 
upstream sector and there is seemingly not an established, conducive framework in place to 
permit transparency initiatives to take hold. Chapter 5.2 will examine in detail what further 
barriers might stand in the way, however before turning to this it is necessary to briefly 
summarise what form some of these initiatives might take. 
 
Ultimately, transparency could be improved in each of the areas discussed in Chapters 5.1.1 
to 5.1.4 and this could be achieved through compliance with international initiatives such as 
PWYP and the EITI, or domestically through legislation, contractual provisions or simply 
good practice. Kenya has already expressed its desire to join the EITI and did so on a very 
public stage by expressing a joint commitment with the United States when Barack Obama 
visited Kenya as president of the United States in 2015: 
The two Governments share a commitment to transparency in decision-making and 
financial flows related to the extractive industries, and intend to work collaboratively 
with all stakeholders to make this information publicly accessible and usable. The 
Government of Kenya commits to implementing the [EITI] domestically and to 
identifying and enabling an EITI implementation focal point within the government 
within six months. The Government of Kenya also commits to adopt and implement a 
progressive and transparent policy and legislative framework for upstream, mid-
stream, and downstream extractive activities, including transparency in licensing 
procedures, publication of contracts, and environmental and conservation and labour 
requirements in line with international standards.” (Joint Commitment Between the 
Government of the Republic of Kenya and the United States of America to Promote 
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Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Efforts in Kenya, 2015:Section II, paragraph 
14). 
 
This public commitment arguably establishes a way-in for the international community and 
grants it a place to press for further transparency, but perhaps more important are the roles 
IOCs, civil society organisations in Kenya and the government can play. Whilst waiting for 
the Upstream Bill and associated policies to be adopted the government could take the 
initiative by publishing a regularly updated database of ownership (direct and beneficial) of 
the upstream blocks and it could also release further PSCs to the public, ideally all existing 
PSCs. Ownership details could include the NOCK’s interests as well as a summary of what 
rights the government has to participate in PSCs. The government could also release details 
of all signature bonuses it has received to date, as well as what contributions have been made 
to training funds and local development projects by IOCs and how such contributions have 
been spent. Finding a suitable auditor for Tullow’s operations would be a significant step and 
this might in turn lead to audits of other IOCs operating in Kenya.  
 
Furthermore, given that production is scheduled to begin in the not-too-distant future, the 
government should focus on its revenue allocation policies. As the KCSPOG (2014:24) 
argued back in 2014, “Kenya should enact standalone legislation on petroleum revenue 
management with clear transfer and withdrawal rules as well as investment and savings 
rules.” This is particularly important because although the government has in the past 
proposed establishing a sovereign wealth fund which will receive all of central government’s 
share of petroleum revenues and will thereafter be used for budget stabilisation and support 
as well as future generational equity, “it is not clear yet what fiscal rule the government will 
adopt to determine the size of annual spending from the fund (KCSPOG, 2014:24).” As 
Charles Wanguhu of the KCSPOG has suggested, transparency on how the government plans 
to utilise its petroleum revenues is fundamental and such revenues should ideally be divided 
into a budget fund, a stabilisation fund and a sovereign wealth fund with clear rules for 
transfers and withdrawals (Chatham House, 2014a; Chatham House, 2014b). Whatever it 
decides, the government must make its policies transparent and communicate these to the 
public. Communication is key and, as the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) consortium 
(2015:291) noted in a 2015 report on Kenya’s oil sector, it is crucial that IOCs and the 
government “develop and implement a communication strategy on the process and timelines 
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associated with exploration and development of the petroleum sector to manage expectations 
of local communities/leaders and Kenyan people in general.” 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.5.1, it is unlikely that IOCs will take the first step to improving 
transparency without obtaining the consent of the government to do so. Further, international 
initiatives will have little impact if the government does not express a will to co-operate. As 
such, the government appears to be in the prime position for advancing transparency in the 
sector. However, as will be demonstrated below, numerous barriers stand in the way. 
 
5.2 Further Barriers to Effectiveness 
 
Chapter 5.1 has shown that there is currently limited transparency in Kenya’s oil sector, 
indicating that significant barriers to further transparency exist. It is necessary to identify 
these barriers, bearing in mind the theoretical view discussed in Chapter 2 that incentives are 
key to promoting and sustaining effective transparency and accountability. This Chapter 5.2 
will therefore examine the roles of the four key actors identified in Chapter 4: the 
government, civil society and the public, IOCs and the international community. 
 
5.2.1 The Kenyan Government 
 
In Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that Kenya’s politics–and by extension its government–is 
characterised by commonplace bribery, corruption, patronage and ethnic division. The 
current electoral debacle is a case in point. Given Chapter 2’s conclusion that political effects 
of the resource curse can include each of these characteristics, it is justifiable to assert that 
these pre-existing characteristics are likely to be strengthened now that significant oil 
reserves have been found and are in the process of being developed. In turn, this casts doubt 
on how effective transparency is to be implemented when many of the powerful actors in 
Kenya, particularly in government, would see their positions weakened by increased 
transparency and accountability. To put it another way, the government–including its 
members, related entities and parastatals–is unlikely to be incentivised to damage a political 
culture it is already so reliant upon by shining a light on it. So, whilst Omolo and Mwabu 
(2014:178) are correct to assert that the “inclusion of the extractive sector as the seventh 
industry in the economic pillar of Kenya’s second Medium Term Plan…of Vision 2030 
shows the importance attached to this emerging industry by the government,” it is likely that 
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the sector is also seen as important to the government as a further opportunity for bribery, 
corruption and patronage. Despite the official supportive rhetoric, this would suggest that 
there may be a lack of will on the part of the government to implement transparency 
measures. 
 
5.2.1.1    A Lack of Will 
 
This lack of will can be demonstrated by practical examples, all of which have stunted 
progress of transparency initiatives to date and can thus help explain why the sector remains 
so opaque. The best illustration is the delayed Upstream Bill. The enactment of this bill 
promises much for transparency, as discussed in Chapter 4.3, however, it remains in limbo 
and is unlikely to be progressed until after the re-run of the elections and thus later this year 
at the earliest. One of the key contentious issues raised by the bill (and by Kenyatta in his 
refusal to provide presidential assent to it in 2016–see Chapter 4.3) is that of revenue 
allocation between central and county governments. Indeed, this issue became a key part of 
Odinga’s election campaign and he pushed for fair revenue sharing: at a campaign rally in 
Turkana County on 27 July 2017 he declared he would give Turkana residents a 20 per cent. 
share of oil revenues (Lutta, 2017), something Kenyatta seems opposed to. Agreement on 
revenue allocation is crucial, but delaying the Upstream Bill garners further uncertainty and 
does little to progress the push for transparency. Only once it is in place will the 
government’s true dedication to transparency be put to the test.  
 
Another example of confusing government reluctance is shown by its lack of co-operation 
with the PwC consortium charged with compiling a report for the World Bank with the 
objective of this report being provided to the government to aid its production of a 
‘Petroleum Sector Master Plan for Kenya’ (PwC Consortium, 2015:17). The consortium was 
made up of PwC, Channoil Consulting Limited and QED Gas Consulting and its report noted 
that “the development of an effective Oil and Gas Master Plan is hampered by the absence of 
reliable data as to the likely extent and recoverability of hydrocarbons in Kenya (PwC 
Consortium, 2015:24).” The consortium called on the government to force IOCs to provide 
more reliable information on their seismic activities and drilling plans so that pipeline 
development and further inward investment could progress, but they specifically highlighted 
the fact that very little information was provided to the consortium by the MoEP or by the 
NOCK (PwC Consortium, 2015:33).  
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In an interview for this research the KCSPOG’s Charles Wanguhu (2017) gave yet another 
example of the government lacking the will to promote transparency when noting that 
although there has been some reform and steps towards reducing opacity, there has been 
government pushback. He discussed the proposed requirement in the Upstream Bill for 
parliament to ratify PSCs–rather than just the Cabinet Secretary, as is currently the case–and 
argued that such a requirement would ensure that the Cabinet Secretary knows that others 
will review the PSCs and therefore the results of his or her negotiations. Wanguhu (2017) 
suggested this requirement would reduce potential avenues for corruption as it would be 
harder to corrupt parliament than just one person. Yet he also said that some had proposed a 
watered-down provision whereby parliament had the right to approve field development 
plans (FDPs), but not PSCs. The issue with this, Wanguhu (2017) argued convincingly, is 
that it will provide far less oversight than if parliament had to approve PSCs: whilst Chapter 
4 revealed that the government has signed over 40 PSCs, very few of these will reach the 
stage where a FDP is required–perhaps only four or five. Moreover, as demonstrated by 
Chapter 5.1 above, significant expenditure is incurred under each PSC document. Therefore 
granting parliament scrutiny over all PSCs is a far greater step towards transparency and 
accountability than only granting it scrutiny over the few FDPs Kenya is likely to see, even if 
expenditure under the latter is likely to overshadow that under the PSCs. The point is that 
parliamentary scrutiny is a tool which can help reveal and act as a disincentive to corrupt 
activity, but the Kenyan government’s seeming reluctance to commit to it indicates there are 
still serious barriers in the way of transparency. 
 
In his interview Wanguhu (2017) suggested that there are two primary obstacles to 
implementing transparency in Kenya: (i) the government’s default to secrecy; and (ii) 
political issues of bribery, corruption and, ultimately, patronage. Regarding the former, there 
has been a slight shift since the adoption of Kenya’s new constitution and reform is 
happening, however the mentality of government secrecy is hard to change. Wanguhu (2017) 
cited the rebuffals he and the KCSPOG receive when approaching IOCs to release their PSCs 
and the standard justification that they will not do so without government permission. The 
government’s fall-back on secrecy is traditional and embedded, and according to Wanguhu 
(2017) it is a bipartisan approach. It is therefore unlikely to change even if the re-run of the 
election sees Odinga appointed as president. Nevertheless, it is something that could be 
overcome with great leadership and Wanguhu (2017) believes bribery, corruption and 
patronage are the bigger issue. He argues that the oil sector is viewed by many in government 
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as a “cash cow” providing many opportunities for pilfering and that this mind-set is very 
difficult to challenge. The promotion of effective transparency would raise accountability and 
would therefore see such opportunities hindered, so the will to embrace such promotion is 
understandably lacking.  
 
5.2.1.2    Capacity Constraints 
 
Nevertheless, government will is not the only barrier in the way of transparency. Kenya’s oil 
sector is still very young and undeveloped. The proposed reforms and changes discussed in 
Chapters 4.2 and 4.3 are a step in the right direction, but it is the case that capacity concerns 
are an issue. It remains to be seen how transparency initiatives, which require a significant 
amount of manpower and time, can be implemented. For example, maintaining publicly-
available records of PSCs, corporate ownership structures and block operational activities as 
well as revenue streams is incredibly onerous, not to mention complicated. It requires well-
trained and experienced staff members, all of whom communicate clearly and effectively 
with one another. Such structures are yet to be truly tested in Kenya and the pressures on 
these structures will be even greater in light of decentralisation. Not only could 
decentralisation magnify regional disparities and ethnic divisions, as well as decentralising 
corruption (see Chapter 3.2), but there are serious questions over whether local, county 
governments will have the capacity to handle the demands of a burgeoning oil sector. 
Moreover, progress to date (most notably in respect of revenue allocation) has suggested that 
further disparity between central and localised government in terms of practical 
responsibilities and policy is likely. Even if the will for further transparency and 
accountability is present, there are therefore numerous capacity issues which will need to be 
addressed before effectiveness is achieved. 
 
5.2.1.3    Summary 
 
In sum, there are two key barriers from the Kenyan government’s perspective to 
implementing transparency and to it being effective: sufficient will and sufficient capacity. 
The youthfulness of Kenya’s oil sector is somewhat of a double-edged sword with regard to 
the latter. Although currently underdeveloped and untested, government capacity can be 
shaped and improved and Kenya has the advantage of being able to observe how other states, 
including its neighbour Uganda, have expanded their capacity and to learn lessons from this. 
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There is also scope for pressure to be exerted by civil society, IOCs and the international 
community in order to push for a greater capacity that will allow transparency initiatives to 
take hold. In essence, capacity can be built and it is the lack of political will to embrace 
transparency that poses a more considerable test to Kenya’s adoption of effective 
transparency and, in turn, accountability. As shown by IOC reluctance to release PSCs 
without government consent, the government is the crucial player in any push for 
transparency. It has to lead the way and create an environment which is receptive to such a 
push and which enables effectiveness through appropriate accountability mechanisms. As 
Hicks (2015:2017) concluded following her study of the oil sectors in Ghana, Chad, Niger, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda and Kenya, the government’s stance is critical: 
what has been abundantly clear…is that it is ultimately governments that decide how 
far it is in their interests to implement the many transparency measures profiled in 
this book. Civil society–campaign groups, journalists, ordinary people and opposition 
voices–has an important role to play, but if leaders decide against a step on whatever 
grounds, protest is often powerless. 
 
 
5.2.2 Civil Society and the Public 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4.2.3, numerous civil society organisation are active in the Kenyan 
oil sector and many of these are involved in the push for greater transparency: these include 
Transparency International, Oxfam and the KCSPOG. Primarily acting in the interests of the 
Kenyan population, it is important to understand how these organisations interact with and 
best represent such public interest. Whether civil society organisations are thwarted by 
capacity constraints–that is by their ability and the ability of the public to effectively analyse 
and interpret the information released through transparency measures–is a relevant question, 
as is that which asks whether they and the public have the political and social freedoms to 
act, exert pressure and hold the government and IOCs accountable. Without such freedoms 
and the requisite capacity there is little chance that transparency initiatives will prove 
effective, for as concluded in Chapter 2.4, to be successful transparency requires effective 
accountability. 
 
5.2.2.1    Freedom of Expression 
 
In Kenya freedom of expression is protected by Article 33 of the constitution (Republic of 
Kenya, 2010). However, there are countless incidences which suggest that this freedom is not 
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always upheld. Perhaps the most well-known is the experience of John Githongo discussed in 
Chapter 3.5 and exposed to the world in Wrong’s (2010) ‘It’s Our Turn to Eat’. More 
recently, a number of Kenyan NGOs including the Kenya Human Rights Commission were 
deregistered, allegedly due to their intention to challenge Kenyatta’s election victory in 
August (Cerono & Mwere, 2017). Whilst this suggests that civil society organisations and 
their representatives may not feel that they have full freedom to operate, the reality is not as 
clear-cut. In his interview for this research Wanguhu (2017) said that he currently feels 
comfortable and free to conduct activities for the KCSPOG–whether with government 
representatives or the media–but that the Kenyan government’s action against these NGOs is 
a warning to other organisations working in the sector: “In effect it is a threat that if we can 
close them we can close you. While we may feel free to conduct activities now the freedom is 
not unlimited or indefinite. The basic premise is that we fall foul of the powers that be then 
we are also a target.” It therefore appears that most civil society organisations operate on a 
day-to-day basis with relative freedom in Kenya, but that there is an underlying threat that 
this may not always be the case.  
 
It is also difficult to ascertain whether the necessary freedoms are afforded to individuals who 
are not high-profile, who are not attached to registered civil society organisations or 
international NGOs or who are members of the press. Freedom House (2017) declares Kenya 
as only ‘partly free’ and concludes that the press is not fully-free, with scores for political and 
civil liberties also poor. In line with the discussion in Chapter 3, it concludes that Kenya’s 
“political rights and civil liberties are seriously undermined by pervasive corruption and 
cronyism, police brutality, and ethnic rivalries that are exploited by political leaders 
(Freedom House, 2017).” In a pre-election study earlier this year, Human Rights Watch 
(2017) also recorded many threats to free expression and it surmised that these had increased 
since Kenyatta came to power in 2013. Its findings suggest that the media is particularly at 
risk from censorship: “The government has attempted to obstruct critical journalists with 
legal, administrative, and informal measures, including threats, intimidation, harassment, 
online and phone surveillance, and in some cases, physical assaults (Human Rights Watch, 
2017).” Whether these restrictions are applicable to expressions relating specifically to 
Kenya’s oil sector is hard to determine given the very nature of the censorship, however any 
push for transparency in a state which suffers such censorship is likely to be stunted.  
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In his interview Wanguhu (2017) also explained that the KCSPOG’s activities are often 
restricted in their scope simply by the lack of information that is available to it (Wanguhu, 
2017). He gave the example of having to use the PSC from Block 10BA in a recent analysis 
of projected revenues from Kenyan blocks rather than the PSC for Tullow’s Block 10BB as 
the latter PSC is not publicly available. Given that Block 10BB is where commercial 
production is due to start, access to the specific information for this block is critical for any 
projected revenue analysis; Block 10BB is simply an adjacent block and in Wanguhu’s 
(2017) opinion it is difficult to overstate the importance of having access to all PSCs in order 
to permit civil society organisations to conduct an accurate and meaningful analysis. Indeed, 
the reality of the oil sector is that PSCs are heavily negotiated, commercial documents and 
access to a model PSC or one for another block is far from comparable with having access to 
the final, signed PSCs under analysis. It further ties in with the theory discussed in Chapter 
2.5.3 whereby the form of information disclosed should be uniform. In this instance, all IOCs 
should ideally be required to release the same information in the form of their PSCs. This 
lack of contract transparency has pushed the KCSPOG to running its new ‘Hidden Contracts’ 
campaign (KCSPOG, 2017) to increase pressure on the government and IOCs to release the 
PSCs. However, Wanguhu (2017) also mentioned that the KCSPOG is considering tackling 
the issue through legal means to try and force the release of contracts. It thus seems that 
although civil society organisations do not suffer from a lack of freedom to express views, 
they are ironically being hampered in their pursuit of further transparency by the current 
opacity of the sector.  
 
5.2.2.2    Capacity for Analysis and Interpretation 
 
Civil society organisations can be granted all the required freedoms to disseminate 
information and exert pressure for accountability, but effective transparency requires a civil 
society–and public–that can correctly and meaningfully interpret and analyse the information 
it receives. As noted in Chapter 2.1.1, the complexity of the oil sector lends itself to creating 
an environment where bribery and corruption can thrive. Breaking down the barriers caused 
by this complexity can thus help to achieve accountability: the greater the capacity for 
understanding and analysis, the less likely it is that corrupt acts can be hidden behind the veil 
of complexity. 
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Kenya’s active civil society organisations are well-organised, well-established and extremely 
capable at producing and disseminating clear and meaningful briefs on aspects of the oil 
sector. This is demonstrated by the number of excellent, detailed and accessible publications 
they produce, most noteworthy of which are those produced by the KCSPOG and its partners. 
For more day-to-day information, Oil News Kenya has a regularly-updated website and 
Twitter feed which permit easy and simple public access to sector developments (Oil News 
Kenya, 2017; Twitter, 2017). However, the ability of the public to access, interpret and 
understand the information produced is another matter. Kenya’s adult literacy rate for the 
years 2008-2012 was 72.2 per cent. (UNICEF, 2017), which is relatively high compared to 
the rate in many of its neighbouring states. Nevertheless, understanding the complexities of 
the oil sector is likely to be a significant challenge for most of the population. To the 
untrained or inexperienced eye, the meanings of terms such as ‘cost recovery’, ‘recoverable 
reserves’, ‘participation interests’ and ‘relinquishment’ that litter oil contracts are almost 
indecipherable and this heightens the pressure on civil society organisations to present and 
distribute released information in an accessible and understandable format. The KCSPOG for 
one is aware of such responsibility, and in his interview Wanguhu (2017) cited the example 
of explaining the complexities of cost recovery to the public: whilst a release of PSCs or IOC 
expenditure and payment details might suggest that an IOC is spending a certain amount of 
money in Kenya, Wanguhu noted the importance of explaining to the public that this amount 
is significantly reduced by the operation of cost recovery mechanisms. Once again this 
demonstrates the need to ensure that the public has access to information, but also that the 
information must be accurate. Civil society organisations thus play a fundamental role in 
interpreting, analysing and disseminating information and, as Wanguhu (2017) notes, it is 
these actions that ‘start the conversations’ which in turn can help push for accountability. 
 
Communication with local communities, particularly where upstream activity is conducted, is 
also crucial. Preventing a disconnect between the provision of information and its use is 
necessary to ensure public expectations are managed accurately and that they are realistic. 
For example, in their recent study Johannes, Zulu and Kalipeni (2014:161) examined the 
potential impact of the discovery of oil in Turkana and warned that their interviews with local 
residents  
revealed a predominant local fear that the oil discovery would worsen their social and 
economic marginalisation. Emerging evidence, including exclusion of local 
communities in oil-related decision-making, land grabbing by outsiders at the 
expense of locals, corruption, and incipient interethnic conflicts over discovered oil-
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field territories in Turkana County indicates increased vulnerabilities, risks, and 
perverse opportunities which suggest a high likelihood that oil will exacerbate 
interethnic conflicts in an already volatile region and even result in full-blown violent 
conflicts between the already marginalised Turkana and the government, national, 
and foreign investors such as Tullow Oil, unless effective preventive and corrective 
actions are taken early. 
 
Transparency can undoubtedly help to ease such a disconnect, provided the correct 
information is provided to locals in a form they can understand and query. A prime example 
is the expectation of Tullow providing locals in Turkana with jobs. As Johannes et al. 
(2014:153) note, this expectation is justifiable but “overpromising and under-delivering is a 
major risk that could lead to more disaffection with the oil industry among the Turkana.” 
Their interviews “revealed that several Turkana residents had already been promised high 
level positions in local Tullow Oil operations, only to be offered menial jobs, including as 
road marshals–positions which paid less than 500 Kenyan shillings (US$6) per day (Johannes 
et al., 2014:153).” Local frustrations have emerged, with local media reporting in June that 
various Tullow assets, including wells, were seized or blocked by activists (Lewis, 2017). In 
another specific study on the impact of oil discoveries in Turkana, Agade (2014:504) 
concludes that expectations must be realistically managed and that efforts to date by various 
actors, including civil society, have helped to improve basic understanding. Both Agade 
(2014:511) and Johannes et al. (2014:161) ultimately warn that the need for effective 
communication and transparency is exacerbated by the heightened risk of conflict in the 
county. In order to minimise this risk it is thus critical that locals have the capacity to both 
access and understand information provided to them, yet in a region where poverty dominates 
and educational opportunities are limited, this is a significant challenge.  
  
5.2.2.3    Summary 
 
There is an important recognition in Kenya that the population must be able to understand the 
oil sector in order to engage in the conversation about its future, something that is 
fundamental if improved transparency is to have a positive effect on the sector and help to 
avoid–or lessen–the impact of the resource curse. Similar to Collier’s advocacy of having an 
impartial ‘broker’ in charge of natural resource revenues (see Chapter 2.4.2), an active and 
capable civil society is necessary to act as the ‘middle man’. This will help to ensure that the 
correct information is being released and that it is being analysed, used and distributed 
effectively in order to prevent negative effects arising from disinformation, including in 
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particular the management of local community expectation in terms of jobs, revenues and 
opportunities. In sum, Kenyan civil society organisations have a critical role to play in both 
the push for further transparency in the oil sector and for ensuring its effectiveness through 
accountability. Whilst these organisations are active and, seemingly, are at present relatively 
unhindered in their activities concerning the oil sector, they are nonetheless indirectly 
hindered by the current lack of transparency and are therefore unable to be as effective as 
they wish in pushing for accountability. Somewhat of a ‘chicken and egg’ situation, this 
would suggest that pressure also needs to be exerted from other areas and that civil society 
must act in concert with the government, the international community and IOCs. 
 
5.2.3 IOCs 
 
IOCs operating in Kenya undoubtedly play a key role in the push for greater transparency. 
Not only do they produce or have access to the bulk of the information that proponents of 
transparency wish to see made public (including PSCs, payments to government, expenditure 
details, reserve details and operational information), they have a unique position in that they 
can exert significant pressure on the government. Without the IOCs, the industry would grind 
to a halt: their expertise and financial reserves are critical for the operation of the sector. This 
is particularly the case for the major IOCs operating in Kenya who are household names and 
some of the largest, most powerful companies in the world. Nonetheless, promising rhetoric 
which hints at a desire to increase transparency has thus far seen little gain in reality and 
IOCs are consistently hiding behind their concerns for commercial confidentiality and fears 
of government reproach. 
 
5.2.3.1    Promising Rhetoric, Contradictory Actions 
 
As operator of the first block in Kenya to have discovered commercial quantities of crude, 
Tullow has a relatively unique position in the Kenyan oil sector and is therefore in a position 
of influence. It also has a reputation as being a company at the forefront of pushes for further 
transparency: for example, it was the first oil company to disclose its payments to 
governments across the world with project-by-project detail (albeit largely in aggregated 
country-by-country format) (Burgis, 2014). It bolsters this reputation with its own statements: 
“At Tullow, we are committed to being transparent about our payments to government as we 
believe this enables communities, citizens and governments to have a constructive debate on 
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the sustainable management of oil revenues (Tullow, 2017d).” It is true that Tullow has 
released a significant amount of information about its payments to the Kenyan government, 
as discussed in Chapter 5.1.3. However, it remains the case that Tullow has failed to make its 
Kenyan PSCs publicly-available, something it has done for many of its PSCs from other 
jurisdictions (including in Uganda). 
 
Canadian-registered Africa Oil is a joint venture partner of Tullow’s in Blocks 10BB and 13T 
where commercial discoveries have been made in Kenya. Like Tullow, it has also identified 
itself as an advocate of transparency and has expressed a desire to release its PSCs. However, 
despite its listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange and the precedent set by other Canadian 
companies, it has failed to do so. Research by the KCSPOG (2016:6) highlighted this 
disjuncture: 
disclosure obligations there [in Canada] require companies to provide to their 
investors all contracts “so significant that the reporting issuer’s business depends on 
the continuance of the contract,” though crucially there are some exemptions. 
Canadian oil companies routinely disclose production sharing contracts as a result of 
this provision, but Africa Oil has not.  
 
 
Furthermore, the KCSPOG suggest that Africa Oil is failing to adhere to International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) requirements. According to the KCSPOG (2016:6), in 2015 
Africa Oil received US$50 million from the IFC “specifically to support the further 
investment in Blocks 10BB and 13T in Kenya. As a matter of policy, the IFC calls on their 
clients to disclose ‘the terms and conditions agreed with host governments under which a 
resource is being developed’.” Yet these PSCs remain hidden from public view. Interestingly, 
in his interview Wanguhu (2017) mentioned a surprising ‘error’ on the IFC’s website: its 
‘contract disclosure’ page states that “IFC Extractive Industry clients commit to being 
transparent about the terms and conditions agreed with host governments under which a 
resource is being developed” and goes on to provide a list detailing its clients and containing 
hyper-links to the relevant ‘terms and conditions’ (IFC, 2017). However, whilst some of the 
other hyper-links lead to investment agreements or operational details about the respective 
client’s assets, the Africa Oil link leads simply to the draft Upstream Bill (IFC, 2017). This 
permits two, alternative assumptions: firstly, Africa Oil itself does not want to release the 
PSCs. This would seem plausible for, if it really wanted to release the PSC, Africa Oil could 
justifiably use the reasoning that the IFC requires–and its stock exchange rules recommend–
PSC release when asking the government for consent to disclose the document. The second, 
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alternative assumption is that the government is reluctant to consent to the release of the PSC 
and is refusing to be influenced by IFC or foreign pressure. Either way, what is clear is that 
PSC release in Kenya is still a contentious issue that needs to be resolved to allow 
transparency initiatives to progress. 
 
5.2.3.2    Consent and Commercial Confidentiality 
 
Practically, it is very difficult to definitively ascertain why IOCs like Africa Oil and Tullow 
have not released their PSCs in Kenya, nor why ownership, operational and revenue 
transparency is still hindered. As discussed in Chapter 5.2.1, it could be because the 
government is simply opposed to such steps towards greater transparency. IOCs are unlikely 
to act if their actions are likely to incur the wrath of the government–the case of BP in 
Angola, as detailed in Chapter 2.5.1, is a reminder that the government is ultimately in 
control of the IOCs’ operations and could, if it so wished, significantly hamper or restrict 
them. This desire to avoid going against the government’s wishes does appear to be relevant 
to Kenya as Wanguhu (2017) noted that the common response he receives from IOCs when 
asking them to release information or PSCs is that the government needs to and has not given 
its consent. Ultimately, most IOCs will be acutely aware that it is not worth ‘rocking the 
boat’ and risking their operations unless they have a lot to lose (or gain) from doing so. 
Perhaps the reality is that pushing for greater transparency is not a risk they are willing to 
take.  
 
This is not to say that all IOCs are happy for information regarding their operations or assets 
to be made publicly-available. As the theory explored in Chapter 2.3 suggests, many 
opponents of transparency initiatives cite confidentiality of commercially sensitive 
information as a justifiable explanation for why certain information must remain undisclosed. 
In an interview for this research, a London-based partner at an international law firm who has 
over 15 years’ experience advising clients on oil and gas matters noted the importance of 
confidentiality to many IOCs: 
Activities and, in particular, the content of contracts that corporate entities have with 
counterparties and governments, include commercially sensitive material. This 
includes the nature of operations that companies agree to carry out, the nature of 
production and other bonuses that they agree to pay, and profit splits. Transparency 
over these items could have a negative impact on a company’s ability to be 
competitive. It could also have a negative impact for the state as it will be under 
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pressure from international investors to always offer the best terms that have been 
disclosed (Interviewee (anonymous), 2017). 
 
He surmised that whilst transparency will undoubtedly help to decrease the incidence of 
bribery and corruption, “this needs to be balanced against the need for companies to be able 
to attract investment and to maintain a competitive advantage (Interviewee (anonymous), 
2017).” 
 
In addition, he suggested that there is a substantial internal administrative burden involved in 
ensuring compliance with transparency measures and that this results in additional costs and 
therefore lower profits for IOCs (Interviewee (anonymous), 2017). Indeed, he argued that this 
has a great impact on smaller companies as it can reduce their ability to attract much-needed 
investment (Interviewee (anonymous), 2017). There is a commonly-held industry view that 
confidentiality clauses in contracts are therefore legally critical to protect commercial 
information and thus to protect the IOCs, particularly those operating in frontier 
jurisdictions–like Kenya–or those who are taking significant commercial risks: 
Companies (and states) are unlikely to be prepared for their commercial information 
to be disclosed to competitors. Absence of that confidentiality may impact investment 
decisions. This is particularly the case in less developed jurisdictions where a sector, 
such as oil and gas, is in its infancy–early-movers are likely to seek greater 
concessions from the state [and these concessions] should be rightfully resisted by the 
state for investors that move once the industry is flourishing (Interviewee 
(anonymous), 2017). 
 
This supports the theory raised in Chapter 2.3.4 that IOCs are particularly concerned with 
triggering a ‘race to the bottom’ by releasing confidential information. Given that Kenya is 
considered a frontier and relatively high-risk jurisdiction due to its limited number of 
commercial discoveries and lack of production, it is likely that many of the IOCs operating 
there are of the view that their commercial terms should be left as a matter for bilateral 
negotiation between themselves and the government. 
 
Further, the majority of the IOCs operating in Kenya are unlikely to be considered 
‘household names’ in many other states across the world; most of them are smaller, 
independent IOCs (see Table 4.3 for a summary of the IOCs currently operating in Kenya). 
For example, the most well-recognised names would likely be Total S.A. and BG Group, as 
well as perhaps Eni S.p.A., Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and Tullow. The point is that 
there is a theory (see Chapter 2.5.1) to suggest smaller, less well-known IOCs are more prone 
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to opacity than those which have a greater reputational risk due to their household branding: 
there is less pressure for them to push for transparency as there is less of a commercial need 
to do so. Additionally, in his interview the legal partner cast doubt on the validity of the 
theories discussed in Chapter 2.5.1 which maintain that a lack of transparency in a 
jurisdiction hampers inwards investment: “Investors seek certainty. Good governance, 
democratic rule and accountability are all matters that investors consider, but if a jurisdiction 
can provide a stable investment environment and access to hydrocarbons, then most will 
invest, even in the absence of those things (Interviewee (anonymous), 2017).” 
 
Nevertheless, these barriers can be overcome. There are benefits to IOCs who operate in a 
transparent manner and in a transparent jurisdiction. Not only does it provide comfort to 
investors in relation to their own compliance obligations, but it “may serve to simplify 
dealings with ministries and other state entities in some jurisdictions if there is a developed 
‘template’ and precedent bank,” particularly as “many projects in developing nations are 
slowed due to the inexperience of the government employees involved (Interviewee 
(anonymous), 2017).” If a majority of the IOCs operating in Kenya were to reach a consensus 
and push for greater transparency, the rest would be made to follow. This is not beyond the 
realms of possibility: Tullow is a major proponent of increasing transparency and is the key 
IOC in Kenya, thus putting it in a natural leadership position. Given that the vast majority of 
the IOCs in Kenya are registered (or have parent companies registered) in western 
jurisdictions as opposed to the more secrecy-prone jurisdictions of China, India and Russia, 
there is the potential for a concerted effort to be made from the IOC perspective to pressure 
the government into converting its rhetorical support for transparency into practical support. 
 
5.2.3.3    Summary 
 
Chapter 5.1 revealed that the Kenyan oil sector is relatively opaque, with IOCs largely 
responsible for what information has, to date, been made publicly-available. Although these 
IOCs have less of a role to play in ensuring transparency could lead to effective 
accountability, they do have a key role to play in the initial implementation of transparency 
initiatives and norms in the sector. However, their ability to push for further transparency is 
currently constrained by the will of the Kenyan government. Whilst fears over competition 
and a lack of pressure exerted by reputational concerns might cause some IOCs to be 
disinclined to release commercial information, government requirements and precedent could 
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force this to happen. With support from key players like Tullow and Africa Oil, IOCs 
supporting increased transparency do have the potential to push the government into action. 
A change in incentives is required. The recent takeover of Maersk Oil’s Kenyan assets by 
Total S.A. will cement the latter as a major player in the Kenyan oil sector and therefore 
offers promise that it could help pressure the government to push for transparency, however 
this is simply speculation. Ultimately, it remains the case that IOCs will ‘pick their battles’ 
with the government and whether transparency becomes the focus of one of these battles 
remains to be seen. 
 
5.2.4 The International Community 
 
A final set of barriers stand in the way of the implementation of effective transparency and 
accountability measures in Kenya: the inherent weakness of current international initiatives 
such as the EITI, PWYP and the NRGI. The weaknesses of these initiatives, including their 
voluntary nature and the lack of sanctions available for non-compliance, were discussed in 
Chapter 2.5. These are, however, shortcomings in the initiatives more generally and they are 
not specific to the case of Kenya. Indeed, the most relevant point is that Kenya appears to be 
paying them little heed and their impact on the Kenyan oil sector is, consequently, limited. 
Wanguhu (2017) confirmed this in his interview and stated that there is little support in 
government for the EITI, despite Kenyatta’s public statements to the contrary and the 
contents of the current Medium Tern Plan. Unless and until the nature of international 
initiatives changes such that it puts significant pressure on and incentivises all states to 
comply, there is little chance that they will greatly impact on Kenya’s oil sector. 
 
That said, where the international community can have a great impact is in the form of 
foreign laws and regulations which capture the activities of IOCs with assets in Kenya. For 
example, in Chapter 4.2.4 and Chapter 4.4 it was explained that foreign stock exchange and 
regulatory rules can require that listed entities and their subsidiaries comply with certain 
disclosure requirements, and it is requirements such as these that are responsible for the 
public availability of the seven Kenyan PSCs analysed in Chapter 5.1. Foreign legislation 
undoubtedly also has an impact, with the legal partner stating the following in his interview: 
The promulgation of the [United Kingdom’s] Bribery Act [2010], and the increasing 
preparedness of the DOJ [United States Department of Justice] to prosecute or 
investigate companies with even a limited nexus to the United States under the FCPA 
[Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977], based on activities undertaken by companies 
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internationally has certainly had an impact over the past 5-10 years. My experience is 
that most oil and gas companies now take this form of compliance incredibly 
seriously and have put in place training and procedures to minimise bribery and 
corruption risks. Many now engage one or more compliance lawyers/officers to 
manage this part of the company’s business (Interviewee (anonymous), 2017). 
 
In essence, these foreign requirements and international initiatives can, cumulatively, help to 
pressure the Kenyan government and IOCs to embrace greater transparency. As Wanguhu 
(2017) succinctly notes, they are additional tools that can assist in the push for transparency. 
But not only can these tools help to see greater transparency measures put in place, they can 
also help to make non-compliance taboo and they can help ensure transparency is effective 
by promoting accountability. 
 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has shown that Kenya’s oil sector is still characterised by opacity despite 
progress in the form of the new constitution, the proposed Upstream Bill, the Petroleum 
Policy and positive rhetoric from key players including Tullow, Africa Oil and Kenyatta 
himself. Amongst other issues, access to PSCs is limited to those released due to foreign 
requirements, operational information is limited to that released by the IOCs, payments to the 
government are largely hidden and it is almost impossible to accurately determine the identity 
of block owners. The first step in achieving effective transparency in the Kenyan oil sector is 
therefore to see an increase in transparency itself, and to do this the government, civil society 
and IOCs must work together whilst adhering to pressures from the international community.  
 
The irony is that each of the actors who could help implement transparency measures in 
Kenya can also be responsible for the failure of such measures, either through a lack of will 
or through a lack of influence. It is fundamental that all of the actors work together with the 
same aim, but the key issue is the will and the capacity of the government. Even if IOCs 
succumb to pressure from civil society and the international community and thus wish to 
improve their transparency and that of the sector as a whole, it is highly unlikely they will 
take the practical steps required without the consent of the government. In this regard, 
perhaps the biggest barrier facing transparency is therefore that Kenya’s political culture 
traditionally lends itself to secrecy. With the prevalence of corruption, bribery and patronage 
in the political system it will be incredibly difficult for advocates of transparency to 
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incentivise those involved in that system to squander what is undoubtedly a new opportunity 
to profit. 
 
What is more, even if opacity is reduced and transparency measures are implemented, there is 
no guarantee that this transparency will be effective in reducing the effects of the resource 
curse. To be effective there must be accountability, and the same barriers standing in the way 
of implementing transparency can also severely inhibit its effectiveness through blocking 
accountability. Again, this is most notable in the form of government will. Nevertheless, it 
remains the case that Kenya is at a critical juncture. As Wanguhu (2017) concluded his 
interview he made an important point: Kenya must get things right now as it is not Nigeria or 
Angola–it does not have the scale of reserves that these states have and it is therefore 
restricted in its opportunity by the relatively short time frame it has to develop the reserves it 
does have. Kenyans must be given the opportunity to access relevant information, to analyse 
it and to synthesise it in order that the dialogue can begin amongst the population as to how 
best Kenya might develop its limited resources in a proper and cost-effective way. 
 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  126 
Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
 
With the aim of determining how best Kenya, a state with newly-discovered commercial 
quantities of oil, might best utilise its natural resources for sustained economic and human 
development, this study has examined a number of strands of resource curse theory. It has in 
particular focused on political aspects of the curse, including the prevalence of bribery, 
corruption and patronage in resource-rich states. It has further considered the theories which 
suggest that good governance–specifically increased transparency and accountability–can 
help a state to reduce the impact of these political effects of the curse by changing incentives 
and removing opportunity for corrupt actions. Following an exploration of Kenyan political 
culture and a summary of the formal structure of its oil sector, these theories were then 
applied to the case of Kenya. A number of significant findings were made. 
 
Firstly, this study has demonstrated that transparency in Kenya’s oil sector is currently very 
limited and that the reality does not match the rhetoric. Despite the government and certain 
IOCs outwardly proclaiming support for breaking down the opacity of the sector’s 
operations, much of the sector is still shrouded in secrecy. Furthermore, what transparency 
there is has largely resulted from external, and not Kenyan, requirements. A second key 
finding is that there is therefore scope for further transparency initiatives to take hold. In 
addition to the rhetoric, numerous reforms have been put in place and there are well-
developed plans in the form of the Upstream Bill and Petroleum Policy to restructure the 
sector for the better. Nevertheless, the third key finding suggests that there are substantial 
challenges to be overcome before the sector is likely to benefit from greater transparency. 
 
This third–and perhaps most important–finding is that for transparency to be effective it 
needs to be implemented correctly and supported by accountability, and that ultimately 
success is dependent on the will and incentives of the actors involved. This study identified 
four key actors as having the greatest formal influence and control over the implementation 
and effectiveness of transparency and accountability measures in Kenya’s oil sector: the 
government, civil society (including the Kenyan people), IOCs and the international 
community. Whilst it is true that each of these actors brings something unique to the table 
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and simultaneously has to work in concert with the others, it was found that the government 
is the party with the greatest influence. Its support and formal promotion of transparency 
initiatives paves the way for effective accountability. Civil society and international pressures 
certainly have an impact and are largely responsible for initiating and maintaining the 
conversation, yet without the government’s approval there is likely to be little traction. IOCs 
do have access to much of the information these initiatives seek to release, but they are 
unlikely to act in defiance of the government even if they do wish to release information. 
Indeed, if the government legislates and sets a precedent for further transparency, even the 
most reluctant IOC will be forced to comply as domestic, Kenyan requirements will be 
binding on all IOCs operating in the state. However, on the part of the Kenyan government 
there seems to be a serious lack of will to push for further transparency and this is largely due 
to the embedded political culture of secrecy, bribery, corruption and patronage. These 
informal influences work alongside the formal framework of the oil sector and are a key 
barrier to the implementation of effective transparency in Kenya. 
 
The rather pessimistic conclusion that can be drawn from these three key findings is that 
although theoretically it appears transparency might help Kenya to avoid some of the effects 
of the resource curse, there are too many who stand to lose from its promotion. There is a 
clear lack of political support and therefore will to embrace transparency initiatives, let alone 
to permit their effectiveness through accountability. The way transparency can foreseeably 
help Kenya beat the curse is if it is implemented through formal measures quickly and 
comprehensively by the government with the support of civil society and IOCs. Only then is 
there realistic hope that it can increase accountability and discourage bribery, corruption and 
patronage. 
 
6.2 Contribution of the Research 
 
Although this research has used Kenya as a case study it contributes more generally to wider 
resource curse literature through its analysis and application of theories relating to good 
governance, transparency and accountability. But by using the Kenyan case study it adds to a 
currently sparse body of academic research on Kenya’s oil sector and in particular it provides 
an in-depth look at Kenya’s support (or lack of support) for promoting further transparency. 
In this regard it hopefully stands to complement the work done to date by the KCSPOG and 
its partners. It has further shown what Kenya stands to achieve if it embraces transparency 
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and it has also drawn attention to what barriers need to be broken down. Finally, it has 
revealed that although international pressures are important for creating norms, domestic 
pressures and constraints are perhaps more important. This would suggest that future research 
should therefore concentrate on the effectiveness of national transparency initiatives rather 
than the current academic focus on transnational initiatives such as the EITI and PWYP. 
 
6.3 Limitations of the Research 
 
The scope of this research has been limited by a number of contextual and practical factors. 
Regarding the former, it is limited in that much of the current legislation of Kenya’s oil sector 
is going through a process of reform. Most notable is the proposed Upstream Bill which 
remains under consultation and has not yet been enacted. This context has therefore required 
the analysis herein to be based on existing legislation that is likely to be repealed in the near 
future, and draft legislation which may yet be tweaked; there is no guarantee as to what shape 
the legislation–a key element governing transparency requirements–will take. Related to this 
is the current political context. As noted above, politics and government feature heavily as an 
influence on transparency initiatives in Kenya, however whilst the tense and uncertain 
process of re-running the presidential election is ongoing it is particularly difficult to analyse 
the impact this is having on the oil sector. A further contextual limitation is simply the fact 
that Kenya has not yet reached commercial oil production: whilst the resource curse’s effects 
can show even before discoveries have been made, the most significant consequences are 
likely to emerge only once production is underway and more substantial revenues are flowing 
into Kenya’s economy. This study is by its very nature speculative in that it seeks to theorise 
how transparency might impact Kenya, however the true effectiveness of any transparency 
initiatives will only be realised when its oil sector is at a later stage of development.  
 
With regard to practical limiting factors, this study would have benefited from a number of 
in-country interviews with members of the public (particularly in Turkana County) as they 
would provide an interesting and valuable perspective on how transparent the sector currently 
is and how effective further transparency measures might be. Nevertheless, the costs and 
logistics involved in organising and conducting such interviews were restrictive. These 
restrictions also prevented interviews with government officials or representatives that would 
add another important perspective about transparency, particularly given the prominence 
ascribed to the Kenyan government in this study. That said, perhaps the largest practical 
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limitation to this study is linked to the sensitivity of its subject matter. Whilst costs and 
logistics were restrictive, more significant were the difficulties encountered when contacting 
and receiving feedback from government officials and IOC representatives about 
participating in the study. Again, further interviews would have broadened the depth of 
evidentiary analysis in this study. 
 
6.4 Recommendations for Future Study 
 
This research has sought to analyse how transparency initiatives might hinder the effects of 
the resource curse, and in particular its negative political effects. The scope for further study 
of such a subject is vast given how many states across the world have significant reserves of 
natural resources and how varied their levels of adherence to transparency in their natural 
resource sectors are. However, Kenya was chosen as a case study in part due to the 
youthfulness of its oil sector: as noted in Chapter 1, this gives the study certain value as 
Kenya is still shaping its sector and thus has the capacity to be influenced. There is therefore 
just cause for future research to make Kenya its focus. 
 
A useful analysis would be one that digs deeper into the motivations of IOCs operating in 
Kenya. More specifically, to gain an insight into whether the current opacity of Kenya’s oil 
sector is caused more by a reluctance on the part of the government or of IOCs, such research 
could record the commercial views of each of the IOCs in Kenya (obtained by interviews 
with company insiders) and could use a quantitative analysis to examine how transparent 
these IOCs are in other jurisdictions. On a related note, it would be informative to conduct 
research on levels of environmental and local content transparency in Kenya (something that 
Wanguhu (2017) considers crucial). Although less relevant to studies concentrating on the 
resource curse, these are vital aspects in the push for greater transparency in the natural 
resource sector more generally and are often over-looked. A study focusing on how 
transparent IOCs are with regard to their environmental and local content obligations–and on 
what these obligations are under Kenyan law–would have great relevance for Kenya.  
 
Of further benefit would be a comparative study examining how Kenya’s transparency 
obligations and progress compares to other jurisdictions. A comparison with Uganda would 
be especially useful given the fact they are geographical neighbours, they share similar 
histories, their oil industries are at a similar stage and are relatively undeveloped, and because 
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a number of the key IOCs involved in these industries (including Tullow) are the same. That 
said, other states could be equally informative as comparative studies if chosen depending on 
their stage of production, level of reserves when compared to GDP, political cultures and 
perceived avoidance of the resource curse.  
 
Nevertheless, there is also scope for somewhat of a ‘sequel’ to this study. Conducting a 
similar analysis as presented above would be particularly informative upon conclusion of the 
latest presidential elections and enactment of the new legislation governing upstream 
activities in Kenya. As noted in Chapter 6.3, this present study has been restricted by its 
timing as the near-term future of the sector is in relative limbo; things are likely to change 
over the coming months and years. Revisiting and updating the analysis once current 
uncertainties have been removed would add an invaluable further perspective on whether 
Kenya is effectively tackling the threat of the resource curse through the tool of transparency. 
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